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ABSTRACT
The South African Presidency has played a significant part in championing the African
Renaissance vision. Elements of the vision attracting most attention are its supposed
recognition of the importance to continental revival of peace, stability and 'good
governance' (including respect for the rule oflaw and fundamental human rights).
The question is whether the vision is able to live up to the hope that it signals new
respect by the governors for the human rights of the governed. The fear has been
expressed that the continent's Renaissance is being crippled in its infancy by an
excessively cautious South African interpretation of the vision, particularly in regard to
human rights issues.
Ex-President Nelson Mandela has urged that, while governments should be mindful of
the high ideals of human rights, they should be conscious also of a democratic realism
that surrounds the issue. Neglect of human rights is the certain recipe for internal and
international disaster. Mandela has called for a "more comprehensive international
policy of 'democratic realism' to replace the traditional concept of 'realism'''. The
policy suggests the protection of diversity both within and between states.
Consequently, consideration is given to options for the promotion, deepening and
defence of 'democracy' as a reliable bulwark against the abuse of human rights.
Foremost among the options considered is armed humanitarian intervention, including
its possible purposes and effects and, particularly, the reliability and durability of its
outcomes.
John Stuart Mill's arguments are examined concerning the vital necessity of domestic
readiness to best utilise any assistance arising from external intervention. If Mill's
thesis is correct, then President Thabo Mbeki' s approach may be the most appropriate
in the circumstances.
Devising agreed policies on intervention in African countries where human rights
abuses are intensifying continues to face significant political resistance based on the
prioritisation of the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign
state. Mbeki clearly understands African leaders' caution regarding human rights
promotion and protection. National sovereignty is difficult to surrender in a world of
weak allies and strong competitors, which ensure continued state resistance to foreign
guidance on democracy and human rights.
South African foreign policy suggests a sober reckoning of the complexity and duration
of the task of turning around the continental ship. South African foreign policy, initially
idealistically seen as occupying the 'moral high ground' following the 'democratic
miracle' of 1994, is now more firmly rooted in a 'realist' understanding of the primary
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need for committed and dependable allies, and sensitive to allegations of hegemonic
aspirations. Mbeki, consequently, follows a non-confrontational consensus-building
process, ensuring that as many African leaders as possible 'buy in' to the vision and its
programme of implementation. He focuses instead on 'educating' and 'encouraging'
domestic populations to object to current experiences of forms of rights deprivation.
While time-consuming, it may at least produce a solidly grounded policy approach to
the amelioration of the continent's ills.
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OPSOMMING
Die Suid Afrikaanse Presidensie het'n noemenswaardige rol gespeel in die vekondiging
van die Afrika Renaissance denkbeeld. Elemente daarvan wat die meeste belangstelling
geskep het is sy vermeende besef van die gewigtigheid vir vastelandse herlewing van
vrede, stabiliteit en goeie staatsbestuur (insluitend respek vir regsoewereniteit en basiese
menseregte) .
Die vraag is of die denkbeeld die hoop kan naleef dat dit beteken nuwe respek van die
leiers vir die menseregte van hul inwoners. Die vrees is uitgespreek dat die vastelandse
Renaissance word in sy kindsheid vermink deur 'n buitensporige versigtige Suid
Afrikaanse vertolking van die denkbeeld, besonder in verband met menseregte.
Oud-president Nelson Mandela het aangespoor dat, terwyl regerings moet oplet vir
menseregte ideale, moet hulle ook bewus bly van 'n 'demokratiese realisme' dat
omsingel die kwessie. Verontagsaming van menseregte is die seker resep vir interne en
internasionale rampspoed. Mandela het om 'n meer omvattende internasionale beleid
geroep om die tradisonele konsep van 'realisme' to vervang. Dié beleid voorstel die
beskerming van ongelykheid beide binne en tussen state.
Gevolglik, opsies word oorweeg vir die promosie, versterking en beskerming van
'demokrasie' as 'n betroubare bolwerk teen die misbruik van menseregte. Voorste van
die opsies oorweeg is bewapende medemenslike ingryping, insluitend die moontlike
oogmerke en gevolge, veral die betroubaarheid en duursaamheid van sy uitwerkings.
John Stuart Mill se argumente is ondersoek rakende sy mening oor die deurslaggewende
noodsaaklikheid van binnelandse gereedheid om gebruik te maak van buitelandse
ingryping. As Mill korrek is, dan is President Thabo Mbeki se uitgangspunt dalk korrek.
Die ontwerp van ooreengekome beleide oor ingryping in Afrikalande waar menseregte
misbruik verskerp moet steeds erken sterk politiese weerstand gebaseer op die beginsel
van nie-ingryp in die interne sake van onafhanklike state. Mbeki verstaan goed Afrika-
leier se versigtigheid oor menseregte-promosie en -beskerming. Nasionale soewereniteit
is moeilik om oor te gee in 'n wêreld van swak bondgenote en sterk vyande, wat besorg
voortgaande staatsweerstand teenoor buitelandse 'leiding' oor demokrasie en menseregte.
Suid Afrika se buitelndse beleid dui op 'n verstandige berekening van die
ingewikkeldheid en duur van die taak om die skip om te draai. Suid Afrikaanse
buitelndse beleid, aanvanklik idealisties gesien as okkupeerder van die morele hoë grond
na 1994 se 'demokratiese wonderwerk', word nou beskou as meer stewig geworteld in 'n
'realistiese' verstand van die primêre behoefte aan getruoe bondgenote, en is uiters
sensitief aan bewerings van heerskappige ambisies.
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Gevolglik, volg Mbeki 'n nie-konfrontasie/konsensueel proses. Daarmee probeer hy om
seker te maak dat soveel as moontlik van sy medeleiers inkoop in tot die denkbeeld en
implementasie program. Hy fokus dus liewer op 'opvoeding' en aanmoedig interne
bevolkings om opstand in te neem teen hul eie ervarings van menseregte-misbruik.
Terwyl dit tyd eis, dalk mag dit 'n soliede beleid besorg.
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7CHAPTER ONE: THE RESEARCH PROBLEM
1.1 Introduction
The South African Presidency has played a significant part in developing and
championing the African Renaissance vision, and in rallying commitment for its
practical implementation. However, as with any new concept, the vision continues to
undergo change and refinement even as it attracts more attention - as well as supporters
and detractors. One consequence of the continuing change has been that the content of
the vision, initially the source of confusion by reason of its unfamiliarity, has now
become a subject of confusion because of its inspirational attraction to an inordinately
wide spectrum of interests.
As a mobilising tool, this vision seems to be stirring great interest among élites, if not
yet proving to be an inspiration to the ordinary inhabitants of the continent. But it is
precisely because its greatest potential value lies in the communication of hope to
ordinary folk and, hence, to their mobilisation (to whatever end), that the vision has
become the property mainly of those who claim to understand and represent 'the
masses'. Having become the private domain of so many different interests, the vision
may sometimes be discounted as a vehicle carrying irreconcilable passengers.
It might be justifiably claimed that, inherently biased as human beings are, we are
poorly equipped to produce an objective analysis of any vehicle of hope. But it is
precisely because the African continent is so widely perceived to be in a desperate need
of tangible hope that the African Renaissance vision can be and should be carefully
examined.
Some of the elements of the African Renaissance vision that have attracted most
attention are the recognition given by its proponents to the importance of peace,
stability and 'good governance' to continental revival. The latter phrase is generally
understood to cover a broad spectrum of values and standards in public affairs, ranging
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8from 'sound' economic management, through a commitment to eradicate corruption
from public administration, to institutional and daily respect for the rule of law and
fundamental human rights.
The question is whether the vision is able to live up to the widely expressed belief and
hope that it signals a new respect by the governors for the human rights of the
governed. The fear has been expressed that the African Renaissance is being crippled in
its infancy by an excessively cautious South African interpretation of the continental
vision, particularly in regard to human rights issues. The focus, then, of this study is to
explore various foreign policy options available to South Africa for the promotion and
protection of universal and fundamental human rights. This will include consideration
of certain forms of bilateral and multilateral diplomacy and, in particular, the
desirability and feasibility of armed humanitarian intervention m the affairs of
sovereign states in order to promote and the observance and protection of universal
fundamental human rights on the African continent. The central value of the human
person and human life will constitute the fundamental assumption underlying this
purpose.
An attempt will therefore be made to answer the following main questions:
1. What is the definition and content of the African Renaissance vision as understood
by, primarily, the Office of the President of the Republic of South Africa?
2. What goals and, hence, values, are implied by the concept and vision of the African
Renaissance as set out in relevant policy documents, public statements by policymakers
and the strategies contained in the Millennium Africa Plan ('MAP'); the Omega-New
Africa Initiative ('NA!'); and the New Partnership for African Development
('NEPAD')?
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93. Does the South African Presidency's espousal and practice of the vision of the
African Renaissance reflect a prioritisation of human rights norms and standards?
4. Is greater respect for international human rights norms necessary for the achievement
of the African Renaissance vision, as it is currently advocated?
5. In appropriate circumstances, is intervention and, particularly, armed humanitarian
intervention in the affairs of a sovereign state a foreign policy instrument that offers the
prospect of enhancing the promotion and protection of human rights on the African
continent, and/or advancing the cause of the African Renaissance?
The answers to these questions will form the basis of an appraisal of the vision of the
African Renaissance and its policy complement. The objective of this analysis will be
to establish whether the policies proposed by the vision are compatible with its core
values and, therefore, whether they are likely to promote the attainment of those values.
The study will require a close examination of South African foreign policymakers'
writings, speeches, statements and media releases, as well as media reports of these
events. Additional available background documentation consulted includes policy
papers and analyses of elements of the policy context and of policy implementation by
professional research institutes and other commentators.
1.2 Basic concepts and definitions
The predicament presenting itself for consideration and underlying the problem
statement is the poor quality of life of most of Africa's inhabitants. This poor quality of
life is characterised by personal insecurity, economic hardship, social disruption, and
declining standards of health and education. These problems are frequently said to arise
from ethnic, political, intellectual and religious intolerance, which often degenerate into
situations of chronic social, political and, in turn, military instability.
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The concept 'quality of life' has many elements, for human beings require many basic
needs to be met in order, first, to sustain life, and then to move beyond mere existence
to the enhancement of its quality. However, even the concept of 'basic needs' does not
enjoy a completely consensual content. The assertion that some agreed core set of
needs exists is confronted with the challenge of the diversity of human culture and,
within the framework of that concept, the additional variable of the uneven acceptance
of the notion and content of individuality. By defmition, moreover, individuality is only
with some difficulty capable of an irreducible core meaning - as is evidenced by the
myriad varieties of personal preference.
Inextricably linked to the debate around the meaning and content of 'individuality' is
the discussion concerning the appropriate place and role of the individual within the
context of various social groups. The present context is the study of human rights in
contemporary international relations. One is faced here with several possible broad
definitions of a social group, including clan, ethnic group, nation I state, region,
continent, and humanity in general, quite apart from the plethora of the sometimes
intersecting subsets of these categories.
Nevertheless, on the basis of the assumption that some agreement is possible
concerning the content of basic human needs, the possibility exists of exploring the
requirements for the satisfaction of that agreed core list of human needs. Proponents
and supporters of sometimes competing conceptions of human rights clearly have not
entirely resolved the matter of precisely which 'needs' form the basis of 'rights'. Thus,
we are faced with several coloured lists, or 'generations' of rights, viz. 'blue', 'red',
'green' and 'brown', all of which jostle for universal recognition as fundamental human
rights warranting equal attention and priority.
Some commentators have asserted that the satisfaction of all or some of these basic
human needs by the observance of these fundamental human rights will herald the
achievement of the goal of 'true civilisation'. By this is meant a generalised and more
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or less equitable enhancement of the quality of life of all of humankind, or 'global
justice,l. However, a vigorous debate has surrounded the relative priority that should or
should not be given to recognising, promoting and implementing the rights contained in
the several lists.
The aim here is not to engage in a detailed debate over whether or not 'universal
fundamental human rights' can exist, or over their content if indeed they do. Rather, it
will be argued that there is evidence of growing agreement on the core content of these
fundamental human rights, if not a steady and sustained process of recognition in
practice. While, therefore, it is accepted that the core content of 'universal fundamental
human rights' continues to rest on somewhat insecure foundations, the contribution
made by - even constitutive value of - their recognition to a healthy society is
increasingly accepted, at least by way of public statement and conduct within
multilateral fora.
Previously, the Cold War era was characterised by the almost unopposed acceptance of
a minimalist/reductionist realist perspective of the need, in a deadly dangerous and
potentially anarchic world, to focus, first and foremost, on the 'hard' security interests
of the state. These security interests of the state in the conditions of the Cold War
required strong alliances: a bipolar rigid bloc formation.
Some argue that the opportunities - and challenges and threats - of globalisation are
obliging states to retain a realist perspective. The struggle to avoid being irrevocably
'left behind' in the race towards economic growth implies a security dimension. Both
domestic stability and international security are dependant upon economic strength.
See, for example, Charles R Beitz 'Justice and international relations' in Charles R Beitz, Marshall
Cohen, Thomas Scanlon and A John Simmons (eds.) International Ethics Princeton University Press:
Princeton, N J, 1985,282-311
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The traditional realist theory of international relations emphasises the short-term needs
of the sovereign state as the primary bulwark against the constant, even imminent,
threat of anarchy. In so doing, it will be submitted, it fails to take account of or, at least,
de-prioritises the vital contribution of more long-term or 'soft' policy initiatives, such
as the legal protection of human rights, to the security of both the individual state and
of international society. Nevertheless, like the liberals and idealists, the neo-realist
approach does recognise that, for the 'nation-state' to survive, it must incorporate
certain elements of the liberal emphasis on multilateralism. Thus, for example,
temporary alliances are formalised in institutions, frequently on a regional or sub-
regional level. These institutions usually focus on economic interests and imperatives
that depend for their success on varying degrees of 'shared sovereignty' - a comforting
euphemism that has, thus far, proven ineffective in allaying fears of the reality of
surrendered sovereignty and power.
It is argued that Africa's current economic and developmental difficulties are caused, in
significant part, by the widespread, continued adherence by its leadership to the
narrower, state-centric aspects of classical realism and their consequent failure to
respect and observe the core content of universal fundamental human rights. This
argument is not advanced in order to deny thereby that significant shifts will have to be
made in the direction of 'justice', however defined, in the international arena outside
Africa, if the protection and observance within Africa of human rights is to have any
prospect of success. The argument is based, rather, on the view that institutionalised
domestic respect for human rights, i.e. in some form of democratic system, provides at
least one essential element of an environment conducive to stability, predictability and,
hence, individual and group diligence and prosperity.
If Africa wishes to stave off marginalisation, and to retain and renew the already
waning interest and commitment of sympathetic funders and commercial partners, it is
widely held that it must play its part by urgently paying attention to the long-term
attractiveness of its domestic markets to foreign investors. In the context of
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globalisation, these foreign sources of investment and development capital enjoy an
expanding range of competing choices for the location of their investment risk.
Similarly, therefore, the globalisation of human interaction has rendered domestic
respect for human rights a legitimate subject of international concern.
This study assumes that respect for human rights is an end in itself, if not on the
grounds of any agreed sacred origin and nature of the human creation, then at least on
the basis of universal human dignity. The study tries to show that it is, also, a necessary
prerequisite for development and its concomitant, the alleviation of poverty. It is argued
that it is in both South Africa's and the West's interest to encourage the practical
recognition of this among other 'truths' as the best and only way to ensure their own
social and economic stability and security.
It is increasingly understood that John Donne's observation that "No man is an Island,
entire of itself,2 is equally applicable to the states composing international society,
particularly in a scenario of rapid globalisation. It is, consequently, in their own self-
interest for relatively developed and prosperous states to ensure that they are not, in the
near future, surrounded by a sea of desperation seeking to flood into their relatively
stable and prosperous societies.
On the other hand, the slow, uneven, sporadic and, sometimes, shallow and
unconvincing growth of democracy on the African continent has been considered to be
a prime indicator of the poor prospects for the observance and protection of human
rishts in the short term. Similarly, the continued widespread absence of a generalised
climate of transparency, accountability and predictability is frequently advanced as an
explanation for erratic and circumscribed - even negative - economic growth in
African societies.
2 Devotions Meditation XVII, quoted in The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Quotations, Oxford
University Press: Oxford 1981 at 89
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And yet some have argued that reports of Africa's marginalisation are both inaccurate
and premature. On the contrary, it is being said, Africa's time has come. Indeed,
President Thabo Mbeki frequently describes the twenty-first century as 'The African
Century'. However, for Africa to 'succeed', it has been acknowledged that it must face
up to its challenges and take responsibility for setting about fmding solutions. It cannot
continue to rely solely on outsiders as either targets for blame or sources of pity and
assistance. Hence, the relevance of prospects of, particularly, regional economic,
political and military co-operation and intervention initiatives.
Consequently, consideration will be given to possible options for the promotion,
deepening, and defence of 'democracy', broadly defined, as a reliable bulwark against
the abuse of human rights. Foremost among the options to be considered will be that of
armed humanitarian intervention, including its possible purposes and effects and,
particularly, the reliability and durability of its outcomes. For, as John Milton has
observed in Paradise Los?:
'Who overcomes
By force, hath overcome but half his foe.'
Armed humanitarian intervention will be given this focus for a number of reasons.
Firstly, the very possibility of the use of various forms of intervention and the lowering
of sovereignty barriers/thresholds has enjoyed renewed academic and political interest
as a result of the passing of the bipolar Cold War and the acceleration of globalisation.
Second is the varying degree of military disengagement from Africa of Western
powers" such as France, the United States and Britain. France has played a particularly
significant and direct role in many conflicts in post-colonial Africa, primarily in
defence of client regimes in its ex-colonies. The United States, on the other hand,
provided mainly financial and military resources, rather than engage its own forces
3 Book i, 1.1 (1668 ed.) ibid at 168
4 See, generally, Jakkie Cilliers and Peggy Mason (eds.) Peace, Profit or Plunder: the privatisation of
security in war-torn African societies Institute for Security Studies: Pretoria 1999, especially at 1-80
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directly. The embarrassment of the Somalian experience was the exception that
reinforced the American reluctance to become directly involved in armed humanitarian
ventures.
Third is the failure by Africa to follow the international trend of any supposed post-
Cold War peace dividend, maintaining its unhappy record of widespread conflicts.
Fourth, the seemingly intractable fractiousness of populations within colonial
boundaries and under unrepresentative regimes has both contributed to and arisen from
human rights abuses and the persistence of underdevelopment, creating the scenario of
'failed states' requiring radical forms of assistance lest acute situations assume chronic
dimensions. In these circumstances, armed humanitarian intervention is increasingly
discussed as a possible tool of international political management, particularly where it
is deployed with apparent success outside the continent.
Intervention in the affairs of a 'sovereign' African country mayor may not support the
view that, despite Africa's many problems, the continent is unfairly being written off as
'hopeless'. Thus, intervention may, variously, reveal an analysis of the state as
irredeemably weak, or as worthy of a degree of assistance in order to bolster its
continued survival. Intervention may, after all, be undertaken as a result of a variety of
considerations, ranging from restoring hope, to temporarily delaying the inevitable tide
of anarchy, to securing a selfish advantage.
1.3 The inspiration of contextual urgency
The 1999 United Nations Human Development Report expressed grave concern at
growing inequalities, with economic factors dominating social and political outcornes''.
This representation of the global wealth structure was echoed by the Fancourt
Declaration on Globalisation and People-Centred Development, which emerged prior to
5 cited by Sikose Mji 'Preface' to P Mathoma, G Mills and J Stremlau (eds.) Putting People First:
African Priorities for the UN Millennium Assembly South African Institute of International Affairs:
Johannesburg 2000 at vii
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the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Durban in November 1999, and
which states", among other things:
'In today's world, no country is untouched by the forces of globalisation. Our destinies
are linked together as never before. The challenge is to seize the opportunities opened
up by globalisation while minimising its risks.
' ... The persistence of poverty and human deprivation diminishes us all. It also makes
global peace and security fragile ....
'If the poor and the vulnerable are to be at the centre of development, the process must
be participatory, in which they have a voice. We believe that the spread of democratic
freedom and good governance ... are key to the expansion of human capabilities, and to
the banishment of ignorance and prejudice. Recognising that good governance and
economic progress are directly linked, we affirm our comrnitment to the pursuit of
greater transparency, accountability, the rule of law and the elirnination of corruption in
all spheres of public life and in the private sector.
, ... Recognising that the full exploitation of the opportunities for developrnent created
by globalisation is not possible without security, political stability and peace[, w]e
cornrnit ourselves, in partnership with civil society, to prornote processes that help to
prevent or resolve conflicts in [a] peaceful rnanner, support rneasures that help to
stabilise post-conflict situations and cornbat terrorisrn of all kinds.
'Good governance requires inclusive and participatory processes at both national and
international levels... '.
It is subrnitted that if there is to be any change in the quality of life for the people of
Africa and elsewhere in the world, then people-centred developrnent rnust be the
primary focus of world leaders. One rnay observe this change in practice, for exarnple,
6 www.polity.org.za/govdocs/misc/tancourtdec.html(Date accessed: 07 June 2000)
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in the recent willingness to consider debt-relief, even if hedged about by (not entirely
unnecessary or unrealistic) conditionalities. One may also mention the new focus on
development, as opposed to simple, gross economic growth, and the awakening to
environmental dangers and their causes. A further instance is the emerging trend
towards the adoption of a transnational approach to what were, traditionally, primarily
matters for internal policing, such as the drug trade and small arms control.
The UN Report, echoed by the Fancourt Declaration, accordingly identifies certain core
principles or values that should be understood as integral to a people-centred
development strategy:
Ethics - greater respect for and observance of human rights standards;
Inclusion - greater incorporation of people and countries into the mainstream of global
priorities and activities;
Human security - greater societal stability and greater certainty, stability and refuge of
people; and
Development - greater equity in the relative distribution of wealth; less poverty and
deprivation.
This focus has arisen because of the extreme social, emotional and physical distress that
the inhabitants of the African continent have endured for so long and which many
continue to face on a daily basis. It is widely acknowledged that this dire situation has
developed at least in part because the African continent has not generally proven to be
an hospitable environment for the consistent observance of and respect for human
rights norms and standards, as reflected in the primary international instruments on the
subject. Nor has the continent generally provided a welcoming home for democratic
political systems, wherein these norms and standards are, historically, most effectively
established and protected.
Several reasons have been advanced for the unfortunate and disturbingly widespread
and ready tendency to disregard the human rights of Africa's residents. These
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explanations have included arguments variously based on the supposed undemocratic
nature of Africa's conservative, subservient (or, at least, quiescent) and irrational
superstitious cultures. Another explanation has been the uncritical and unelaborated
application to national governance of the persuasive but parochial values of group or
factional leadership", Another makes reference to a lack of fmancial and developed
human (as opposed to material) resources required to effectively manage a modem
democracy. This, in tum, raises issues of international economic justice; questions
concerning the serial impact, of slavery, colonialism and, later, of realist theories of
national strategic interest that held sway during the Cold War; as well as the lingering
debate over the universality or otherwise of human rights norms and standards.
Whatever the explanation, the widespread practice arose whereby African (and Third
World) states championed 'solidarity rights' - to the virtual exclusion of civil and
political rights. Thus, certain rights that had been identified as fundamental - if not
always practised - by the international community, while occasionally accorded some
recognition in international discourse by African states, were not respected internally
within their physical borders. During the post-independence decades, many African
governments, while professing to endorse human rights issues in multilateral fora,
ignored their civil and political manifestations in their internal and bilateral relations.
Robertson refers", for example, to "vehement Third World objections, not so much to
the very idea of human rights as to its elucidation in the UN Declaration and the twin
Covenants. These were said to embody 'Western' preconceptions of freedom at odds
with those in Asia and Africa ... ".
African governments argued that, by so doing, they protected pre-colonial human rights
regimes that were, supposedly, all-encompassing. This argument was fallacious. For,
while professing to be inspired by 'African practices' on human rights, they put in
7 John Stremlau 'Putting People First: Priorities for Africa and the UN Millenium Assembly' in
Mathoma et al. op. cit. 1-27 at 4-5
8 Geoffrey Robertson Q.e. Crimes Against Humanity: The Struggle for Global Justice Penguin:
London 2000 at xvi
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place instead regimes whose human rights practices did not incline them to external
scrutiny. Having agitated for independence on a broad human rights platform, post-
independence governments in Africa proceeded to put in place human rights policies
that were as bad, if not worse, than those of their colonial predecessors. This logically
led to many African governments adopting foreign policies devoid of any 'first
generation' human rights content.
Oji Umozurike offers the following description" of Africa, one decade after the new
independence movement heralded a new dawn:
' ... [A] negation of democracy .... [O]pposition parties, being prone to oppose on
every issue, became clogs in the wheels of progress .... [G]overning parties became
more intolerant, denied government resources and facilities to their opponents and
veered to the single party system. The line between public, party and private property
became blurred, as evidenced in the massive wealth of most long-reigning political
leaders - even as their countries wallowed in penury. As corruption became rife, the
misused resources were insufficient to support the expected rate of development' .
He then offers the explanation that the "political leaders were too familiar with, and
had suffered under, the dictatorship of the colonial powers, whereas they were
constitutionally expected to practice the democracy of the metropolitan states of which
they had a fleeting acquaintance as students, visitors or workers. They visited the
opposition parties with the repression they themselves had experienced."
Umozurike excuses the dictatorial viciousness that has characterised much of African
governance as a "malady" that "befell" an otherwise benign class of leaders. On the
other hand, his observation that the situation was "[at least] compounded by
inexperience, ineptitude and foreign manipulations to reintroduce colonialism in other
forms" seems intuitively more accurate. "Falling commodity prices, the increased cost
9 U Oji Umozurike The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights The Raoul Wallenberg
Institute/Martinus NijhoffPublishers: The Hague 1997 at 22
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of imported goods and technological backwardness were obstacles to the high
expectations of independence". Stremlau endorses'? the deficiency in resources
allocated by the West to 'political development' as one of the reasons for the failure of
independent African states to deal effectively with the broader challenge of
development.
Umozurike continues to describe how the military, "controlling the bulk of coercive
instruments", either took over or attempted to overthrow "virtually all" African
governments, "purportedly to cleanse the" perceived, alleged or actual corruption
within the "Augean stables". He asserts that they were initially enthusiastically received
as saviours by the populace but, in time, "fell" into the selfsame "errors" as their
civilian progenitors. "Used to issuing or receiving orders, the military oligarchies were
often more intolerant of opposition or of differing views" or "administrative styles" and
were "prepared to defend their 'shortcomings' with the arms entrusted to them for the
purpose of national defence against external threats. They became threats that had to be
placated, assuaged" or simply "bribed by the governments. The swords of the military
hung over the heads of the tax-payer, who paid the bills. The rule of law changed to the
rule of force and in some states some ethnic groups were marked out for systematic
decimation and marginalisation".
In the 1970s, at the height of the Cold War, respect for human rights on the African
continent reached its lowest ebb. Except in the case of Liberia, "the OAU!! maintained
an indifferent attitude to these breaches, relying on just one of its interdependent and
mutually-limiting principles - 'non-interference in the internal affairs of states" - to
absolve it of any obligation to in any way oppose the infringement of human rights
standards.
10 John Stremlau op. cit. at 4
Il Le. the Organisation of African Unity, in many instances controlled by client regimes of the
superpowers
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However, as Umozurike observes, "the domain of domestic jurisdiction does not cover
matters of treaty-law or customary [international] law". Already as of the immediate
post-colonial era, the domestic duty to observe and uphold the broad spectrum of
human rights had been firmly established under international law. Thus, Shyley
Kondowe has decried the misuse of 'state sovereignty' by African leaders and
governments as a deliberate tool "to sustain the oppression of their citizens,,12.
Particularly in view of the passing of the Cold War, the advent of globalisation and the
development of international governance, "it is futile", he argues, for states to continue
to insist on sovereignty as "a sole condition of statehood". He quotes South African
President Thabo Mbeki13 as stating that:
'the process of globalisation necessarily redefmes the concept and practice of national
sovereignty. The frontiers of sovereignty are being pushed back, especially as regards
the smaller countries of the world, such as our own'.
One is inclined, then, to endorse Umozurike's conclusion that it is "unconvincing that
preoccupation with development and national stability resulted in the neglect of human
rights. There could be no genuine development at the expense of human rights"!".
Indeed, Mary Robinson, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights,
emphasised the indivisibility of human rights when she called'" for equal concern for,
on the one hand, civil and political rights, and social, economic and cultural rights, on
the other. The economic and social citizenship of the African people needs to be
promoted simultaneously with the move towards the strengthening of democratic
practices.
12 'Sovereignty, Intervention and Democratisation in Small African States' in Mathoma et al., op. cit.
85-93 at 85
13 South African President Thabo Mbeki's address to the 54th Session of the United Nations, quoted in
Kondowe ibid at 86
14 K. Vasak and P. Alston (eds.) The International Dimensions of Human Rights 1982, Vol. 2, quoted in
Umozurike op.cit. at 23
15 M. Robinson 'Bread and ballots: Human rights aren't divisible' International Herald Tribune 9
December 1998, quoted in Shadrack B 0 Gutto 'The African State, Human Rights and Refugees' in
Mathoma et al., op. cit. 73-84 at 84
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If human rights are indeed indivisible, it is argued that, if Africa is to enhance its profile
internationally and if it is to succeed in having its development agenda considered, it
must re-evaluate its domestic policies and diplomacy with a view to giving a central
place to human rights issues. Despite repeated horrors, and despite Africa's belated
experiments with human rights, democracy and the rule of law, there are hopeful signs
that human rights observance is increasing rather than diminishing in Africa.
Similarly, democratic systems are the subject of increasing experimentation on the
African continent. This is so even though democracy is an imprecise and contentious
business wherever divisions of whatever nature run deep'" - an undeniable and
significant factor in the arbitrarily-drawn map that characterises multi-cultural and
multi-ethnic Africa 17.
Consequently, Abdoul Aziz M'Baye, writing on human rights and democratisation in
Africa", has noted that human rights, initially differently perceived by different human
groupings, have progressively evolved towards a common global understanding as
communication has increased and improved between previously isolated groups. He
defines human rights as referring to "the social equilibrium between groups, and
particularly to the balance between the collective requirement to secure the survival of
the group and the need of the individual to achieve its goals".
The purpose and priority of the state, within this context, is first to rationalise intra-
group interactions and, second, to ensure the preservation of the group itself. The
16 Roland Paris 'Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism' International Security Vol,
22 NO.2 (Fall 1997) 54-89 at 75-76, discusses how democratic elections, by encouraging political
activity, can be exploited by ambitious and unscrupulous politicians in deeply divided societies to
foster 'parochial exclusiveness ... at the expense of ... the broader public good'. This has led to
instability and consequent gross abuses of human rights in countries such as Angola, Sudan, Rwanda,
Bosnia, Sri Lanka and Ethiopia
17 I William Zartman 'Africa as a subordinate state system in international relations' International
Organisation Yol.21 No.3 1967,545-564, made the observation that Africa was a continent of 'state-
nations' , not nation-states. Cited in Mathoma et ai, op cit. at 5
18 Abdoul Aziz M'Baye 'Nations, States or Nation-states: Human Rights and Democratisation in
Africa' in Mathoma et al., op. cit. 'at 51-71
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purpose of the state is, accordingly, to balance these two imperatives. The concepts of
human rights and democracy provide the theoretical and practical framework for policy
formulation and implementation in meeting the challenge of ensuring this balance. In
this regard, it is worth recalling UN secretary-general Kofi Annan's description of
democracy as the best available conflict resolution mechanism, not necessarily because
of what it can do but because of what it can prevent'".
1.4 The current status of human rights
The concept of respect for others - the notion that there are certain things that we
should not do to one another, and that there are particular duties we owe to each other-
is common to all civilisations, although these core values have been defined differently
by different cultures throughout history. As Ken Booth has argued in his advocacy of
cosmopolitanism, or "sensitive universalism", that there needs to be a "dialogue
between universal values and local definitions", or interpretations'".
This commonality of values is accurately reflected in Harold Courlander's extensive
collection of oral literature, traditions, myths, legends, wisdom and sayings in A
Treasury of African Folklore21• His 'Introduction' observes that:
'The oral literature and traditions of African peoples communicate to us the scope and
nature of our common identity. We discover there, if we have not already surmised it,
how much we share - our views about good and evil; about what is pompous or vain
and what is moderate or immodest; and our standards defming the mutual
responsibilities of the group and the individual. . .. the similarities of outwardly
contrasting societies are more impressive than the differences/é. '
19 Greg Mills 'Global Realities and African Priorities: A View from South Africa' in Mathoma et al.,
ibid. 29-38 at 35, citing 'Freedom's journey: A survey of the 20th Century' The Economist 11
September 1999 at 7
20 Ken Booth 'Human wrongs and international relations' International Affairs Vol. 71 No.1 (1995)
103-126 at 119
21 Marlowe and Co.: New York, NY 1996
22 Courlander ibid. 1-2
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The changes that have taken place internationally since the fall of the Berlin Wall have
highlighted the acceptance by the international community that questions of human
rights, and the inherent dignity of the individual, must play a more important role in the
relations between states. Hitherto, such perspectives were relegated to the backwaters
of international discourse, with the result that some (including African) states professed
respect for such values publicly, but failed to respect them in practice. In a globalising
environment, however, it is becoming increasingly necessary to attempt a common
understanding of the content of these core values in order to avoid conflict and to
facilitate human interaction across particular borders.
The concept of 'human rights' has been identified as the shorthand expression of an
emerging global consensus on the identity of the core interests to be protected in order
to preserve peace and promote development. Adherence to accepted human rights
norms is gradually assuming what is submitted to be its rightful place as a virtual
precondition for admission into the global game.
Additionally, while respect for human rights is no automatic panacea, the correlation
between peace, development and human rights is increasingly accepted. Consequently,
the precise content of the notion of human rights and who is to defme that content have
become issues of utmost significance.
Understanding of the content of the concept is dynamic and undergoes continual
evolutionary, although not necessarily 'linear,23, development. Ancient societies had no
equivalent to the modem concept of a right that applies to all human beings equally,
inasmuch as, for example, slavery, male dominance and the reservation of rights for
citizens alone, were all recognised by the law at various times and in various places.
23 Robertson op. cit. xvi
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Ancient legal systems were frequently founded upon an understanding of what the deity
had ordained. Thus, for example, the Koran (Surah 4:34) recognised the right of men to
chastise women, and even the Old Testament, in Genesis 3:16, records God's
pronouncement that man shall 'rule over' woman. However, the New Testament
Christian message of the common ancestry of God, the equality of all humankind and
the ideal of love for all and service to all humanity, is essentially favourable for the idea
of human rights. There is no agreement on the sacred origin of the human creation.
Nevertheless, at least on the basis of universal human dignity, human rights norm
observance is a necessary prerequisite for global contact in areas of human interaction
as diverse as social, cultural, religious and economic.
1.5 The nature of human rights
Despite the growing appeal and status of the human rights idea, its content remains the
subject of extensive debate. The concept of human rights, like that of democracy, is
espoused by all the world's ideologies. However, as with the democratic idea, the
precise meaning of the expression 'human rights' continues to be elusive: there is no
commonly agreed defmition of that concept in political, philosophical, and legal
discourse". Intuitively, suggest Kibwana, Acheampong and Mwagiru, the word
'human' implies that the rights deemed human are those that pertain essentially to
human beings. This appears to be the import of definitions of human rights that hold
that "human rights are rights which all persons equally have simply because they are
human,,25.Although this assumption has the merit of simplicity, it does not settle the
controversy over the precise definition and content of human rights. This is because,
24 This is true of 'rights' generally: see J Waldron (ed.) 'Theories of Rights' Oxford University Press:
Oxford 1992, cited in Kivutha Kibwana, Kenneth A Acheampong and Makumi Mwagiru Human
Rights and Diplomacy in Africa: A Critical Perspective
www.ukc.ac.uklpolitics/publications/journals/kentpapers/kibwana.html
(Date accessed November 2000)
25 A Gerwith 'The Epistemology of Human Rights' in P Frankel, J Paul and F D Miller (eds.) Human
Rights Basil Blackwell: Oxford 1984 p.l; see also Gerwith Human Rights: Essays on Justification
and Applications Chicago University Press: Chicago 1982, cited in Kibwana et al., ibid
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rather than forming the root of all particular rights which human beings have, human
rights have generally always been deemed to be one species of these rights'",
To further compound matters, the word 'rights' itself has not enjoyed undisputed
defmition. Indeed, if there is any agreement at all in rights discourse, it is that rights
norms exhibit profound ambiguity. According to Hohfeld's analysis, the word 'right' is
an ambiguous term used to describe a variety of legal relationships". There is,
26 R Wasserstrom 'Rights, Human Rights and Racial Discrimination' in D Lyons (ed.) Rights
Wadsworth Publishing Co.: Belmont, Ca. 1979 at 48, cited inKibwana et al., ibid
27 N W Hohfeld Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning Yale University
Press: New Haven 1923, cited in Kibwana et al., ibid See also J W Harris Legal Philosophies
Butterworths: London 1980 at 76-86.
Sometimes it is used in the strict, positive sense of a right holder being entitled to claim something,
with a correlative duty in another. At other times it is used to indicate a privilege or liberty to do
something. On other occasions, the word 'right' stands for a passive immunity from having one's
legal status altered by another person's act, while it also refers to a power to alter legal rights and
duties.
In spite of all these terms having been identified as rights, each concept invokes different protections,
and produces different results. The problem is illustrated by the philosophical analysis of legal rights,
which has engendered various theories of rights, the most popular being the contract and the power
(or will) theories of rights. For a detailed discussion of these theories and others, see D D Raphael
Problems of Political Philosophy Macmillan: London, 1975, especially at 54-114; and J W Harris
ibid especially at 24-35 and 209-218.
The contract theory of rights sees rights as arising from a legally binding promise made by one
person to another, often for a reciprocal promise or commitment (i.e. consideration). The parties to
such a contract are said to owe obligations to each other by virtue of their mutual promises to do or to
refrain from doing specified acts. Their contractual undertakings can be legally enforced by either of
them. Hence, they are bound to perform their obligations.
The inadequacy of the contract theory of rights in determining which rights constitute 'human' rights
lies in the fact that rights universally acknowledged as human rights do not imply any contractual
relations in which parties (e.g. a state and its citizens) exchange mutual promises of action or
forbearance. It has been accurately observed that:
'The rights of the hungry to be fed, the rights of children to be educated, the right of a citizen to a fair
trial...all make no essential reference to a prior promise ...on the part of those with correlative
obligations[.] [T]hey may be claimed, asserted, upheld and in general understood without involving
the notion of contract in any way, yet they are just as much rights as the right of any promisee'. See T
Campbell The Left and Rights: A Conceptual Analysis of the Idea of Socialist Rights Routledge and
Kegan Paul: London 1983 at 115, cited in Kibwana et al., ibid
In contrast to the contract theory of rights, the power (or will) theory of rights deems one to have a
right when one is able to require another to act or to refrain from acting in a certain way, thereby
limiting that person's freedom of choice. This theory has a positivist outlook in that, in establishing
the existence of any right, all that needs to be done is to verify the relevant rules or laws by which one
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consequently, still nagging controversy over virtually every facet of the concept of
human rights. Thus, there is no agreement on such basic issues as the origin and
justification of human rights, their irrevocability or otherwise, their content and
priority, and whether only individuals, groups, or both, are the proper bearers of human
rights.
can impose an obligation on another, while that obligation can also be waived by the right holder.
The limitation facing the power/will theory is that human rights do not find expression only in rules.
The reason is that there exists also the possibility that such rules of law may be empty of moral
content, thereby failing to provide any effective protection for human dignity that is widely accepted
as the more appropriate basis of human rights.
The interest theory of rights has been proposed as an alternative to both the contract and the power
theories of rights. According to this theory, "[T]o have a right is to have an interest protected or
furthered by the existence or non-existence of a rule, law or understanding requiring action or
inaction in ways which are designed to have a bearing on the right-holder; obligations, under these
rules, are owed to the right holder because they are obligations to further or protect A's interests, this
being the essence of the right in question, rather than a secondary consequence of the fulfilment of
the obligation". See Campbell ibid. at 92. Locating rights in interests is not entirely Campbell's idea.
For another defence of the interest theory of rights, see D N MacCormick 'Rights in Legislation' in P
M S Hacker and J Raz (eds.) Law, Morality, and Society Clarendon Press: Oxford 1977 at 189-209,
cited in Kibwana et al., ibid
In Campbell's view, any objection to the view that all rights relate positively to what right-bearers are
interested in, on the ground that social and legal rights do not always have a direct impact on what
individuals are concerned about, is superficial. This is because such interests are 'dispositional' and
their protection gives individuals the right to have them when they choose to exercise them. He
further notes that the 'interested in' theory of rights could also be criticised for embodying the notion
that one's rights need not relate to one's welfare. Such an argument, he validly contends, is likely to
be made by those in societies in which self-directed individualistic interests are those most prized and
protected.
While these various theories may illustrate certain elements of the concept of human rights, they do
not themselves yield a substantive definition of human rights. For this reason, an attempt has been
made to determine what are human rights by ascertaining the demands or proposals made in the name
of human rights. The reason is that "theory construction is not the only way of providing
understanding, for we achieve some, perhaps sufficient, understanding of the notion of rights by
learning how to respond to the necessities it expresses". See B Gower 'Understanding Rights: An
Analysis of a Problem' in F E Dowrick (ed.) Human Rights: Problems, Perspectives and Texts Saxon
House: Westmead 1979 at 53, cited in Kibwana et al., ibid.
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CHAPTER TWO: THE NATURE OF HUMAN RIGHTS
PROTECTION
2.1 A history and classification of human rights
This persistent controversy notwithstanding, international conventions provide
examples of certain widely accepted approaches to human rights. One such approach
deems human rights to refer to individuals as well as groups. Group rights, as attested
to by the meaning of 'genocide' in the United Nations Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948), are of as legitimate concern as
individual rights and, in certain circumstances, individual rights can be secured through
group rights".
Secondly, although human rights must be possessed by all human beings, this is not the
same thing as endorsing the proposition that all human rights should be realised
contemporaneously in all societies. The general acceptance of the notion of the
progressive realisation of certain human rights, especially economic, social and cultural
rights, rules out such a proposition.
Thirdly, the concept of human rights encompasses various groups, or 'generations', of
rights. These are civil and political rights; economic, social and cultural rights; and
solidarity rights, that is, the right to development, the right to peace and security, and
the right to benefit from the common heritage of mankind, Le. the right to a clean and
healthy environment. This approach takes cognisance of the fact that specific historical
circumstances form the basis of all demands that are made in the name of human rights.
Civil and political rights take their roots from the eighteenth century struggles in
Europe and America to emancipate the individual from state oppression and secure for
him liberty from the arbitrariness of state action. The revolutions occasioned by these
28 See Article 11
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
30
struggles engendered the classic eighteenth century declarations: the Virginia
Declaration of Rights (1776), the Declaration of Independence of the United States
(1776), and the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen (1789) in France.
A number of these instruments constituted significant landmarks in Western political
development, and these, in turn, influenced the universal perspective of human rights.
For example, the English Magna Carta, which King John signed in 1215 at the
insistence of his barons, subordinated the King, as well as his subjects, to the law: The
former was obliged to engage with the latter within the four corners of the law. The
ambit of the Magna Carta was restricted to the clergy, the nobility and the bourgeoisie,
and held no benefits for the ordinary people. The charter was upheld by subsequent
kings and was extended and strengthened by the Petition of Rights of 1628 and the Bill
of Rights of 168929•
The language of the preamble to the American Declaration of Independence from
English colonialism employed a generous ecumenicism and was favourably disposed to
the idea of human rights - despite the subsequent hypocrisy that characterised the
continued acceptance of the practice of slavery. Thus, the founding fathers expressed
the belief, founded on an article of faith, that:
'We hold these Truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created equal, that they are
endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable Rights, that among these are Life,
Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness. That to secure these Rights, Governments are
instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the Consent of the Governed.
That wherever any form of Government becomes destructive of these Ends, it is the
Right of the People to alter or to abolish it and to institute new Governments, laying its
foundation on such Principles and organising its Powers in such Form, as to them seem
most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness'Ï'',
29 J Williamson The Evolution of England Oxford 1961 at 103, quoted in Umozurike op. cit. at 9
JO Umozurike ibid at 10
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The French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen of 1789 again proclaimed
universal principles applicable to all peoples. It declared the equality of all, the primacy
of the rights to liberty, property, security and resistance to oppression and the equality
of citizens, freedom of thought and of opinion, as well as their admission to honours,
public posts and employment on the basis of merit. Sovereignty was recognised as
properly residing in the nation and all authority to exercise it must be derived from the
people".
The foundation of Western, now increasingly universal, human rights, observes
Umozurike", was 'at first ethical and moral' and was later strengthened by the
introduction of political and then legal dimensions by philosophers such as Grotius,
Locke and Montesquieu.
Initially, human rights fell within the domestic jurisdiction of states'", The few
exceptions to this general rule included the treatment of foreigners and the controversial
right of humanitarian intervention in cases of gross violations of human rights, or
atrocities34• The progressive internationalisation of the protection of human rights
began with several landmark documents. These included the Wold War I peace
settlement; the peace treaties for the protection of the religions and languages of
minorities in Central and Eastern Europe; minimum labour standards under the
supervision of the International Labour Organisation; and the mandate system for the
31 Lord Acton Lectures on the French Revolution 1916, quoted in Umozurike ibid at 11
32 ibid at 9-10
33 ibid at 11
34 See, generally, John Stuart Mill 'A Few Words on Non-Intervention' in John M Robson (ed.) The
Collected Works of John Stuart Mill Vols. 1-33 University of Toronto Press: Toronto and London
1963-1991, cited in Georgios Varouxakis 'John Stuart Mill on Intervention and Non-Intervention'
Millennium: Journal of International Studies Vol. 26 No.1, 57-76. See, also Robertson Crimes
Against Humanity op. cit. 403-411, and Richard N Haass Intervention: The use of American military
force in the post-Cold War world Brookings Institution: Washington D.C. 1999 at 9-18
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colonies of the defeated powers that endeavoured to ensure accountability to, and the
public welfare of, the governed, as a trust to civilisatiorr".
Economic, social and cultural rights became part of human rights discourse after the
1917 socialist revolution in Russia, and were later adopted by the newly independent
states. That revolution proclaimed the Rights of the Oppressed and Toiling Workers
and Peasants. The socialist approach to human rights proceeds from the premise that
"social opportunities and rights are not inherent in the nature of man, and do not
constitute some sort of natural attributes". The reason is that "rights and freedoms of
individuals in any state are materially stipulated and depend on socio-economic,
political and other conditions of the development of society, its achievement and
progress't".
Nazi atrocities during World War II shocked the conscience of humankind and forced
the peoples of the world to seriously reconsider the legitimacy and adequacy of the
concept of domestic jurisdiction as it bore upon human rights. Human rights were,
consequently, enshrined in the UN Charter, albeit in general terms. They were,
however, soon elaborated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948. The
Declaration was initially not intended to be legally binding. Rather, it was to be "a
guiding light to all those who endeavoured to raise man's material standard of living
and spiritual condition ... a moral obligation on the different countries to find ways and
means of giving effect to the rights proclaimed therein?".
However, with its constant repetition, reaffrrmation and elaboration in subsequent
instruments, both universal and regional, as well as in national constitutions, the
35 See, for example, Stephen D Krasner 'Sovereignty, regimes and human rights' in Volker Rittberger
(ed.) Regime Theory and International Relations Clarendon Press: Oxford 1993, 139-167 at 159
36 V Katarshkin 'The Socialist Countries and Human Rights' in KVasak (ed.) The International
Dimension of Human Rights Greenwood PressIUNESCO: Westport, Connecticut and Paris 1982 at
631, cited in Kibwana et al.
37 UN Plenary Meeting, Official Records of third session, part I (1948), P 873, Netherlands delegate,
quoted in Umozurike op. cit. at Il
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essential principles have acquired the status of customary international law binding on
all states without their express consent".
Near universal acceptance exists that the concept of human rights includes the two
categories of rights contained in the Universal Declaration of Rights of 1948, viz. 'first
generation' rights or civil and political rights, and 'second generation' rights such as
social, economic and cultural rights. Increasing recognition attaches to 'third
generation' rights, such as environmental, group and developmental rights. These
'solidarity rights' emanate from the growing realisation that, particularly in a
'globalising' society, international co-operation is called for if states are to fulfil certain
human rights obligations. Hence, rights such as the right to peace and security and the
right to the equal enjoyment of the environment cannot be secured by states acting
individually. Africa has played an important role in including this latter set of group-
focused rights in the international agenda, particularly by reason of their incorporation
in the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights.
Thirdly, it is generally accepted that certain categories of human rights are not absolute,
and may be restricted in order to secure the comparable rights of others, and the
interests of the community at large'". Such limitations do not deny the worth or
existence of such rights, but underscore the fact that while these rights are not
extinguished, they may, in certain circumstances, be properly overridden or, at least,
temporarily constrained. It is in this light that the assertion is made that human rights
areprima facie rights and not absolute rights'",
38 See, generally, M Akehurst A Modern Introduction to International Law (5 ed.) George Allen and
Unwin: London 1984 23-42, especially 25-34; Christopher M Ryan 'Sovereignty, intervention and
the law: a tenuous relationship of competing principles' Millennium: Journal of International Studies
1997 Vol. 26 No.1, 77-100 at 89 and the authorities quoted there; and Robertson op. cit. 85-87, for
useful discussions of the concepts of opinio juris andjus cogens
39 See Joseph Raz 'Rights-Based Moralities' in J Waldron (ed.) Theories of Rights op.cit. at 182-200,
cited in Kibwana et al
40 An argument for a limited notion of absoluteness in the strongest sense, can be made without falling
foul of the view that human rights should be limited to enable all to enjoy such rights and in the
interest of the whole community. For example, the right that no one shall be subjected to torture or to
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment can be held to be such an absolute right. This is
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Finally, the concept of human rights contains the demands that are made on the basis of
societal values, and focuses on the morally appropriate way of treating human beings
either in their individual capacities or as members of social groups. In this conception,
human rights are accorded to individuals or groups in order that they can realise their
self worth and dignity, and to organise society in such a way that these goals are
effectuated and respected.
2.2 Three generations of human rights
The development and elaboration of international human rights norms fits into a
conceptual framework that recognises their development in three simultaneously
interpenetrating and interconnected stages. International human rights law"
consequently recognises the emergence, in turn, of three generations of human rights'".
First generation human rights ('blue') are based on the eighteenth century conceptions
of libertarian rights, and reflect natural law ideas. These are negative rights, to the
extent that they provide protection against the encroachment by government on
individual rights. First generation human rights provide for civil and political liberties.
Not only did they inspire seminal international human rights instruments such as the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), but also the International Covenant of
Civil and Political Rights (1966), and are expressed in many national constitutions.
Municipal institutions and courts have a primary role to play in the promotion of first
generation human rights, since they may clarify their content, or create evidence of
because there is no morality, public welfare or general good that any limitation of this right could be
held to protect in any society. It is for this reason that Article 2(2) of the Convention Against Torture
and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1984) provides that 'No
exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal political
instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as justification of torture' .
41 In political terms, this approach is loosely characterised as the 'three worlds' of human rights. The
western (First World) approach emphasises civil and political rights; the socialist (Second World)
approach emphasises economic and social rights, while the Third World approach emphasises self-
determination and development rights. See Jack Donnelly International Human Rights Westview
Press: Boulder Co. 1993 at 35, cited in Kibwana et al.; see also the cautionary words of Robertson op.
cit. at 80-82
42 See for example, D H Ott Public International Law in the Modern World Pitman Publishing: London
1987 at 238-238, cited in Kibwana et al.
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state practice, thus aiding in the development of these rights into customary
international law.
Second generation human rights ('red') evolved in an effort to temper and balance the
highly individualistic character of first generation rights. For this reason, second
generation human rights display a highly social orientation. They usually require
affirmative action: state intervention is considered necessary for their fulfilment.
In Africa (and generally in countries that were formally colonised), the development of
second generation rights was seen as being prompted by, amongst other reasons,
reaction against colonial exploitation. Indeed, developing countries introduced an
argument for the primacy of second generation human rights over first generation ones:
they argued that the achievement of social and economic rights is a precondition for the
enjoyment of other, particularly first generation rights, such as civil and political rights.
In this regard, Third World countries made significant contributions to the development
of some second generation human rights, such as the international legal regime against
racial discrimination43.
On the other hand, the argument has been advanced that second generation human
rights" are 'inferior' or secondary to first generation human rights; that whereas first
generation rights can be realised by governmental pursuit of certain policies, the
realisation of second generation rights depends on the availability of resources. Being
purely aspirational, therefore, governments merely undertake to fulfil them, but cannot
be held responsible for their non-fulfilment (or abuse). However, this perspective
ignores the fact that international instruments embodying aspirational rights do still
oblige governments not to adopt policies that are contrary to their letter and spirit.
43 YK Tyagi 'Third World Responses to Human Rights' 21 Indian Journal of International Law (1981)
119-140, cited in Kibwana et al.
44 As reflected for example in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(1966)
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Increasingly, therefore, legislative instruments require the 'progressive realisation' of
rights in this category".
Third generation human rights ('brown' or 'green'), unlike the first two, transcend
national borders, and are in essence rights against the international community of states
as a whole. Third generation rights, also known as 'solidarity' or 'brotherhood' rights,
have as their philosophical foundation the global interdependence of both individuals
and nations. Their roots are found in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which
asserts that everyone is entitled to an international order in which their rights can be
fully realised". However, their juridical basis was most-clearly set out in the Barcelona
Traction Light and Power Case"; where the court suggested that states may have
obligations ergo omnes. There is, then, a sound basis on which to argue for the
international protection of third generation human rights, such as the right to self-
determination, to a healthy environment, to peace, and to 'development'.
African states have been justly accused of not respecting human rights generally.
Nevertheless, as with second generation rights, they have made a notable contribution
to the development of third generation rights when they were included in a regional
human rights instrument for the first time in the African Charter on Human and Peoples
Rights".
2.3 The problem of quality control
The Third World's emphasis on second generation rights and on third generation (i.e.
'solidarity') rights was historically used to ignore their record on the observance of
45 See, for example, section 27 (2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act, No. 108 of
1996, which obliges the state to take 'reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available
resources, to achieve the progressive realisation' of the rights to health care, food and water, and
social security.
46 Article 28
47 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. Case (Belgium v. Spain, ICJ Reports (1970), in D J Harris
op. cit. 453-464 at 454, and Robertson op. cit. 86
48 U Oji Umozurike 'The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights' 77 American Journal of
International Law (1983) 902-912, cited in Kibwana et al
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especially first generation rights. Further, third generation rights tended to expand the
scope of human rights, and promoted quantity at the expense of quality. For this reason,
the idea of the quality control of human rights has been mooted". The basis of this idea
is that the inclusion of all types of endeavour as 'human rights' may serve to dilute the
very concept of human rights and, moreover, especially render their enforcement
difficult.
This is a pertinent concern: there is still a need to identify a core of human rights whose
respect by all states should be mandatory, giving rise not only to international concern,
but to direct action 50. Otherwise, fears that African states - and developing countries
generally - would use their development concerns to include every facet of human
endeavour in an ever-expanding portmanteau of decreasingly enforceable 'human
rights', while continuing to withhold or ignore the most fundamental - and easily
implementabie - rights from their citizens", would be well founded.
It has been argued that, if this quality control approach were accepted, it could lead
logically to the identification of a core set of human rights which all states would be
required by international law and practice to observe. This core of rights would be
uniform for all states, and would in some way (either through constitutions or other
laws) be reflected in municipal laws. This would mean that states would have a similar
and enforceable human rights regime. This aspiration towards a uniform and
internationalised core human rights regime would eventually make their enforcement
easier, and would also put to rest the jurisprudential debate as to the status of
international human rights law in the municipal domain.
49 See for example, P Alston 'Conjuring up new human rights: a proposal for quality control' 78
American Journal of International Law (1984) 607-621, cited in Kibwana et al.
50 The argument in favour of humanitarian intervention in conflicts such as those in Somalia and
Rwanda is a good example. (On the concept of humanitarian intervention see C A Arend and R J
Beck International Law and the Use of Force: Beyond the UN Charter Paradigm Routledge: London
and New York 1993, ch.8)
51 See E G Bello 'Human Rights: The Rule of Law in Africa' 30 International and Comparative Law
Quarterly (1981) 628-637 at 631, cited in Kibwana et al.
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The debate on the status of international law in municipal law centres on the question
of whether a state adopts a dualist or a monist view52• Where a monist view is adopted,
international law is automatically incorporated into municipal law (i.e. domestic law);
whereas a dualist view specifies that international law must be formally adopted and
transformed into municipal law for it to be enforceable in that domain53.
The question of whether the international law of human rights is binding on states
should not, say the authors, be based on a choice between the positivist view that it is
dependent on consent only, or on natural law-based arguments. The argument should be
rather that the content is agreed on by states generally, and on that basis is reflected in
municipal law, i. e. contractually, and hence directly enforceable. The uniformity of
content thus acquired would put to rest sovereignty-based arguments for the non-
enforcement of a general human rights regime since it would also be reflected in the
municipal laws of all states.
While the apparent simplicity and neatness of the proposal has its attractions, the
authors fail to explicitly recognise that the proposed solution is itself positivist in that it
relies entirely upon the consent of and implementation by individual states. For this
reason, it is submitted, their recommended solution is likely to indefmitely remain an
aspiration as the member states of the United Nations, where they do not continue the
debate over the precise core content of human rights norms, then fail to implement
existing legal standards.
On the other hand, the difficult truth is that, the realm of operation of human rights does
encompass almost the entire range of human interaction. They are, consequently, best
protected when they are observed voluntarily, based on internalised values, and
52 See G Schwarzenberger and E D Brown A Manual of International Law Professional Books: Oxford
1976 ch.5, cited in Kibwana et al. See also Akehurst op. cit. 43-48; and Harris op. cit. 55-57
53 See M Dixon and R McCorquodale Cases and Materials on International Law Blackstone Press:
London 1991 ch.4, cited in Kibwana et al
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integrated into the cultural practices and daily lifestyle of a nation". No legal system
can promise to police all situations where human rights may come under threat. The
Preamble to the African Charter explicitly asserts that 'the virtues of ... historical
tradition and the values of African civilization ... should inspire and characterize ... the
concept of human and peoples' rights'. This makes it a significant contribution to the
international effort to meet the challenges set out in the Preamble to the Charter of the
United Nations. So, too, the former's instruction in Article 29 (7) to 'preserve and
strengthen positive African cultural values'.
Nevertheless, the very existence of global and regional legal systems for the protection
of human rights arises from the regrettable reality that these virtues and values - and
their concomitants elsewhere in the world - are frequently observed more in their
breach. Such is the case in the instance of Africa, too.
2.4 A brief history of human rights in Africa: pre-colonial times to independence
Oji Umozurikef has responded to the general cynicism and dismissive attitude to
arguments supporting the recognition of human rights in pre-colonial Africa. While
declining to romanticise or generalise about daily life in the diversity that was African
society, he accurately observes that "[a] group of people bent on denying or ignoring
one another's rights cannot exist as a society. The [mere] existence of society thus
presupposes the recognition of the rights of the members. This truism applies as much
to human society as to the society of nations". Nevertheless, he recognises that this
statement should be understood within the context of the rather different conception of
the range of rights recognised and accepted by the various cultures and religions
prevalent at the time.
54 Francis Fukuyama Trust: the social virtues and the creation of prosperity Harnish Hamilton: London
1995, cited in Nicholas Rennger 'The ethics of trust in world politics' International Affairs Vol. 73
NO.3 (1997) 469-487 at 482
ss Umozurike op. cit. at 12-19
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R.J. Vincent echoes'? Umozurike:
' ... morality is a notion that presupposes society. Nobody, as Marx said, seen in his
isolation produces values, and nobody, as Hannah Arendt adds, in his isolation cares
about them - things, or ideas, or moral ideals, 'become values only in their social
relationship' .
Umozurike has referred to Africa's somewhat different cultural conceptions of human
rights. Nevertheless, the existence and expanding recognition of universal basic rights
has been emphasised by Vincent and others, like Ken Booth, who advocate that we
look beyond our doubts, engage with the real needs of real people by "having the
courage of our confusions", and think and act "without certainty'f". Accordingly, he
argues, not every idea originating in the West can be simplistically labelled as
"imperialist" and discarded. There are some ethnocentric ideas - and individual human
rights is one of them - for which it should not be necessary that one apologise. What
matters from his cosmopolitan perspective is not the origin of an idea, but the meaning
and significance it currently bears: nowadays, cultures and their values are
"promiscuous", "made in the world"s8.
In any event, it is not entirely clear that the idea of human rights in fact originated in
the West. Ken Booth refers to a 1947 UNESCO survey on the origins and possible
universal nature of human rights, where a Chinese scholar argued that they had
originated in the Middle Kingdom, while an Islamic philosopher had asserted their
origin in Islam.
These considerations do not necessarily mean, however, that Africa has no need of a
separate paradigm of analysis when one examines the prospects for democracy and the
56 R J Vincent 'Western Conceptions ofa Universal Moral Order' in Ralph Pettman (ed.) Moral Claims
in World Affairs Croom Helm: London 1979 at 77
57 R J Vincent Human rights and international relations Cambridge University Press/Royal Institute of
International Affairs: Cambridge 1986 esp. 127-8, cited in Ken Booth 'Human wrongs and
international relations' International Affairs Vol. 71 No.1 (1995) 103-126, at 112
58 Ken Booth ibid at 113-4
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promotion and protection of human rights. Moreover, the solutions are not necessarily
identical simply because the continent's cultural history may be understood to bear
some similarities with European experiences. Nevertheless, UN Secretary-General Kofi
Annan has insightfully observed that "It was never the [African] people who
complained of the universality of human rights, nor did the people consider human
rights as a Western or Northern imposition. It was often their leaders who did SO"S9.
Generally, the well-being of the members of traditional African society was anchored
on the health and stability of the society as a whole. Thus, the 'rights-claimer' had to be
prepared to carry out the obligations that accompanied them, for rights were - and still
are - understood to be intertwined with duties. Claude Ake'", explaining the interface
between individual and societal rights, concludes as follows:
'We put less emphasis on [the] individual and more on the collectivity, we do not allow
that the individual has any claims which may override that of the society. We assume
harmony, not divergence of interests, competition and conflict; we are more inclined to
think of our obligations to other members of our society rather than our claims against
them'.
Similarly, Umozurikél embraces Uchendu's description of pre-Christian and pre-
Islamic Nigeria as characteristic of all of black Africa. The latter found that the social
order was ontologically-aligned and resolved problems with a handful of kinship
principles, reciprocity and redistribution:
'The kinship principle provided the individual with a community whose moral order
emphasised shared values, a sense of belonging, security and social justice. In such [a]
social order[,] duties preceded rights. The principle was clear: [in order] to enjoy your
rights[,] you must do your duty; and duty and right have a reciprocal relationship[.]
59 Address to the Communications Conference at the Aspen Institute, Colorado, 18 October 1997
www.unhcr.chlhuricanelhuricane.nsff[symbolllsg.sm.6366.En.opendocument
(Date accessed: 18April 2000)
60 Claude Ake 'The African Context of Human Rights' Africa Today, 1stf2nd Quarter 1987, 5 -12,
quoted in Umozurike op. cit. at 18
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[S]tructurally[,] both were [in] balance[.] ... The lineage incorporates the living, the
dead and the unborn. By the principal of reciprocity, the living respect the ancestors
and the traditions they left; the ancestors reciprocate by maintaining the prosperity of
the living community and[,] through reincarnation, strengthen the living lineage. When
the living die, they join their ancestors'.
Equally, testifying before the West African Land Commission (1908, p. 103), Chief
Elesi of Odogbolu in the western part of Nigeria said'", " ... the land belongs to a vast
family of which many are dead, few are living and countless members still unborn."
African societies thus had 'stabilising' factors that included a sense of obligation to
one's kith and kin, a respect for (and sometimes fear of) the deity that was omnipotent
and omniscient, and to which all humans were accountable for their actions on earth.
This belief structure had a restraining effect on human activities, since the good
expected to be appropriately rewarded and the wicked or their successors to be
condemned.
Morality (in the sense of ethics, or applied morality), concludes Umozurike, was
therefore of the greatest importance in African private and public relations - a situation
that, he asserts, was decimated by the advent of slavery and colonialism.
A popular school of thought on the pre-colonial human rights situation in Africa argues
that human rights were recognised to the extent that the communal-based economic
systems emphasised the provision of economic, social and cultural rights. The existing
political organisations ensured that political and civil rights were either not violated, or
that violations were rninor'". Indeed, some have argued that human rights, particularly
61 V C Uchendu 'Tradition and Social Order' excerpt from inaugural lecture, University of Calabar,
Nigeria, Il January 1990, in Umozurike, ibid at 19
62 Quoted with approval by the Privy Council in Amodu Tijani v Secretary to the Government of
Southern Nigeria (1921) 2 AC 399, cited in Umozurike ibid. at 18
63 For a discussion of human rights in pre-colonial Africa see 0 C Eze Human Rights in Africa: Some
Selected Problems Nigeria Publishers Ltd. and Macmillan: Lagos 19849- 14, cited in Kibwana et al.
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economic rights, were well developed and respected in pre-colonial Africa. This
argument has therefore been used to support the primacy of second generation rights in
post-colonial Africa, and the view that Africa has its own special conception of human
rights.
Kibwana and his co-authors accept that a high degree of freedom existed in pre-
colonial societies, especially those of an acephalus, or devolved, character. Often, an
individual who disagreed with his or her family or clan was free to leave the immediate
community. Sections of a community could remove themselves from the jurisdiction of
a tyrannical leader by migrating to another jurisdiction. However, they argue, this
freedom was more apparent than real as it was curtailed by the fact that individualism
and separatism were not viable where community life was necessary to conquer a harsh
natural environment to ensure survival.
They submit, moreover, that the exponents of the view that pre-colonial Africa
displayed a well-developed and encompassing human rights regime paint too rosy a
picture. In the early civilisations and kingdoms such as in Ancient Egypt, Ethiopia,
Nubia and the West African kingdoms, human rights, especially those of slaves and
other low class populations, were virtually non-existent: indeed, only the ruling groups
enjoyed an abundance of such rights?'. Further, they submit, the development of
custom and customary laws in many ways served to qualify the basic human rights. For
instance, with the advent of patriarchy, women's rights were gradually but significantly
curtailed, or compromised.
64 For a consideration of the pre-colonial human rights situation in the great African civilisations,
especially the political and constitutional structure of those civilisations, see G Mokhtar (ed.) A
General History of Africa: Vol.II UNESCO and Heinemann: Paris and London 1981. See also C A
Diop The African Origin of Civilization: Myth or Reality? Lawrence Hill and Co.: Westport
Connecticut. 1974; H J Salemson and M de Jager (eds.) Civilisation or Barbarism: An Authentic
Anthropology Lawrence Hill and Co.: Westport Connecticut 1981, cited in Kibwana et al.
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Similarly, Umozurike divides pre-colonial Africa into two broad types of societies'".
There were those with advanced systems of government, with kings ruling over
extensive areas. Executive, legislative and judicial powers were usually concentrated in
the rulers, who designated their officials and subordinates. The greater part of Africa
was, however, "atomistic", consisting of small communities with recognised heads in
the nature of kings, elders, title-holders or other functionaries.
In both types of society, though, members and citizens, as opposed to aliens, were'
accorded full rights that both the community and the leadership sought to protect. The
rights to life and property, for instance, are as old as human society and infractions
brought upon the perpetrator delictual or criminal consequences. Importantly,
Umozurike states that, with some notable exceptions, the kings were not authoritarian
and every society had its democratic processes. The Ashanti kings in Ghana, for
example, were ritually warned against dictatorship and abuse of office before they
assumed office.
On the negative side, Umozurike admits that " [v]irtually all" African societies
"recognised" the institution of domestic slavery, and some societies were blighted by a
'caste' system whereby some people were treated as inferior to other human beings, as
well as by the ritual of human sacrifice.
The content of the rights recognised and guaranteed during this early period was
minimal. For example, although the economies burgeoned, they still could not support
a high level of economic rights. Indeed, the political and civil rights guaranteed then are
dwarfed by the array of equivalent rights recognised in contemporary complex
societies. Despite these qualifications, however, Kibwana et al. accept that there existed
an emerging African customary law of human rights, which could have acted as a base
for developing a code of human rights practices during the colonial era.
65 Umozurike op. cit. at 14
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However, such base as did exist was "significantly destroyed" by colonial
administrations, and did not serve as a foundation for constructing an independent
regime of human rights in Africa that was based on experiences different from western
European ones.
The authors note that it has been suggested that "[ d]uring colonialism, it was European
colonisers who violated human rights in their efforts to enforce the political and legal
authority of the colonial government and ensure smooth colonial administration'f".
Whatever the justification(s) advanced for colonialist rule by the colon ising powers'",
colonialism meant the wholesale denial of peoples' human rights: indeed, this provided
one reason for the resistance to colonial rule'", Without the use of force, colonialism
could not have been sustained.
Therefore, they argue, during most of the colonial period, the growing human rights
regime that had been nurtured during the pre-colonial era became subverted. However,
it must be noted that the negation of human rights in the colonial period was not
wholesale, since the human rights of the colonisers, and of white and other migrant
communities, were guaranteed. Thus, "within the womb of colonialism lay the seeds of
its later destruction", since the colonised peoples were able to appreciate what an
acceptable level of human rights was by simply observing the human rights position of
the foreigners.
Later, the development and articulation of an international human rights regime,
especially the promulgation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), gave
66 EO Esimokhai 'Towards an Adequate Defence of Human Rights in Africa' (1981) 21 Indian Journal
of International Law 141-148 atl42, cited in Kibwana et al.
67 For example, Lord Lugard gave the rationale for colonialism as based on a 'dual mandate': to exploit
the wealth of the colonies, and to promote the moral and educational progress of the colonised
peoples. See F J D Lugard The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa William Blackwood and
Sons: London 1929 18, cited in Kibwana et al.
68 For a discussion of human rights during the colonial era in Africa, see 0 C Eze Human Rights in
Africa op.cit. at 14-22, cited in Kibwana et al.
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the colonised peoples an idea of the human rights that could and should be aspired to
and enjoyed by all human beings, including themselves.
During colonialism, the negation of human rights was effected not only through force,
but also by legal instrumentalism, that is, the justification of such negation through
legislation. As a result of this, many draconian laws were promulgated, for instance
emergency regulations, detention without trial, provisions on compulsory labour, and
the proscription of public meetings, whose aim was to control native populations 69.
Although these laws were detested by the African populations, "future African leaders
were socialised and culturalised within that colonial system and subsequently adopted
the colonial modus operandi as well-suited for post-independence governance.
Unsurprisingly then, for many African countries, the brief interlude of uhuru (freedom)
after independence quickly gave way to authoritarianism akin to that which existed
under colonial rule".
Human rights ideology was advantageously used as a basis for the struggle for
independence from colonialism. Thus, Africans demanded, and were able to secure,
certain rights, such as the right to self-determination, and the freedom of association
and expression. To the extent that the adverse human rights situation was used to indict
colonial rule, human rights gained a legitimacy that rendered it difficult to justify the
denial of those rights to the populace after independence.
As was to be expected, the colonised were most vocal in criticising the absence of
guaranteed human rights under colonialism. But, when it came to fashioning
constitutions and their human rights contents during pre-independence negotiations, it
was the colonial powers that most vocally advocated the inclusion of standard forms of
69 See, for example, R M van Zwanenberg Colonial Capitalism and Labour in Kenya, /919- 1939 East
African Literature Bureau: Nairobi 1975, cited in Kibwana et al,. on how these laws and policies were
effected.
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human rights in these constitutions". To the colonial authorities, western-type human
rights were pivotal to guaranteeing the property interests of settlers and colonial civil
servants, argue the authors.
Although these fundamental rights, as enshrined in the independence constitutions,
expanded freedom and the individual rights of indigenous populations generally,
nationalist leaders frequently characterised them as an imposition by foreigners, geared
towards protecting their vested interests. Indeed, the later emasculation of Bills of
Rights contained in African constitutions was justified on those grounds as well as on
their over-concentration on western type, individualised civil and political rights to the
exclusion of economic and social rights".
Some countries such as Ghana and Tanganyika initially opted not to have a Bill of
Rights in their constitutions. Their central argument was that a Bill of Rights would, in
the process of its enforcement, invite conflict between the executive and an activist
judiciary. Supporting this argument, Tanganyika Government Paper No.1 of 1962
stated that:
'The government believes that the Rule of Law is best preserved not by formal
guarantees in a Bill of Rights, which invites conflict between the Executive and the
Judiciary, but by independent judges administering justice free from political
pressure" .
Despite such absences of a constitutional Bill of Rights, human rights practice was not
significantly different between those countries that adopted, and those that did not
adopt, a Bill of Rights. However, in those countries that did not, the enjoyment of
human rights by the citizenry rested on the goodwill of the political leadership. It is
70 For a discussion of how human rights got into African independence constitutions, see L Zimba
Zambian Bill of Rights: An Historical and Comparative Study of Human Rights in Commonwealth
Africa East African Publishing House: Nairobi 1984 19-37, cited in Kibwana et al.
71 Even supposedly more 'liberal' leaders such as Julius Nyerere, used this argument, see Kibwana et al.
72 Tanganyika Government Paper NO.1 of 1962, Dar-es-Salaarn, Government Printers, 1962, at 6, cited
in Kibwana et al.
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unsurprising, then, that even in countries such as Ghana and Tanzania, the citizens
subsequently agitated for constitutionally guaranteed and justiciable rights73.
Although most African countries incorporated in their constitutions a justiciable Bill of
Rights modelled on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, official recognition
and the practice of human rights left a lot to be desired. As one commentator has
observed:
'One would have thought that when African states gained their independence the
unpleasant experiences of the repressive colonial regimes would have made their
leaders abhor violations of human rights. Instead, some African leaders showed traits of
intolerance, high-handedness and callousness in dealing with political opponents and
non-conformists' 74.
Political leadership in Africa chose to reduce the human rights content of their
countries' constitutions largely in order to preserve their political positions", although
whether this was for reasons of avarice and ego, or based also upon the example of
historical and traditional model of long-lived leadership, remains obscure. In either
event, the one party system, for example, with all its potential for negating human
rights, was meant to ensure the political longevity of incumbent regimes. Thus, soon
after independence, the human rights situation in many independent African countries
bore an unhappy resemblance with that obtaining under colonial rule.
Political leaders presided over systems that diluted human rights values that had been
thought during the struggle for independence to be absolutely central to democratic
government. However, this state of affairs did not mean that human rights provisions
served no useful purpose, the authors submit. African regimes were not willing to go so
far as to actually remove Bills of Rights from their national constitutions, for fear of
73 In Tanzania, this was eventually achieved through the Law of Fifth Amendment, 1984, see Kibwana et
al.
74 Esimokhai 'Towards an Adequate Defence of Human Rights in Africa' op.cit. at 142
75 BO Nwabueze Constitutionalism in the Emergent States C Hurst and Co.: London 1973, cited in
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confirming that their rule was authoritarian and undemocratic. Consequently, during
periods of repression and misrule, affected citizens relied on the human rights
provisions enshrined as Bills of Rights to challenge unconstitutional and undemocratic
rule, and to vindicate their rights. With time, the Bills of Rights, like the sphinx,
resurrected and have formed one of the more useful weapons for challenging the
legitimacy of politically unresponsive regimes during the struggle for greater
democracy in Africa.
2.5 Sovereignty and human rights in post-colonial Africa
Christof Heyns and Frans Viljoen thus note76 that there is, generally speaking, "a high
level of norm recognition in the various African countries". Their conclusion is based
on the fact that "human rights standards are recognised as valid norms", and are
included in many national constitutions, or are contained in international treaties signed
by African countries. Thus, for example, all 53 members states of the OAU have
ratified the African Charter, and norm recognition or norm acceptance "could
consequently be regarded as universal?".
Their analysis of associated provisions and implementation mechanisms, however, as
well as of the actual practices in many countries on the continent, "generally reveals
weak norm enforcement''". This is either because no constitutional provision is made
for recourse to judicial or other enforcement or, where such recourse is provided, it has
not been utilised to any significant effect.
This problem is evident in the African Commission on Human Rights, established in
terms of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights. The Commission has only
the 'power' of secret recommendation passed through a political filter (the Assembly of
Kibwana et al., op. cit.
76 1999 (15) South African Journal on Human Rights 421-438 at 424
77 ibid at 428
78 ibid at 424
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Heads of State and Government of the OAU) still largely fixated on the preservation of
pristine sovereignty.
Consequently, without a certain basic level of practical respect for human rights norms
within the participating domestic systems, wider regional systems based on voluntary
compliance by its constituent parts are unable to function. Indeed, this is unsurprising if
one accepts that it is inherently unrealistic to expect any state to voluntarily adhere to
the human rights pronouncements of any supra-national institution when it refuses to do
so in respect of its own courts or other domestic human rights institutions.
Where, however, a basic commitment to the observance of human rights norms exists
in public life, even though complete consensus is elusive, or where spontaneous
adherence is fragmentary, law can play a pivotal role in promoting consensus and
encouraging and enforcing compliance.
A basic commitment to human rights norm observance requires an acknowledgement
or acceptance that sovereignty is not an absolute or immutable principle. Indeed, the
very notion of human rights constitutes a limitation on state sovereignty": It is
submitted, therefore, that:
'There are things that states may do only as an affront to higher principles. To enforce
human rights is to impose restraints on state discretion and to oblige states to ensure
that individuals and institutions respect those restraints. Respect for human rights is a
fundamental principle of modem international law and international relations,
indicating thereby that they are too precious to be left in the realm of exclusive state
discretion. Consequently, a matter is correctly understood to have been removed from
the realm of domestic jurisdiction as soon as it is the subject of customary international
law or treaty law'so.
79 Umozurike op. cit. at 83
80 Nationality Decrees of Tunis and Morocco Case PCIJ Ser. B No. 4 (1923), D J Harris Cases and
Materials on International Law (3 ed) Sweet & Maxwell: London 1983 at 695-6; Case Concerning
German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia PCIJ Ser. A NO.7 (1926) P 19, quoted in Umozurike, op.
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As will be discussed in the following chapter, regional and global arrangements for the
protection of human rights constitute the international or supra-national legal system in
this field. The 'teeth' of international law are significantly weaker and its enforcement
more indirect than is true of human rights enforcement in the domestic context. Co-
operation among sovereign states in the international system is based upon the principle
of the consent of equals. Nonetheless, non-conformity with human rights norms may
and does on occasion lead to one state being ostracised by others states or institutions
which may use the 'naming and shaming' strategy to oblige the offending state to
redirect its actions. In an increasingly interdependent world, the shame associated with
marginalisation can be expressed in diplomatic or economic isolation, both of which
are potentially powerful tools to influence state behaviour.
In view of the limited practical utility of the African Commission on Human Rights,
Heyns and Viljoen81 have concluded that it may be argued that the international
enforcement of human rights depends for its success on the existence of a web of
diplomatic, cultural and trade relations between states. One might add that the political
will to deploy these tactical weapons is a further critical prerequisite for the effective
enforcement of human rights norms. Only where these ties exist, and where the
exercise of political will does not constitute an unrealistic eventuality, can their
potential suspension or severance constitute a credible threat or sanction.
Heyns and Viljoen argue82 that, while international systems for the protection of human
rights generally lack the benefit of direct enforcement characteristic of domestic
systems, regional systems arguably enjoy certain advantages over the global or United
cit. at p 83; see also Markovic 'Implementation of Human Rights and the Domestic Jurisdiction of
States' in A Eide and Shou (eds.) International Protection of Human Rights 47; Okungwu 'The OAU
Charter and the Principle of Domestic Jurisdiction in Intra-African Affairs' 13 Indian JIL (1973) 589;
Umozurike 'The Domestic Jurisdiction Clause in the OAU Charter' African Affairs (London April
1979) 179; Akinyemi 'The Organisation of African Unity and the Concept of Non-Interference in
Internal Affairs of Member-States' (1972-73) 46 British YBIL 393, quoted in Umozurike ibid. at 83.
See also Robertson op. cit. 14-15 and 403-411
81 op. cit. at 433
82 ibid at 423
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Nations system. Regional systems, they submit, are able to give "more authentic
expression to the values and historical peculiarities of the people of a particular region,
resulting in more spontaneous compliance". Further, due to the geographical proximity
of the states involved, regional systems, under the right conditions, have the potential to
exert stronger pressure against transgressing neighbours. "Peer pressure is easier to
exert in a smaller circle of friends", they aver. An effective regional system can,
consequently, supplement the global system in significant ways.
However, it is also argued the critical outstanding link in the chain of international
human rights norm enforcement is constituted by a reliable, independent and objective
system for defming, identifying and publicising such violations. There exists then, one
would suggest, a clear need for either an independent multilateral 'early warning
system' to perform this information-gathering and -dissemination function. The
beginnings of an appreciation of this fact appear in the 'emergency' procedures
envisaged in Article 58 of the African Charter. The machinery established in the
African Charter is, however, poorly developed and an opportunity was lost to establish
a credible institution to perform this vital role.
2.6 Human rights expressed as ubuntu
Ex-President Leopold Senghor of Senegal has attempted to reassure those who fear the
consequences for individual liberty of the 'African philosophy of law'. The African
tradition does not consist in alienating or subordinating the individual to the
community, but in co-existence, in giving everyone a certain number of rights and
duties'". The emphasis on peoples' rights together with individual rights seeks to
create harmony between the individual and society. The African notion of 'man in
society', or ubuntu, is one of harmony, for only in and through society can a person
find the fulfilment of their aspirations. Far from being a relationship of subordination -
83 OAU Doc. CABILEG/67/5, p. 6, quoted in Umozurike op. cit. at 90-91
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an impression fostered by its abusers - it is one of "complementarity, participation and
dialogue's".
This communitarian approach differs from the orthodox Western perspective, with its
emphasis on the individual as against society. Importantly, it also contrasts with the
collectivist orientation that subordinates individual rights to those of the state and the
fundamental development of communism. This latter orientation permits the state to
determine, delineate and protect individual rights. The state is, by implication,
consequently entitled to curtail them according to the dictates of its own 'higher'
interests. The drawback here is that 'the state' is a fiction created and operated by and,
all too often, for the benefit of, a select group of fallible individual bureaucrats and
members of the executive.
Various attempts have been made in recent years to employ the concept or philosophy
of ubuntu as shorthand for the communitarian African approach to the protection of
human rights. The concept of ubuntu was referred to in Constitutional Principle XIII in
South Africa's interim Constitution, Act No. 200 of 1993. It has been defmed by Mr
Justice Pius Langa, Deputy-President of South Africa's Constitutional Court, as
signifying that ''the life of another person is at least as valuable as one's own,,85. He
asserts that the concept entails the reciprocity of individual rights and duties owed to
the community. This carries with it the consequence that individual rights in the
African Charter can be explained and justified only by reference to the rights of the
community'". His fellow judges on the Court variously settled on definitions
emphasising various aspects of the philosophy, such as humaneness, social justice and
fairness, as well as entailing constructive or corrective or restorative punishments in
law as opposed to vengeance. This latter approach was founded on the understanding
84 W Benedek 'Peoples' Rights and Individuals' Duties as Special features of the African Charter on
Human and Peoples' Rights' in Kunig, Benedek and Mahalu (eds.) Regional Protection of Human
Rights by International Law: The Emerging African System 1985, 59-94 at 63, quoted in Umozurike
ibid. at 90
85 S vMakwarryane 1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC) at 752C-D para [225]
86 Rosalind English 'Ubuntu: the Quest for an Indigenous Jurisprudence' 1996 (12) SA Journal on
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that the offence had been committed against the community, rather than against the
individual victim.
Archbishop Desmond Tutu, on the eve of his Chairmanship of the first hearings of the
Truth and Reconciliation Commission, outlined his understanding of the concept as
follows:
'Our people must show the world that God has given us a great gift, ubuntu ....
However, the world should also know that forgiveness and reconciliation are not cheap
. . .. Ubuntu says I am human only because you are human. If I undermine your
humanity, I dehumanise myself. You must do what you can to maintain this great
harmony, which is perpetually undermined by resentment, anger, desire for vengeance.
That's why African jurisprudence is restorative rather than retributive,8? (emphasis
added).
Rosalind English88,trying to explore the meaning of the concept, expresses frustration
at the fact that it is both "underexplained and overexplained", requiring one to choose
between conflicting explanations. English quotes Acting Judge Sydney Kentridge as
defming ubuntu (extra-judicially) as a "feeling of common humanity", but cautions that
this does not assist us in solving the conflict between the state's notion of the public
interest and the freedoms and liberties of the individual'".
She asks whether the concept is capable of playing the role of a useful jurisprudential
tool, or whether it is, simply, all things to all people. She criticises appeals by judges of
the South African Constitutional Court to look for the substantive values informing the
content of the concept in 'the will of the people' who, she notes, are notoriously
capable of prejudice, caprice, selfishness and "short-termism". She cites Langa J's own
Human Rights 641-648 at 643
87 'Profile' inMail and Guardian March 1996, quoted in English ibid at 645
88 English, ibid
89 Alec Russell, similarly, notes that, unfortunately, in ubuntu's strength lies its weakness: 'It is a
beguiling ideal but its culture of tolerance is easily abused. Too often in Africa it has become an
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concern'? that "the relationship between 'contemporary standards of decency' and
public opinion is uncertain".
John Hart Ely has pointed out" that there is no way of avoiding this contradictory
position once one appeals to community morality in a judicial context. The argument
that there is some sort of people's morality out there to support the decision of a court
on an issue of rights is "pernicious nonsense". This is because it allows judges to strike
down majority legislation in the interests of protecting minorities, whilst justifying their
powers to do so with appeals to majority opinion:
'Now think again about consensus as a possible source, and the message will come
clear; it makes no sense to employ the value judgments of the majority for protecting
minorities from the value judgments of the majority.'
The concept of respect for others - the notion that there are certain things that we
should not do to one another, and that there are particular duties we owe to each other-
is common to all civilisations. This is despite the fact that these core values have been
defined differently by different cultures throughout history.
It is the practical, compassionate expression of this ethic of mutual respect that has
been lacking in far too many African experiences of government. And its absence has
been replicated to devastating effect in the self-serving club that is constituted by the
Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU. Shyley Kondowe has
decried'? the misuse of sovereignty by African leaders and a collusively-woven blanket
of silence has been drawn by the Assembly over the abuses perpetrated by its members
upon the hapless populations of African countries. And it is this long-standing practice,
based on the supposedly overriding principles of sovereignty and non-interference that
excuse for subservience or tyranny or both.' See Big men, little people: encounters in Africa
Macmillan: London 1999 at 256
90 S v Williams 1995 (3) SA 632 (CC) at 643G-H para [36], quoted in English ibid. at 648
91 in 'Consensus' Democracy and Distrust (1980) 69, quoted in English, ibid.
92 Shyley Kondowe 'Sovereignty, intervention and democratisation in small African states' in Mathoma
et al., op. cit. 85-93 at 85
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has attracted the perception of an institutionalised immorality within the halls of power
on the African continent.
Consequently, then-President Nelson Mandela, addressing the OAU Summit meeting
of Heads of State and Government in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, on June 8 1998,
forcefully propounded the view that3:
'None of us is a superstar and none can succeed without the success of the other....
That common destiny requires that we should treat the question of peace and stability
on or Continent as a common challenge. Accordingly, I believe that we must all accept
that we cannot abuse the concept of national sovereignty to deny the rest of the
Continent the right and duty to intervene when, behind those sovereign boundaries,
people are being slaughtered to protect tyranny. In all instances, this takes place with no
regard whatsoever to the fact that the legitimacy of our governments derives from our
commitment to serve the interests of the people on the basis of mandates given by the
people themselves.
'In this context, we must frankly assess whether our 'Central Organ for the Prevention,
Management and Resolution of Conflicts' is succeeding to meet the hopes of our
Organisation and peoples.'
93 www.anc.org.za/ancdocslhistorylmandela (Date accessed 11 October 2000)
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CHAPTER THREE: THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE
PROMOTION AND PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN
AFRICA
3.1 The United Nations system
Human rights have been on the agenda since the beginning of the state system". They
have, however, achieved their historical apotheosis in the United Nations system.
United Nations' concern with the promotion and protection of human rights and
fundamental freedoms stems directly from the acceptance by the international
community that 'recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable
rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and
peace in the world'. It arises also from the consequent pledge by States Members of the
United Nations 'to achieve, in co-operation with the United Nations, the promotion of
universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms'l".
Thus, Article 1 of the Charter of the United Nations includes the achievement of
international co-operation 'in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and
for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or
religion' as one of the purposes of the United Nations. This inclusion represents a clear
expression of the profound commitment of its founders to human rights. Moreover, the
experience of the two world wars convinced them that effective international protection
of human rights is one of the essential conditions of international peace and progress".
94 Ryan 'Sovereignty, intervention and the law: a tenuous relationship of competing principles'
Millennium: Journal of International Studies 1997 Vol. 26 No. I, 77-100 op.cit. at 88; and Stephen
D Krasner, 'Sovereignty, regimes and human rights' in Volker Rittberger (ed.) Regime Theory and
International Relations Clarendon Press: Oxford 1993 at 139ff.
95 Human Rights Fact Sheet No. 1Human Rights Machinery United Nations Centre for Human Rights:
Geneva, 1992, at 3. See also the 'Appendix: Charter of the United Nations' to H G Nicholas The
UnitedNationsas a politicalinstitution(5 ed.)OxfordUniversityPress:London1977
96 Fact Sheet No. 1 ibid
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The Charter of the United Nations is replete with references, albeit somewhat
generalised, to human rights and fundamental freedoms. In the Preamble, the peoples of
the United Nations express their determination "to reaffirm [their] faith in fundamental
human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men
and women and of nations large and small'. They continue to vow to 'establish
conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from ...
international law can be maintained, and to promote social progress and better
standards of life ... ".
Further, the words 'promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and
fundamental freedoms' are repeated, with slight variations, in Article 1, on the purposes
and principles of the United Nations. They appear also in Article 13, on the functions
and powers of the General Assembly; in Article 62, on the functions of the Economic
and Social Council; and in Article 76, on the basic objectives of the International
Trusteeship System.
In Article 56, all Members of the United Nations pledge to take joint and separate
action in co-operation with the Organisation for the achievement of the purposes set out
in Article 55. These ends include the promotion of 'universal respect for, and
observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to
race, sex, language or religion'. Article 55, furthermore, explicitly recognises that the
creation of conditions of stability and well-being are necessary for peaceful and
friendly relations among nations founded on, among other factors, respect for the
principle of equal rights. Article 68 empowers the Economic and Social Council to set
up commissions 'in economic and social fields and for the promotion of human rights'.
In terms of Article 13, one of the functions of the United Nations General Assembly is
to initiate studies and make recommendations for the purpose of (a) 'promoting
international co-operation in the political field and encouraging the progressive
development of international law and its codification'; and (b) 'promoting international
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co-operation in the economic, social, cultural educational, and health fields, and
assisting in the realisation of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all ... '.
For the most part, human rights items on the agenda of the General Assembly originate
in sections of the report of the Economic and Social Council which relate to human
rights, or in decisions taken by the Assembly at earlier sessions to consider particular
matters. Issues with a bearing on human rights have also been proposed for inclusion in
the Assembly's agenda by the other principal organs of the United Nations System, by
Member States, and by the Secretary General. Since its adoption of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, the Assembly has adopted numerous
declarations and conventions focusing on human rights.
Under Article 62 of the Charter, the Economic and Social Council ('ECOSOC') may
'make recommendations for the purpose of promoting respect for and observance of,
human rights and fundamental freedoms for all'. It may also prepare draft conventions
for consideration by the General Assembly and convene international conferences on
human rights issues. Article 68 provides that the Council shall, where necessary for the
performance of its functions, establish one or more commissions for the promotion of
human rights.
These 'specialised agencies' report regularly to the Council. The Council may, in terms
of Article 64, make arrangements with these agencies and with Member States to be
furnished with reports on steps taken to implement its own recommendations and those
by the General Assembly that relate to the Council's mandate. The latter may then
make its observations known to the General Assembly.
To assist it with issues relating to human rights, the Council has established the
Commission on Human Rights which has, in tum, established the Sub-Commission on
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities. The Commission on Human
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Rights was established in 1946 and is the principal body dealing with human rights
issues, as it may engage on any matter relating to human rights.
The Commission undertakes studies, prepares recommendations and drafts
international instruments relating to human rights. It also executes particular tasks
assigned to it by the General Assembly or ECOSOC, including the investigation of
allegations concerning the violation of human rights and the handling of
communications relating to such violations. The Commission has also established
organs to investigate human rights problems in specific countries and territories, as well
as on thematic or systemic situations.
As of 1992, no country- or region-specific agency had been set up to deal with an
African problem, apart from those dealing with apartheid and its spillover'". In more
recent years, however, under the current Secretary General, Mr Kofi Annan, a number
of special rapporteurs have been appointed in connection with African problems.
A major weakness of the Commission is the fact that its membership consists of the
states whose human rights actions are intended to be the subject of scrutiny and
criticism by the other States Parties to the Convention. The crucial legal principle of
procedural fairness, audi alteram partem, may be served by such inclusion, but the
accompanying weakness is that decisions are taken by a vote of the elected members,
rather than necessarily upon the basis of principle. It has, in consequence, closely
examined the activities of only pariah states such as South Africa under apartheid,
Israel, and Chile under Pinocher". Individual states report on their own practices and
the reports are, consequently, frequently either propagandistic or irrelevant, simply
listing constitutional provisions. The more powerful states in international society have
97 ibid. at 7-8
98 Krasner op. cit. at 164. Robertson op. cit. at 45-47 notes that the Commission has signally failed to
consider even Pol Pot's Cambodian genocide; the Central African Republic's Emperor Jean Bédel
Bokassa's "primitive savagery"; Idi Amin's mass murders in Uganda; the "grotesquely unfair
treason" trials in 1995 of dissidents like Ken Saro-Wiwa by the Nigerian dictator, Sani Abacha; or
China's 1990 Tiananrnen Square shootings.
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not been subjected to much pressure because other states fear the potential retaliatory
threats to their own sovereignty. As will appear below, the persistence of these
weaknesses may hardly be said to have set an appropriately rigorous standard for the
African Commission.
Furthermore, despite the fact that six treaties provide that disagreements concerning
human rights issues can be referred to the International Court of Justice, the Court has
not been very active - because states are required to consent before a matter may go to
the Hague'", Even those states that have lodged blanket consents have been hesitant to
sue other states - for fear of the tables being turned in the future. Independent oversight
is, therefore, still limited.
Africa constitutes one of the five UN regions. The 53 African countries that are
members of the UN by and large form an integral part of the United Nations human
rights system, as assessed by, for example, the number of African states that have
ratified the principal UN human rights treaties. These treaties are the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination ('CERD')IOO, the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ('ICESCR,)lol, the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ('ICCPR,)lo2, the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women ('CEDAW,)lo3, the
Convention Against Torture ('CAT')lo4 and the Convention on the Rights of the Child
('CRC,)105. 'Norm acceptance' at this level is relatively high106•
99 ibid. at 164
100 660 UNTS 195, adopted on 21 December 1965, entered into force on 4 January 1969
101 993 UNTS 3, adopted on 16 December 1966, entered into force on 3 January 1976
102 999 UNTS 171, adopted on 16 December 1966, entered into force on 23 March 1976
103 UN GA Res 34/180, UN doc A/34/46, adopted on 18 December 1979, entered into force on 3
September 1981
104 UN GA Res 39/46, UN doc A/39/51, adopted on 10 December 1984, entered into force on 26 June
1987
105 UN GA Res 44/52, adopted on 20 November 1989, entered into force on 2 September 1990
106 Heyns and Viljoen op cit. at 425
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'Norm enforcement' in respect of these treaties takes place primarily by means of
reporting to the treaty monitoring bodies (in the case of all six treaties) and individual
complaints (in the case of three of the six). Heyns and Viljoen, unsurprisingly, report a
relatively high number of African states as having failed to comply with their
voluntarily-assumed reporting obligations. Moreover, where states parties have
subjected themselves to the individual complaints procedure, "a tradition of using these
mechanisms has not yet been developed".
The challenge is for states to comply with existing obligations and to subject
themselves to the full range of preventive mechanisms contained in the conventions.
NOOs should also enhance their monitoring operations and, where necessary, challenge
state reports and do more to encourage individuals to lodge complaints, where
applicable.
3.2 Regional arrangements
As discussed earlier, nothing in Chapter VIII of the UN Charter 'precludes the
existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to
the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional
action, provided that [they] and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and
Principles of the United Nations'.
While the Charter goes so far as to encourage such regional efforts at the pacific
settlement of disputes, regional organisations may not, with certain exceptions, take
independent enforcement action.
3.3 The Organisation of African Unity
One such regional dispute resolution agency is the Organisation of African Unity. The
Preamble to the Charter of the OAU, among other things, expresses the conviction that
it is 'the inalienable right of all people to control their own destiny'. It also evidences a
consciousness that 'freedom, equality, justice and dignity are essential objectives for
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the achievement of the legitimate aspirations of the African peoples' and recognises
that 'conditions for peace and security must be established and maintained'. Moreover,
it reaffirms adherence to 'the Principles of ... the Charter of the United Nations and the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights' on the grounds that they 'provide a solid
foundation for peaceful and positive co-operation among States' .
Article II of the OAU Charter provides that the Organisation shall include the following
objectives:
'(a) to promote the unity and solidarity of the African States;
(b) to co-ordinate and intensify their co-operation and efforts to achieve a better life for
the peoples of Africa;
(c) to defend their sovereignty, their territorial integrity and independence; and
(e) to promote international co-operation, having due regard to the Charter of the
United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights'.
Article III solemnly affirms and declares Member States' adherence to the following
principles, including the sovereign equality of all Member States; non-interference in
the internal affairs of States; respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each
State and for its inalienable right to independent existence.
The relative importance of these and other principles in Article III clearly demonstrates
the continuity of overriding concerns prevalent at the time of agreement on the OAU
Charter. So, too, the particular structure of the substitute for the Specialised
Commission on political and human rights issues envisaged in Article XX, viz. the
African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights established under the African
Charter of Human and Peoples' Rights. Those concerns related to the perceived
fragility of the independent viability of many Member States. Nevertheless, the
importance of human rights, within the context of the relative unimportance of ethnic
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
64
and national rightsl07, are clearly recognised as providing a 'solid foundation' for the
'peaceful and positive co-operation' that are recorded as a primary purpose of the
Organisation. This recognition has since been codified in the African Charter on
Human and Peoples' Rights.
Despite the paucity of references to human rights in the OAV Charter, the distinctively
anti-colonialist and anti-apartheid practice of the Organisation, as well as its efforts in
other areas such as refugee affairs, has exhibited its clear, if occasional, official
recognition of the value of human rights. These seeds of sensitivity, together with the
considerable influence of external forces, paved the way for a 'great leap forward' in
the enshrinement of less equivocal human rights standards'l".
3.4 The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights
The OAV adopted the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights at the Nairobi
Summit of Heads of State in 1981. The African Charter, also known as the Banjul
Charter, after the city in which it was first considered, came into force on 21 October
1986, having secured ratification by an absolute majority of member States.
The African Charter is the central instrument in the African system of human rights
protection. The two others are the OAV Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of
Refugee Problems in Africa (1969), which entered into force in 1974, and the African
Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (1990), which was not yet in force as of
late 1999. The African Charter was drafted largely as a response by African jurists to
human rights violations during the 1970S109•
The African Charter, as its name suggests, includes both human and peoples' rights, as
well as both rights and duties, an approach which, although new to international
instruments, accords with the African conception of rights as inseparable from
107 Preamble to the OAU Charter
108 Umozurike op.cit. at 25-28
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duties!". These rights and duties apply to individuals and groups alike. The emphasis
on a community and collectivist approach is reflected in the focus on the family,
society, the nation, and the State.
Two bodies are responsible for the promotion and protection of human and peoples'
rights: the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights and the Assembly of
Heads of State and Government of the OAV. However, an additional protocol, the
Protocol on the Establishment of the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights
(1998), has been adopted. When the Protocol enters into force it will supplement the
non-binding mandate of the Commission with the binding powers of an African Human
Rights Court. As of late 1999, thirty-three countries have signed the Protocol, but only
two have ratified itlll. Fifteen ratifications are required before the Court may be
established. Perhaps significantly, Senegal is one of the two countries to have ratified
the Protocol (the other is Burkina Faso). It was Senegal that in March 2000 arrested the
erstwhile President of Hissene Habré of Sudan on charges of domestic human rights
ebuses'F.
The African Commission comprises Il members elected by the Assembly, with the
Chairman and Vice-Chairman being elected by the members from among their number.
The Secretary is, however, appointed by the Secretary General of the OAV, thereby
further increasing the potential for political management and control of the
Commission's activities, despite their nominal integrity and independence. The fact that
the Secretary General of the OAV is also entitled to draw up the Commission's agenda
further inhibits the potential for principled action by the Commission, despite the
obligation that the Chairman of the Commission be consulted 113.
109 Heyns and Viljoen op. cit. at 428
110 Isaac Nguema, first Chairman of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights in Human
Rights Series The African Charter of Human and Peoples' Rights United Nations Centre for Human
Rights: Geneva 1990 at 1
111 Heyns and Viljoen op cit. at 428
112 Cape Times March 2000 Independent Newspapers Cape Town
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The principal responsibilities of the Commission are to ensure the promotion and
protection of human and peoples' rights. The task of promotion involves functions
relating to studies, research, information, sensitisation, consciousness-raising education,
dissemination, training and general guidance by way of advice and recommendation. It
also includes quasi-legislative functions in terms of which the Commission is required
to prepare, and propose to States, draft laws and regulations on human rights and to
defme the principles applicable in the field. Promotion also includes co-operation with
non-governmental organisations having similar or complementary objectives.
The Commission's protection mandate consists of examining complaints of human
rights violations by States parties. Complaints may be referred to the Commission by
either other States parties or by private persons, whether natural or juristic. The
investigation of complaints results in a report, detailing the facts and findings of the
enquiry, together with an opinion, transmitted to the Assembly for decision. The
Assembly alone has the power of decision - "a matter for regret", according to Isaac
Nguema, first Chairman of the Commission'!",
Although Article 60 provides explicitly that the Commission 'shall draw inspiration
from' the usual international sources of international on human rights, the work of the
Commission is limited by a number of procedural limitations in addition to those
discussed above. Firstly, the Commission may investigate a complaint only upon
receipt of a complaint: it has no mero motu powers. This is a particularly important
defect within the context of the provisions of Articles 52, 53 and 58. The former
sections confme the Commission to (a) reporting obligations and powers of
recommendation to (b) the Assembly of Heads of State and Government - precisely the
locus of potential political stalemate.
113 Rule 6 of the Rules of Procedure of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights
114 ibid at 3
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Secondly, the provisions of Article 58 seriously constrain the ability of the Commission
to effectively intervene in situations of 'emergency', or 'a series of serious or massive
violations of human and peoples' rights'. The obligation on the Commission to first
report to the Assembly and then await further instructions from the Chairman of the
Assembly bears with it the seeds of an institutional inability to prevent such swift
holocausts as a Rwanda or even the slow collapse of a Zaire.
Thirdly, the effective veto on publicity in the hands of the Assembly contained in
Article 59 and Rule 32, and in the hands of the Secretary General in Rule 33, further
limits the tactical and strategic efficacy of the Commission's interventions by making
them subservient to political considerations.
The extraordinary wording of Rule 81 'Contents of Reports' further compounds the
Commissions powerlessness. The rule concerns the obligation by States parties to
submit, every two years, a report on the 'legislative or other measures taken with a
view to giving effect to the rights and freedoms recognised and guaranteed' by the
African Charter. Rule 81 provides as follows:
'1. States parties to the Charter shall submit reports on measures they would have
taken to give effect to the rights recognised by the Charter ... . The reports should
indicate, where possible, the factors and difficulties impeding the implementation of
the provisions of the Charter.
3. The Commission may, through the Secretary General, inform States parties to the
Charter of its wishes regarding the form and the contents of the reports... ' (emphasis
added).
It seems difficult to avoid the inference that the wording of the Charter and its
regulations has been adopted with the clear intention that member States will be
expected to fail to meet their human rights obligations. The implicit message,
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moreover, seems to be that no negative consequences will ensue for the defaulting
State.
In addition, the Secretary General is, in sub-rule 3, once again granted a discretion to
interfere in the Commission's requests for information that it may deem necessary for
the proper performance of its functions. This discretion is repeated in the following
Rule, where the Secretary General 'may, after consultation with the Commission,
communicate to the specialised institutions concerned', copies of those parts of the
country reports that relate to their competencies. This provision, together with the
repeated requirement that the proceedings of the Commission must be held in secret
closed session, add to the restrictions on the free flow of information and the
opportunities for untoward interference in situations requiring the Commission's and
the Assembly's attention.
Nevertheless, despite these apparent limitations, its 1989-1991 Chairman, Oji
Umozurike, considers the intentionally confidential design of the dispute resolution
mechanisms to be its strengthl15• He admits that the Commission's power to criticise
human rights violations is hamstrung by the requirement of confidentiality and delayed
by the procedure of having to report first to the Assembly'!", but locates responsibility
for the success or failure of the Commission on the calibre of the Commissioners
themselves. The difficulty here seems to be that several Commissioners have close
relationships with their national executive'!", thereby creating perceptions of a possible
lack of appropriate independence.
In view of these constraints, it is perhaps unsurprising that the Commission has been
described as having been "slow in implementing its protective mandate"ll8. By the end
lIS U Oji Umozurike The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights op. eit. at 83
116 ibid at 83
117 Heyns and Viljoen op cit. at 432
118 Heyns and Viljoen ibid at 429; and U Oji Umozurike 'Five Years of the African Commission on
Human and Peoples' Rights' (1993) 4 Calabar Law Journal I, cited in Heyns and Viljoen op cit. at
431
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of 1996, the Commission had fmalised only 72 cases, of which 50 were declared
inadmissible, 5 were withdrawn and 5 settled amicably. Of the 12 cases actually to have
received substantive attention, violations were found in all instances. It is unclear
whether the recommendations flowing from these fmdings have been complied with.
In Constitutional Rights Project v Nigeria, No. 139/94 (in respect of Ken Saro-Wiwa
and seventeen others) and in Constitutional Rights Project v Nigeria, No. 140/94 (in
respect of M K 0 Abiola, A Enahoro and others), the Commission was requested to
ensure that the state safeguard the activists' health in detention pending the final
disposition of their cases. The limited nature of the Commission's recommendations 119,
with respect, exemplifies the weakness arising from the Commission's confidential
marmer of operation. Indeed, Umozurike later seems to recant his initial endorsement of
the cosy confidentiality of the Commission's operations. He signals agreement with the
Commission's first Chairman, Isaac Nguema, when he concedes'I" that it is "doubtful
whether traditional reconciliatory methods can be a substitute for modem judicial
settlement". Thus, he endorses proposals for the institution of an African Court of
Justice along the lines of the European Court. These proposals have, since, to some
extent, been included in the Protocol on the Establishment of the African Court on
Human and Peoples' Rights.
Nguema makes the significant point, however, that respect for human rights has been
internationalised and their protection is not restricted to present, limited African
remedies: any shortcomings in the enforcement procedures of the African Charter can
be taken up "elsewhere". Where possible (i.e. where the offending state is a signatory),
therefore, a matter may, in the interim, be referred to a body such as the Human Rights
Committee established by Article 28 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights.
119 ibid at 82
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Although empowered to conduct itself as an ordinary court of law once it is fmally able
to entertain a matter, the envisaged African Court will, however, have limitations of its
ownl21• Although the Court will be able to deliver advisory opinions and decide
contentious cases, it may consider and decide upon a contentious matter only after it
has been filtered through the African Commission, or by the member states,
individually or collectively. Furthermore, individuals or NGOs may not approach the
Court directly, except for an advisory opinion, without the consent of the state
concerned. Enforcement of the Court's orders is also supervised (or 'managed', one is
tempted to suggest) by the Council of [Foreign] Ministers, as opposed to the Assembly
in regard to the Commission's recommendations. The caution with which one
approaches this supervisory role by the Council of Ministers arises from the provisions
of Article XIII of the OAU Charter which establish this body. Article XIII (1) states
explicitly that the Council of Ministers 'shall be responsible to the Assembly'.
It seems clear, therefore, that the interests of the rulers will continue to be prioritised
over those of the ruled. Within this particular context, 'rights of power', such as
sovereignty, will continue to trump 'democratic rights', such as liberty.
3.5 Morality, ethics and human rights under the African Charter on Human and
Peoples' Rights
Despite these shortcomings, however, the African Charter contains numerous
indications of underlying values, such as the express inclusion of certain human duties
towards family, community and state, that conform to widely accepted norms of
acceptable conduct. Virtually all societies will be able to identify with this expression
of a commonality of values. It bears with it further substantiation, if such were needed,
of the confident assertion that there is no reason why African heads of state should be
permitted to continue to claim a peculiarly African morality that entitles them to act in
disregard of, particularly, their citizens' individual rights.
120 ibid. at 92. See also E Ankumah The African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights Martinus
Nijhoff: The Hague 1996, reviewed by Rachel Murray in 1997 (13) SAJHR, 695-699
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Thus, the African Charter incorporates and repeats virtually all the rights recognised by
the principal international human rights instruments such as the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights and the Conventions on Civil and Political Rights, and on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights. In addition, the African Charter espouses what is arguably a
more balanced approach to the issue that, if adequately understood and appropriately
applied, holds the promise of correcting what some see as a Western drift from liberty
to licence.
For example, Article 17 of the African Charter obliges States parties to promote and
protect 'morals and traditional values recognised by the community'. While such values
inevitably vary to some extent between communities, they will be interpreted by the
Commission 'in conformity with the modem trend in the State as a whole,122.Although
uncommon in international instruments, these values reflect historically widespread, if
not necessarily contemporary, African social mores.
The African Charter may be said to recognise that pre-colonial Africa was no Nirvana
and enunciates a need to move away from the less acceptable aspects of traditional
African society. Accordingly, the individual is obliged, in Article 29(7) 'to preserve
and strengthen positive African cultural values in his relations with other members of
society, in the spirit of tolerance, dialogue and consultation and, in general, to
contribute to the moral well-being of society' (emphasis added). Further, Article 27(2)
requires that the 'rights and freedoms of each individual shall be exercised with due
regard to the rights of others, collective security, morality and common interest.'
The inclusion of these references and appeals to moral values exemplifies the important
and undeniable link between international law and international morality. Thus, for
example, the Treaty of Paris 1914 referred to 'the sin of the slave trade'. The Final Act
of the Congress of Vienna 1815 had viewed the slave trade as 'repugnant to the
121 See Heyns and Viljoen op cit. at 431
122 ibid at 97
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principles of humanity and universal morality'. In The Antelope, the United States
Chief Justice Marshall held that although the slave trade did not violate international
law (at the time), it was contrary to natural law123. Britain, nevertheless, subsequently
concluded many bilateral treaties banning the slave trade, which led to the first
multilateral treaty recognising its illegality: the Berlin Treaty of 1885. As a result, then,
of a (proclaimed) moral aversion, the slave trade was progressively outlawed.
Umozurike reiterates'j" the view that the "existence of any group of people, including
national and international communities, requires a substructure of law and morality; the
one supports the other. The 'law habit' [or, 'the rule of law'] encourages respect for
moral rules that are not legally binding, while morality strengthens the attitude of
respect for the law." One might add that morality supplements and leads changes in the
law by drawing attention to its deficiencies. Hence, as Oppenheim has pertinently
observed, "[t]he higher the standard of public morality rises, the more will International
Law progress,,125.
There is a "congenital" relationship between morality and legality, asserts
Umozurike'P, Personal morality plays a significant role in public morality. It is almost
tautologous to assert that a leadership that observes and respects a personal moral code
is less likely to challenge municipal or international law. For example, the determinants
of President Jimmy Carter's foreign policy prioritisation of human rights are said to
have been "his religious beliefs, his fundamentalist origins, the moralist streak of his
nature, and the success of the civil rights movement in the [American] South,,127.
Umozurike summarises the essence of this perspective when he observes that the
simple universal moral precept of the Golden Rule, i.e. doing unto others as we would
12323 US (10 Wheaton) 1825,66, quoted in Umozurike The African Charter op. cit. at 98
124 Umozurike ibid at 99
125 Sir Hersch Lauterpacht (ed.) International Law: A Treatise by LOppenheim (7 ed.) 1948, at 84,
quoted in Umozurike ibid at 99
126 Umozurike ibid at 101
127 Kenneth W Thompson Morality and Foreign Policy (1980) 72, quoted by Umozurike ibid at 101
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have them do unto us, "resolves seeming principled arguments into a straightforward
choice between right and wrong". Thus, for example, the prospective victim of a denial
of a right is quite unlikely to argue that his national state has an absolute right to deal
with him as it pleases, to the exclusion of intervention of any kind. One should adopt,
along with Umozurike, a perspective that focuses on the weak and vulnerable in any
situation, the attitude that prioritises the 'right' to an inviolable sovereignty is revealed
for what it is: a morally bankrupt 'threadbare' new robe for the emperor.
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CHAPTER FOUR: INTERNATIONAL LAW, HUMAN
RIGHTS AND ARMED HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
4.1 Armed humanitarian intervention in international law and practice: history
and theory
It was mentioned earlier that the policy instrument of armed humanitarian intervention
re-emerged strongly onto the international agenda following the end of the bipolar
stalemate of the Cold War. Variants of the tool have been used with some degree of
success, and after some reluctance, by the Western powers in the Balkans during the
disintegration of Yugoslavia and, more recently, in Afghanistan. On the other hand, the
failure to deploy it in Rwanda and elsewhere in Africa has been roundly condemned. A
more modest armed humanitarian intervention by the British in Sierra Leone has
produced a less dramatic and slower, but nevertheless effective cessation of the brutal
Liberian-supported civil conflict. Richard N. Haass has predictedl28 that both
opportunities and calls for armed humanitarian intervention are likely to increase in the
future.
Historically, the treatment of citizens by their own state was traditionally a matter of
domestic jurisdiction and the observance of human rights was merely amoral or
political obligation. The historical exceptions have been the treatment of foreigners and
gross human rights abuses, specifically in regard to religious and ethnic minorities.
Consequently, Stephen D. Krasner has observedl29 that the content of the human rights
agenda during various historical periods reflected the concerns of those states that
possessed superior economic and military power. Systems of human rights protection
have, historically, depended heavily, if not exclusively, on the power and interests of
128 Richard N Haass 'Intervention: the use of American military force in the post -Cold War world'
Brookings Institution: Washington DC 1999 at 132. See also Shyley Kondowe op. cit. at 90 ff; and
Geoffrey Robertson QC Crimes against humanity 403-424
129 Krasner 'Sovereignty, Regimes and Human Rights' in Volker Rittberger (ed.) Regime Theory and
International Relations Clarendon Press: Oxford 1993, 139-167 at 166
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
76
these states. This is because the essential functions of monitoring and enforcement have
depended on the policies adopted by the 'great powers'. In these circumstances, the
principle of self-help superseded the principle of non-intervention.
However, the gross abuses associated with the conduct of the warring countries during
the Second World War caused such revulsion that the UN Charter sought to reverse this
ordering of principles and, at least partly because of Hitler's abuse of the principle'?",
partially reasserted the principle of non-intervention". The Universal Declaration of
Human Rights that followed it mitigated this reordering by providing for a 'common
standard of achievement for all peoples of all nations,132,rather than a legal obligation,
to respect and promote human rights at an international level. However, the two 1966
International Covenants on human rights spelled out these same rights in legally
binding documents that evidenced a resumption of the efforts of earlier centuries to
mediate the relationship between the ruler and the ruled.
Since 1945 there has been an explicit effort to construct an international human rights
system - albeit not the first such endeavour. Thus, the Peace of Westphalia had
contained detailed provisions concerning religion in parts of Germany. Similarly, a
series of treaties, concluded in the first half of the nineteenth at the behest of Great
Britain, had created an international system to abolish the slave trade. Detailed
agreements were also concluded in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to
protect minorities in East and Central Europe. These early efforts, from the time of
Hugo Grotius in the 1400s until immediately prior to World War I, did not absolutely
prohibit war but sought to impose moral constraints on it133• Modern international
society has, however, sought to replace these moral constraints with overtly legal
proscriptions.
130 See Robertson op. cit. 31
131 Article 2(7), which must, however, be read with and qualified by Chapter VII, particularly Articles 39
and 51, and Article 55 in Chapter VIII
132 Eleanor Roosevelt, Chairperson of the United Nations Human Rights Committee, quoted in
Umozurike ibid. at 99
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These persistent attempts to create human rights systems that enshrined principles and
norms governing the relationship between leader and citizen, and the controversy they
have generated, are indicative of the inherent contradiction in the notion of state
sovereignty, asserts Krasner'<'. Thus, a political order based upon sovereign states
implies both the right of self-help and the norm of non-interference. But if states
actually have the right to pursue whatever policies they choose, there is nothing to
prevent them from interfering in the internal affairs of other states.
Such intervention has frequently been implemented directly, largely in the forms of
military and humanitarian intervention, and by way of cultural and economic
'imperialism'. But it has also been manifest in various human rights systems that have
reflected the values of the most powerful states in the system at a particular historical
juncture. The contemporary system of universal declarations and conventions largely
espouses the values of the western liberal democracies, he concludes.
However, he continues, the articulation of principles and norms is one thing; their
enforcement is quite another. He cites the example of the success of the anti-slavery
movement which, he finds, was largely a consequence of Britain's willingness to
unilaterally employ its naval power to police shipments on slave routes!", despite the
acknowledged existence of a widespread revulsion for the trade in the western world.
Thus, the religious tolerance and the later religious freedom that spread in the West was
not the result of an international regime, but of individual national states' reassessment
of their own priorities. Similarly, attempts to protect the minorities of Eastern and
Central Europe were a complete failure because the more powerful states were
unwilling to enforce the norms they had imposed. Even the coherence of the
contemporary human rights regime is attacked on the basis of the intermittent readiness
to commit meaningful resources to monitoring and enforcement.
133 Lassa Oppenheim International Law (7 ed.) Longman: London 1953, at 177-78, cited in Ryan op. cit.
at 81
134 Krasner ibid at 165
135 Robertson op. cit. 14
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These experiences, he concludes, tend to suggest the continuing relevance of the realist
paradigm, rather than the liberal co-operative model of international society and the
prospects of success for international human rights regimes. Krasner does concede,
nevertheless, that realism is unable to provide a full account of the creation and
implementation of human rights regimes. He quotes John Ruggie136 as saying that
"social purpose", which cannot be explained by a bare description of the distribution of
power in the international system has, in fact, determined the content of various
regimes. The reality of internal domestic divisions, and the presence and growth of an
active civil society have led to the creation of transnational alliances that contribute
substantially to the efficacy of human rights regimes in the modem era that increasingly
bypasses the power of the state.
Christopher M. Ryan137 elaborates on changes in strategic realities since the end of the
Cold War that demand a different response to the state power-focus of the realist
approach. During the Cold War, international society sought to resolve conflict by
emphasising and prioritising the "maintenance of state power and the inviolability of
territorial sovereignty". Political ideology and military might were arguably used to
maintain the status quo in an international system that often winked at state use of force
against other states and against internal populations'r".
Crucially, he notes the greater convergence of international political and legal
ideologies, at least in principle, as well as some change in the priorities of international
society. Accordingly, the primary concern of international society continues to be the
prevention and resolution of interstate conflict. However, the increasing attention given
to intrastate conflicts and their origins - previously considered to lie within the bounds
of the domestic jurisdiction of states - has prioritised humanitarian and human rights
136 Krasner, ibid at 167
137 'Sovereignty, Intervention and the Law' op. cit
138 Ryan cites Louis Henkin How Nations Behave Columbia University Press: New York, NY 1979 at
137-38
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law in contemporary conflict resolution processes'f". One example of this change is the
greater debate around and willingness to undertake controlled humanitarian
intervention in circumstances that would previously have been regarded as being of
solely domestic concern.
It is important to be aware of the dynamic nature of international law - as of any legal
system that aspires to continued relevance. Changing circumstances generally lead to a
change in the law, sooner or laterl4o• Thus, the failed efforts early this century to control
armed conflict, for example with the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, have been followed
by later efforts, such as the League of Nations and the United Nations. Consequently,
the Preamble to the UN Charter states that the guiding purpose of the organisation is to
'save succeeding generations from the scourge of war' and 'to ensure, by the
acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that armed force shall not be
used, save in the common interest'. At the time of the creation of the UN, the common
interest of states was the renunciation of all forms of international aggression.
Nevertheless, the Allied powers agreed even then that the regulation of warfare and the
basic protection of human rights could not be left entirely within the jurisdiction of
individual states'?'. As international society has changed, however, so has our
understanding of the 'common interest', argues Ryan. With the advent of human rights
law as a significant incarnation of international law, it is possible to argue that the
legality of humanitarian intervention should be judged against the international norms
that have developed since then.
139 United Nations Fact Sheet No. 13 International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights United
Nations Centre for Human Rights: Geneva, 1991. See, too, Michael Veuthey 'The Contribution of
International and Humanitarian Law to the Restoration of Peace' in Kevin Kahil (ed.) A Framework
for Survival: Health, Human Rights and Humanitarian Assistance in Conflicts and Disasters Council
on Foreign Relations: New York, NY 1993, cited in Ryan ibid 77
140 See, for example, Akehurst op. cit. at 23 ff and 176 ff; and Harris op. cit. at 11 ff
141 Thus, in 1948, US Secretary of State George Marshall observed that "Governments which
systematically disregard the rights of their own people are not likely to respect the rights of other
nations and other people and are likely to seek their objectives by coercion and force." Cited in
Stephen Marks 'The Roots of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in the French Revolution'
Human Rights Quarterly 20 (1998) 483-4, quoted in Robertson op. cit. 31
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The concept of sovereignty is not absolute under international law. Indeed, throughout
history, international society has placed varying degrees of constraint upon states'
domestic autonomy. While Ryan concedes Krasner's point that historical human rights
regimes were "motivated more out of political necessity than humanitarian concern",
this does not negate the fact that, for several centuries, international society has
endorsed the principle that governments cannot act with unrestrained licence within
their borders. The "weight of [further] positive law was added to these beliefs" when
the League of Nations enacted the first ('international' /multilateral') formal
commitments to the domestic protection of human rights.
These early 'exceptions' showed not only that states are capable of voluntarily agreeing
to curb both their international and internal conduct, but also that a willingness existed
to submit to the binding authority of an external authority, Carl von Clausewitz's
'competent body,142.Although the League, "an international organisation based on the
rule of law for the purpose of regulating not only international aggression, but also
internal state actions", ultimately failed, it set a precedent that cannot be ignored, says
Ryan. Indeed, the destructiveness of warfare has forced states to realise that it is in their
long-term interest to surrender certain aspects of their sovereignty and to accept the
regulation of conflict by an independent entity.
Accordingly, the world no longer faces the same threat of nuclear confrontation.
However, it continues to be confronted by a variety of lesser but no less significant
threats, such as the proliferation of weapons in developing countries, the rise of
conventional armies in the developing world, civil war, ethnic conflict, the drug and
slave trades, international terrorism, and 'warlordism' in Africa. The potential for
violence is increased by the uncertainty surrounding the 'rules of behaviour' in the
post-bipolar international system where no obvious hegemon has stepped in to fill the
void and decisively impose order.
142 See Ryan op.cit at 79-80
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The result is that each decision and each action by the United Nations assumes greater
relevance and significance as the de facto and de jure rules of conduct are being
developed. This vacuum represents an opportunity - and, indeed, a responsibility - for
international society, through international law, to provide a clearer and more detailed
'code of international conduct'. Hedley Bull also recognises that, given the absence in
international society of any legislative authority competent to change the law, it is
essential "to take account of changing values" when interpreting the law' 143. The
continued credibility of the international system depends, to no insignificant degree, on
its ability to generate these new rules.
The United Nations has a legally acknowledged role as the primary international forum
for international society to deliberate on global security and human rights issues. It is,
therefore, a strong contender for the role of Clausewitz's 'competent body' to lead the
development of international law in these fields, and particularly on the issue of control
of domestic human rights abuses that have the potential to lead to breaches of
international peace and security. Indeed, Article 13 of the UN Charter provides that:
'[t]he General Assembly shall initiate studies and make recommendations for the
purpose of:
- promoting international co-operation in the political field and encouraging the
progressive development of international law and its codification;
- promoting international co-operation in the economic, social, cultural, educational and
health fields, and assisting in the realisation of human rights and fundamental
freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion' (emphasis
added).
Further, Article 14 of the Charter allows the General Assembly, subject to a Security
Council request in terms of Article 12, to 'recommend measures for the peaceful
adjustment of any situation, regardless of its origin, which it deems likely to impair
the general welfare or friendly relations among nations'. These include 'situations
143 Bull op. cit. at 150
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resulting from the violation of the provisions of the present Charter setting forth
the Purposes and Principles ofthe United Nations' (emphasis added).
Article 1, setting out the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations, includes the
following provisions in paragraph 1.:
'To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective
collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for
the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring
about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and
international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations
which might lead to a breach of the peace ... ' (emphasis added).
It is clear from these provisions that the United Nations is endowed with the
competence to assist in the promotion of the peaceful resolution of disputes that have
their origin in domestic situations of gross human rights abuses. The UN's collective
mandate to ensure the peaceful settlement of disputes also provides it with the tools of
sanctions, concessions and the use of force, thereby facilitating the role of international
law in offering viable response options to the majority of conflicts".
However, Ryan then quotes J L Brierly as saying that "[l]aw will never playa really
effective part in international relations until it can annex to its own sphere some of the
matters which at present lie within the 'domestic jurisdiction' of ... states,,145. Ryan
thus acknowledges that the ability of international law, as developed by the United
Nations and generally, to perform this task and fulfil the role advocated by him, is
challenged by those who fundamentally question the relevance of international law.
Thus, classical realists, such as E H Carr and Hans Morgenthau, have expressed the
view that political/military power is the ultimate determinant in an anarchical state
144 Louis Henkin, Richard C Pugh, Oscar Schachter and Hans Smit International Law: Cases and
Materials West: St. Paul, Minn. 1993,945, cited in Ryan op. cit. at 82
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systeml46. Neorealists such as Kenneth Waltz, and structuralists such as Susan Strange
have argued, more recently, that economic and other power relationships determine the
structure of international relations'V. The realist tradition148 has argued that
international law is essentially an 'epiphenomenon'. As such, it has only a marginal
effect on state behaviour independent from the power relationships characterising
international society: States generally consider reliance on international law to be a
practical option only when it coincides with their overriding objective of power
maximisation.
On the other hand, institutionalists and legalists understand international law as one
among several important constraints on state behaviour. International law is capable of
promoting international co-operation by motivating states to recognise that their own
long-term self-interest requires them to observe and enforce intemational law'Y. Thus,
"[a]ll countries say that they are great defenders of and believers in human rights ....
No country really admits it is a human rights violator"15o. One would therefore argue
that such is the persuasive moral and legal force of the principles of both international
law and of human rights that no-one readily admits to brazenly flouting them. Rather, a
country that has, in fact, breached an internationally accepted standard will usually aver
that it has, instead, faithfully observed the relevant prescripts.
Article 2 (1) of the UN Charter provides that 'the organisation [i.e. the UN] is based on
the principle of the sovereign equality of all its members' and codifies the customary
145 Ryan ibid. at 82
146 E H Carr Nationalism and After Macmillan: London 1967; and Hans Morgenthau Politics Among
Nations: The Struggle/or Power and Peace A A Knopf: New York, NY 1967, cited in Ryan ibid.
at 83
141 Susan Strange 'Cave! hic dragones: a critique of regime analysis' in Stephen Krasner (ed.)
International Regimes Columbia University Press: Ithaca, NY 1977 at 333-54
148 Hedley Bull The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics Macmillan: London 1977 at
127-161
149 See Ryan op. cit. at 84 and the authorities cited there
150 Patricia Derian, ex-President Jimmy Carter's Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights, quoted
in Stanley Hoffman 'Reaching for the Most Difficult: Human Rights as a Foreign Policy Goal' in
Daedalus Vol. 112No.4 (Fall 1983) 19-49 at 26
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international legal norms of sovereignty and non-intervention inherited from the Peace
of Westphalia in 1648. It also embodies the foundation upon which much of the current
international legal system is built.
Even if one accepts this, however, it is possible to assert that sovereignty has been
compromised both in law and in principle (de jure), as well as in practice (de facto).
Thus, for example, in principle, the laws of war have prohibited states from waging war
in any manner that they choose: the concepts of 'proportionality' and 'necessity' are
accepted as principles overriding the sovereign authority of states. Moreover, in
practice, technological advances and the expanding realm of economic and social
interdependence of international society continue to decrease the ability of the state to
assert complete autonomy of domestic decision-making'<'. These practical matters of
daily life are progressively eroding the traditional understanding of sovereignty and are
blurring the distinction between the internal and international spheres of the conduct of
a state's affairs.
Moreover, international law also recognises the existence and legitimacy of' cardinal
principles that supersede the freedom of a state to act with impunity within its own
borders. Thus, ius cogens (or, the peremptory norms of international law, usually
considered to be derived originally from natural law, but now to be discerned primarily
from custom and treaties) is considered by leading authorities to bind states to the
extent that they may not contract out of them 152.
Thus, the Genocide Convention'F, the Convention Against Torture I54, and the
Convention Against Apartheid155 are human rights treaties that have codified and
151 See Ryan op. cit. at 85 and the authorities cited there
152 See Akehurst op. cit. at 40-41
153 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted 9 December 1948,
UN Treaty Series Vol. 78, 1951,277
154 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
adopted 10 December 1984, International Legal Materials Vol. 23, 1984, 1027
ISS Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, adopted 30 November
1973, cited in Ryan op. cit. at 86
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criminalised three of the primary principles of ius cogens. Additional limits to
sovereignty are recognised in international law: states may voluntarily conclude
agreements that limit their autonomy or which transfer aspects of their autarky to
international organisations, such as the UN, the European Union and the OAU.
While the principle of state sovereignty contained in Article 2 (7) of the UN Charter
expressly forbids international intervention in the 'domestic' affairs of a state, ''the
emerging legal view of sovereignty attempts to correct this fundamental flaw of the
Westphalian system,,156.Simply put, if absolute sovereignty prevailed in all matters of
international law, it would be entirely impossible to devise any norm or law that bound
all states, even if they were to purport to agree to a treaty. This fact, together with the
havoc a state can visit upon its domestic population, renders the principle potentially
catastrophic.
Consequently, 'absolutist' notions of sovereignty have begun to wane and, while the
state remains the legal agent of international action with the relevant elements of
independent decision-making, it is arguable that the legitimacy of state action is
increasingly understood as derived from 'the people' I57. This liberal definition of state
legitimacy has been endorsed by the United Nation Security Council'j", However, a
state's 'right' to govern its people (through its reiterated Westphalian claims of
territorial sovereignty) is tied to its 'responsibility' to those people by means of a
contract of consensual transfer of some of its citizens' rights159.
The crucial implication arising from this resolution is that a state that fails to meet its
obligations in this regard is legally subject to international sanction and to intervention
to enforce these responsibilities. Ex-President Bill Clinton of the United States was,
156 Ryan ibid at 87
157 Ryan ibid at 87 and the authorities cited there
158 Provisional Records of the Security Council, Document SIPV.3406.9, New York, NY: United
Nations, 1992
159 Fernando Teson Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry into Law and Morality Transnational
Publishers: Dobbs Ferry, NY 1988, 15, cited in Ryan ibid at 87
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thus, able to justify a bombing attack on a sovereign state that had done nothing to
damage narrow American interests on the grounds that "We could not stand aside and
let history forget the Kosovo Albanians,,160.He later elaborated: "In Kosovo, we did the
right thing, we did it the right way and we will fmish the job. Because of our resolve,
the twentieth century is ending not with helpless indignation, but with hopeful
affirmation of human dignity and human rights for the twenty-first century"'?'.
International human rights law, including the UN Charterl62, aims at the protection of
basic human values as expressed in individual and group rights. The Charter recognises
the connection between the respect for and observance of human rights, on the one
hand, and the maintenance of international peace and security on the other. Its purpose
is to provide a minimal standard of individual rights protection and to alleviate human
suffering. Customary international law, the laws of war and the 'general principles of
law' form the basis of many of the norms of international human rights law. The phrase
'general principles of law' is a reference to the Statute of the Permanent Court of
International Justice, the forerunner of the International Court of Justice'". There is no
reason, says Michael Akehurst, why it should not mean the general principles of both
international and national law. It includes the collection of laws found in the majority
of national and successive international legal systems that regulate the same concepts,
for example, the prohibitions on murder, slavery, torture and genocide.
The fundamental origins of human rights law, however, are to be found in the
relationships between states as contained in the international agreements concluded
since the Second World Warl64. Foremost among these are the UN Charter and the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The Charter, while speaking of human rights
protection in broad and arguably vague terms, nevertheless remains the ultimate source
160 Bill Clinton 'Why the Allies must fight on' Sunday Times (London) 18 April 1999, cited in Robertson
op. cit. 444
161 The Times (London) 15 July 1999 p. 46, cited in Robertson ibid. at 444
162 Article 55 of the UN Charter
163 Akehurst op. cit. at 34
164 Ryan op. cit. at 88
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of authority for enforcement'F. The Declaration, in Article 28, boldly asserts the
international framework for national human rights protection in the following words:
'Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and
freedoms set forth in this declaration can be fully realised' (emphasis added).
The ability of international society to ascertain when a gross violation of human rights
law has occurred is relatively easy; the proliferation of civil society organisations and
ease of access to advanced telecommunications has assisted official agencies in their
monitoring roles. It is considerably more difficult, however, for international society to
authoritatively enforce the law on offending states. Probably the most effective means
of imposing enforcement measures are the domestic courts of the violating state. But it
is unlikely that the courts in a state that perpetrates gross violations of human rights
will be either competent or prepared to challenge the actions of its political leaders.
International tribunals are potentially less partial- because they are less beholden - but
they have faced difficulties of authority.
The jurisdiction of an 'international' court is usually dependent upon the consent of the
states involved, as is demonstrated by the example of the Lockerbie aeroplane bombing
trial of Libyan nationals under Scottish law in the Netherlands. However, the recent
experience of the International Tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda has shown that it
is possible to set up credible institutions, whether with or without the consent of the
violating state. On the other hand, this option focuses on ex post facto activity whereas,
as the saying goes, 'an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure' .
4.2 Practical experiences of armed humanitarian intervention
The question then arises concerning the existence and nature of preventative measures
that might be available to the international community. One is armed humanitarian
intervention, but this mechanism is still controversial and, consequently, has been
165 Henkin and Pugh in Ryan ibid at 89
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rarely used and then usually once the situation has reached crisis proportions, such as
the British intervention in Sierra Leone. Even here, though, the situation could not be
termed intervention proper, as the British troops and supplies were dispatched to
Freetown only after an invitation from the beleaguered government. The Western
intervention in the Yugoslavian province of Kosovo and also in the Federation 's capital
of Belgrade at the end of 1998 are, perhaps the prime examples of humanitarian
intervention properly so-called in recent times.
Much has been said of late concerning the need for the UN, for example, to move away
from the impartiality of its peacekeeping mandate and corresponding avoidance of
military actionl66. The 1992 United Nations intervention in Somalia has been widely
understood as the equivalent of 'the lesson of Vietnam' (that is, 'stay out, period').
Nevertheless, the criticism arising from the subsequent decision to ignore the Rwandan
genocide has resuscitated the idea that some form of rapid intervention force should be
created to intervene in humanitarian disasters with a political origin or character.
As the twentieth century drew to a close, Geoffrey Robertson identified in the
Lockerbie trial, the Rwandan and Yugoslavian war crimes tribunals in Arusha and The
Hague, and in the arrest of General Pinochet, a veritable "quest - almost the thirst - for
justice". He asserts that this search replaced "even the objective of regional security as
the first principle of international action,,167.
This focus on 'justice' and on intervention in the internal affairs of the state emerges
from the growing understanding that most present and future conflicts will take place
within states, rather than between them. Hence the necessity of emphasising hitherto
subordinate themes. The reality of the changes wrought by the passing of the Cold War
era is beginning to be identified. With that recognition has come a readiness to begin
166 Robertson op.cit. 446
167 Robertson ibid 448
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discussing alternate strategies for the protection of human rights and the prevention of
large-scale human rights abuses and atrocities, not least in Africa.
One example has been the Nigerian-led ECOWASIECOMOG intervention in Liberia
and Sierra Leone. Another has been the United States'-inspired exploration of a
homegrown African 'peace-keeping' force. In the realm of human rights, as in the
arenas of culture and economics, the message is being sent that, given the imperatives
of globalisation, the days of almost unlimited state sovereignty are numbered.
Consequently, responsibility can no longer be denied and pressure is mounting for
some form of direct military action that cannot be indefinitely avoided. It is
appropriate, therefore, to consider the prospects for armed humanitarian intervention,
particularly given the recent history of failing African states where internal conflict is
characterised by widespread human rights abuses.
4.3 Armed humanitarian intervention: philosophical and theoretical dimensions
Ralph Pettman'I" has stated succinctly that "[m]oral discourse is an integral aspect of
any political conversation". Ralph G Carter has, similarly, bluntly observed'f" that
"[flor those entrusted with political power and held accountable for their actions, moral
considerations cannot be avoided". However, he continues, "policy decisions usually
involve trade-offs between multiple values, and one option rarely emerges as clearly
superior to others. ... The difficulties of making moral choices in government are
magnified in the foreign policy realm. . .. Unlike their domestic counterparts, foreign
policymakers are faced with the need to promote policies that are acceptable in both
domestic and external arenas".
American President Woodrow Wilson's 'idealism' of the 1930s offered the following
foreign policy prescription: if nations would adopt democratic forms of government
168 Pettman op. cit. at 17
169 'Morality in the Making of Foreign Policy' in Ethics, Government and Public Policy: A Reference
Guide J S Bowman and F A Elliston (eds.) Greenwood Press: Conn. 1988,287-305 at 287
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and consistently implement the 'golden rule' in their interactions, global harmony
would be advanced. The rise of fascism and the failure to preserve international peace
seemed, however, to prove the naïve and simplistic inadequacy of Wilson's notions for
the chaotic world of international politics characterised by the global crisis of the
Second World War.
Consequently, the aftermath of World War II witnessed the rising influence of realism
in American and Western foreign policy in general. The consequence was the close
identification between the USA and reactionary, repressive and authoritarian, yet anti-
Communist, regimes. The unsavoury nature of these regimes and the changes that
relationships with them wrought in US foreign policy contributed, in tum, to a growing
rejection of realism as a guide to policy. For idealists, moral considerations could not
be ignored and had to be reintroduced into the foreign policy-making process.
Reinhold Niebuhr led the criticism of Wilsonian idealism in the 1930s in his classic
Moral Man and Immoral Society: A Study in Ethics and Politics. He laid the foundation
for the realists who followed by dismissing the idea that moral considerations
applicable to individuals hold true also for society'Ï". He argued that groups were far
less likely than individuals to act morally since the former were ruled by emotion and
force, instead of reason. Moreover, the self-criticism required for moral analysis could
easily be interpreted as disloyalty to the group. Being emotionally- rather than
rationally-driven, groups fmd it difficult, if not impossible, to honestly give equal
consideration to the needs of both outsiders and its own.
Furthermore, the patriotism promoted by group loyalty has a perversely contrary and
immoral outcome. Individually, patriotism is a moral act following a voluntary decision
taken to sacrifice one's own needs to those of the group. But, as Niebuhr noted, "the
sentiment of patriotism achieves a potency in the ... soul, so unqualified, that the nation
is given carte blanche to use the power, compounded by the devotion of individuals, for
170 Scribner's: New York, NY 1932, discussed inCarter op. cit. at 288 ff.
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any purpose it desires". Thus, the individual act of patriotism might produce support for
immoral national practices, such as the killing of civilian non-combatants in wartime.
The most common conceptual paradigms of 'the group' in international relations are
'the state' and 'the nation-state'. And it is these structures that provided the focus for
the distinction between political and personal ethics, between the moral burdens of the
statesmen and their less strategically significant countrymen. It is not, says Pettman 171,
a quantum leap from a focus on the 'state', to "doctrines that positively exalt" its status,
to realpolitik and the logic that the most moral claims are those that preserve the
national interest, "however and by whomever this is defmed". He concedes, however,
that this does not deny the fact that enlightened self-interest is usually sufficient to
persuade against the resort to crude power politics alone.
By alleging that, in terms of group morality, the end justifies the means, Niebuhr
prepared the way for the realists who followed, including Hans Morgenthau who set
outl72 the fundamental principles of the theory. Realists considered that the laws of
human nature governed politics. Within the context of human frailties and
shortcomings, foreign policymakers sought to gain, maintain, or extend their national
power. Morality was shifting, dynamic and situational and so avoided the fundamental
'error' of equating one's own cultural moral views with some broader set of moral laws
governing the universe.
Morgenthau further argued that the ethics of nationalism had overcome the Christian
ethics of cosmopolitanism in the past 150 years. Consequently, leaders who followed
their 'true' national interests simultaneously engaged in 'moral national' behaviour,
171 Pettman op. cit. at 22
172 Hans J Morgenthau 'A Realist Theory of International Politics' in David L Larson (ed.) The Puritan
Ethic in United States Foreign Policy Van Nostrand: Princeton, N. J. 1966, 62-72. Also Politics
Among Nations A A Knopf: New York 1951; and 'The Mainsprings of American Foreign Policy' in
James M McCormick (ed.) A Reader in American Foreign Policy Peacock: Itasca, Ill. 1986, 48-50,
all cited in Carter op. cit.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
92
whereas those whose actions were based on their personal moral principles engaged in
'moralistic' behaviour, which would certainly fail to achieve its goals.
The realist approach offered two advantages. Firstly, it appeared to more closely reflect
international politics than did Wilsonian idealism. Secondly, realism seemed to
legitimise the use of immoral means to achieve moral ends. Realists, thus, favoured
teleological arguments that defined actions as moral based on the goodness of the goals
those actions were intended to achieve, rather than on the attributes of the behaviour
itself. One might add that, with intention as the defining precondition, realists also
disregarded the issue of whether or not the envisaged goal was, in fact, achieved.
Idealists, on the other hand, tended to accept deontological arguments that prioritised
just action, even if unjust outcomes perhaps resulted.
The most notorious exponent of the view that immoral means may be employed in the
pursuit of some greater good is probably NiceoIo Machiavalli, who is regularly
wheeled out to illustrate the cynics' position. "A prince", he argued, "cannot observe all
those things which are considered good in men; being often obliged, in order to
maintain the state, to act against faith, against charity, against humanity, and against
religion ... he must ... not deviate from what is good, if possible, but be able to do evil
if constrained ... ,,173. Similarly, "[al man who wishes to make a profession of goodness
in everything must necessarily come to grief among so may who are not good.
Therefore it is necessary for a prince [and a peoplel, who wishes to maintain himself, to
learn how not to be good, and to use and not use it according to the necessities of the
case"!".
173 The Prince and the Discourses Random House: New York, NY 1950, at 64-6, cited in Pettman op. cit.
at23
174 ibid Cho XV and Cho XVlII quoted in JD B Miller 'Morality, Interests and Rationalisation' in
Pettrnan op. cit. 36-51 at 40
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Pettman correctly identifies175 something "more important" in Machiavelli's position:
"Implicit in it is a direct attack on one enduring assumption of Western political
thought, that of the existence of 'natural law"'. He states that Machiavelli
"malignantly" ignored the tradition because he viewed Christian morality as simply
incompatible for a head of state with the sort of secular morality he considered
necessary to build a secure state. As Isaiah Berlin has argued176, " ••• For Machiavelli
there is no conflict [between public and private morality]. Public life has its own rules:
to which Christian ethics is a gratuitous obstacle".
There is more to this than the argument that love and goodness cannot be realised in the
public arena, and that generous motives may be foolish and dangerous when pursued in
an environment of hostility and interstate competition. It goes further than the
separation of politics and ethics; "it is the uncovering of the possibility of more than
one ethical system, with no criterion common to the systems whereby a rational choice
can be made between them". The implication of denying the existence of an objective
and generalised set of human ideals entails the collapse of a cornerstone of the Western
philosophical tradition, Berlin asserts. The existence of an objective, generalised set of
ideal standards for human behaviour is usually understood to have its origin in Grotius'
natural law, which he successfully severed from the limitations of divisive and
intolerant human religious denominations.
Unsurprisingly, the realist idea that policymakers could be absolved of the moral
consequences of their actions was strenuously challenged. Critics noted that, in the real
world, policies were devised and implemented by people who were rarely able to
maintain a separation between their value systems and their decisions. The focus of
idealist criticism was their rejection of the realist use of immoral means to attain moral
ends. Indeed, idealists noted approvingly that realists such as Morgenthau accepted that
175 Pettman ibid at 23
176 Isaiah Berlin The Originality of Machiavelli a paper delivered to the Political Studies Conference,
Oxford, 27 March 1963, 1, quoted by Pettman ibid at 23
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the defmition of national interests should be narrowly defmed and should take into
account the needs of other nations177.
Similarly, other realists like Alexander Hamilton, Theodore Roosevelt and George
Kennan endorsed the idealist principle that the pursuit of national interests should be
constrained by moral considerations. Kennan proposed that [American] foreign policy
should be consistent with [American] moral standards, but should not seek to impose
those standards on others. Hence, Americans [and others] should not object when other
states offend US [their own] sensibilities but do not hurt essential national interests.
The extensive historical span represented by these individuals indicates the "continuing
impact of moral considerations on American foreign policy,,178; Indeed, Carter
assertsl79 that the "only major exception to the close linkage between the means of
American foreign policy and claims to higher moral values came during the height of
the Cold War". The deep divisions around involvement in Vietnam facilitated renewed
interest in idealist approaches to international relations.
Nevertheless, asserts Carterl80, there may be broader international consensus on moral
issues than many realise. He quotes Niebuhr as claiming that "enlightened men of all
nations have some sense of obligation to their fellow-men, beyond the limits of their
nation-state". Carter goes on to cite Paul A Freund" as saying that this sense of
obligation may be virtually universal, since most cultures value justice and the
equitable treatment of individuals.
Unfortunately, says Carter, universal values are often too general to provide policy
guidance in specific real-world cases. Significantly, however, Carter fails entirely to
177 Carter op. cit. at 289
178 ibid at 290
179 ibid at 291
180 ibid at 302 and the authorities cited there
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consider the implications of the expanding role that the notion of human rights is
playing in providing an ever more detailed set of values against which to assess
political action. Miller understands this point when he states182, from within a state-
centric paradigm, that the only hope of relative international harmony and a wider
common morality being applied lies in "sufficient mutual accommodation". This
balancing of interests will continue to be essential if peace and development are to take
root, and this will require both African states and Western-dominated institutions to
demonstrate a simultaneous recognition of each other's legitimate concerns about the
other.
Miller relies on Figgis183 when he emphasises the fundamental necessity of a general
acceptance of the existence of some universal imperative if the rights of 'others' are to
be given any consideration. "Some form of the 'reason and nature doctrine' must
prevail", he argues. Otherwise nationalist expedience will continually threaten to
atomise domestic and international society.
R J Vincent" goes further than Miller in his interpretation of natural law and
propounds the position that "universality is ... implied by the very idea of morality".
'Right reason' as the means of accessing the moral principles inherent in (human)
nature is available - and applicable - to all humankind. Both essential elements of
justice are, accordingly, universally present in and binding on the individual, including
Machiavelli's prince. Thus, he says, "[I]fthe protection of the interests of individuals or
groups is something which in general the state does better than any more inclusive
entity [such as a smaller, more congruent, group], then the interests of the state ...
181 'Philosophy, Moral Reasoning and Law' in Kenneth W. Thompson (ed.) Ethics and International
Relations Transaction/Council on Religion and International Affairs: New Brunswick, N.J. 1985,
cited in Carter ibid at 291
182 Miller op. cit. at 50
183 J N Figgis From Gerson to Grotius Cambridge 1923,74-7
184 R J Vincent 'Western Conceptions ofa Universal Moral Order' in Pettman (ed.) op. cit. at 52-78
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acquire thereby a moral dignity,,185.State morality is, thus, derivative rather than
something to be found a priori.
The realist position stands to be criticised for accepting, but then fixing, this domestic
position and generalising it to the international arena by its doctrine of the immutability
of a morally plural world. In an increasingly interdependent and globalising world, it is,
simply, increasingly inaccurate. The consequence of the realist position is a norm of
non-intervention that suffices only in a world of self-contained states, whereas it is
argued that it constitutes moral abdication in contemporary circumstances.
Vincent identifies several dimensions of the debate between realism and idealism.
There is, first, disagreement about the principles that are to direct action in international
relations. Secondly, there is debate around the criteria by which we judge actions once
taken. Thirdly, the origin of these rules, and the basis of obligation to them, are the
subjects of dispute. 'Naturalists', or supporters of the natural law orientation, assert that
rules of right reason are discoverable by the use of the intellect and apply to humankind
and their institutions by virtue of their very humanity. Positivists, or realists, on the
other hand, derive rules from command, custom or treaty, and "from practice rather
than precept". The latter appealed to "good sense" in not setting rules too far ahead of
behaviour, and observed that different societies did, in fact, have different moral
regimes.
Nevertheless, the attention paid to human rights in such instruments as the UN Charter,
the Charter of the Nuremburg International Military Tribunal and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, arose not from the evidence of state practice, but from a
conviction about right conduct regardless of state practice.
185 ibid. at 58
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There are four grounds upon which 'naturalism' , to which these developments
represented a return, may be defended as a source of morality. In the first place, the
positivist doctrine that what is considered to be right in any society is, in fact, right,
might have the effect of legitimising practices that the ordinary person would fmd
morally offensive. Natural law, here, is the ordinary person's 'informant' or
conscience. Secondly, the "unscientific" quality of the naturalist description of a
universal morality, viz. "principles of conduct discouraged by the use of right reason",
can be avoided by rephrasing it into either a logical question regarding the necessities
for social life, or into an empirical question. For example, "Are there, as a matter of
observation, certain principles of human conduct that are universal in the sense that no
society exists that does not, to some extent, observe them?" A variant on this latter
question would ask whether it is accurate to assert that a capacity for ethical conduct
may be observed in people everywhere so that, even if the particular rules are different,
an "ethical competence" is universal.
A third defence of natural law relies not on its form but on its function: Whatever might
be thought of the particular pronouncements of natural law at particular times, it is a
body of doctrine that has fulfilled three "majestic" functions in Western political
experience. It has established a universal basis for law (the Stoics; Rome); it has
provided a rational foundation for ethics (Aquinas); and it has produced a theory of
natural rights that infused the American and French revolutions.
Rationalism, observes Vincent, is a thread that runs through each of these functions and
constitutes a fourth defence of natural law. A significant part of morality is included if
one required 'good' reasons for any action. He recognises that this is a weak defence
because it separates 'right' and 'reason', thereby letting in positivism by default. But,
he exhorts, it does, at least, "provide a protest against arbitrariness". If this were the
only function of naturalism, its 'otherworldliness' would be a central weakness. On the
other hand, its 'worldliness' is the central weakness of positivism.
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Human rights are the modem incarnation of natural rights. They claim a universal
applicability and an authority that both precedes and supersedes human enactment.
However, the free exercise of human rights is still extensively held in thrall to the
strictures of positivism and the limitations of its cognate, realism. Sir Hirsch
Lauterpacht' s assertion that, by virtue of the fundamental rights of the individual in the
Charter of the United Nations and in other international instruments, he has now been
constituted a subject of international law whose rights and freedoms states have a duty
to observe. But this statement is to be balanced against the positivist limitation that
hinders much of international law - the poor prospects of enforceability.
There is a greater likelihood of even the smallest state enforcing its rights than there is
of the individual doing so, at least in regard to rights not also recognised in regional
instruments - as in Europe - that establish a court accessible to the individual. This is
all the more true if Article 2(7) of the UN Charter - the clause reserving domestic
jurisdiction against any intrusion by the international organisation except in the case of
the enforcement of peace and security - is taken seriously and is not regarded as an
outmoded dogma. Indeed, UN practice, as noted elsewhere, has, until relatively
recentlyl'", been to reinforce domestic jurisdiction rather than to accord enhanced status
and recognition to the individual. Accordingly, the 1966 UN General Assembly
covenants on human rights retreated from the individual-focus of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and provided only that states may petition the human
rights committees established by them on behalf of an individual in another state.
If states are to remain the guardians of human rights within each other's territories, any
expectations about their performance must be measured against their unpromising
record thus far in this regard. This is especially so given their collective failure
regarding the issue of primary concern in the UN Charter - the maintenance of peace
and security in international relations.
186 See Provisional Records of the Security Council, Document SIPV.3406.9, New York, NY, United
Nations, 1992, cited in Vincent ibid at 70
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
99
Nevertheless, it is the idea that states do have duties concerning human rights that has,
according to Vincent, informed the traditional doctrine of humanitarian intervention, so
that if a state's behaviour seriously offends the conscience of international society it is
disentitled from invoking the principle of non-intervention. The problem with this
doctrine is, in his view, however, not in its identification of the evil to be discontinued,
but in the trust we are required to place in those who are to act on behalf of the
international community. The moral argument for non-intervention even in the face of
gross and outrageous conduct within a state arises partly because of the absence of such
trust in those who have not proven themselves worthy of it, and partly because of the
uncertain practical consequences of intervention.
The moral basis for the principle of non-intervention in international society is founded
on an analogy with the right of individuals to be left alone to pursue their legitimate
ends, as long as they do not, in so doing, interfere unduly with the similar activity of
others. States, however, enjoy an additional moral claim to the application to them of
the principle. It is not based upon any intrinsic moral superiority of this particular form
of group association, but on its practical potential to provide a "framework of order
within which justice might be achieved. It is to be defended then, on moral grounds, for
what it makes possible, rather than for what it is", it being difficult to conceptualise
justice facilitated except by the provision of order.
It may be true that this order might "play host to injustice" in a particular instance. He
argues!", however, that for the moral defence of the state to be rendered indefensible,
and with it the principle of non-intervention, "it would have to be shown that its affront
to justice was systematic, and not merely possible". Ultimately, therefore, the moral
case for non-intervention relies not on the perfection of the state, but on the absence of
a serious and viable competitor for its role as a community within which morals might
be enforced.
187 What are Human Rights? at 81, quoted in Vincent ibid. at 78
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Where, however, offences against human rights are extensive or extreme, and the
particular state has clearly lost the moral argument, it is grotesque to pander to form
when substance demands action. Insistence on the pretence of an invitation to intervene
is hypocritical and reliance on the moral purity of the intervening state too unreliable.
Multilateral approval and co-operation is the remaining option, whether at the regional
or global level. Even Hedley Bull finds a consensual multilateral approach to
intervention ecceptable", although he predicates this upon the object of intervention
failing to conform to the defming characteristics of a state, either completely or, ideally,
at all.
Bull challenges the claim that developments in the field of human rights are evidence of
the "majestic progress of the prevailing norms of world politics 'from international law
to world law', the birth-pangs of a world society or community that is replacing the
society of states".
He then asserts that "the legal standing of many of the declarations and resolutions in
which standards of human rights are proclaimed, is in dispute. With the important
exception of the European Convention, the instruments that have been developed are
without effective procedures for implementation and enforcement. There is
[furthermore] a great gap between the standards proclaimed and actual 'human rights
conditions' in various parts of the world". He thereby implicitly calls into question the
legality of virtually the entire body of international law, despite the widespread
agreement on its status as law, as reflected by respected writers such as D J Harrisl89
and Michael Akehurst'Ï". Bull fmds support from John Stuart Mill, for whom "... the
law of nations is simply the custom of nations"!". Michael Akehurst, however,
cautions that "it is significant that those who regard international law as a form of [non-
188 'Human Rights and World Politics' in Pettman (ed.) op. cit. 79-91 at 83
189Cases and Materials on International Law (3 ed.) 1983 op. cit
190 'A Modem Introduction to International Law' (3 ed.) 1977; and (5 ed.) 1984 op. cit.
191 quoted by Varouxakis 'John Stuart Mill on intervention and non-intervention' inMillennium op. cit.
at 71
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binding] morality usually speak of it as 'mere morality",192. It is suggested that this
recitation by Akehurst speaks volumes about the fundamental assumptions of the
adherents to the view that international law is not law.
Bull goes on to argue that it is clear, despite the convergence of values around human
rights that one may infer from the proliferation of treaties and declarations, that "there
are divergences of the most fundamental kind as to what these values are". One may
observe that arguments based upon the general similarity of the central principles of
human legal systems might be similarly inadequate.
However, it would not, it is believed, be inappropriate to observe that circumstances
have changed since Bull wrote in 1979. He is, consequently, no longer entirely accurate
in his assertion that "claims that they express not the consent of states, but 'the general
will of the world community', are an aspiration rather than a description of actual
trends". Indeed, even then, Bull accepted ex-President Jimmy Carter's insistence that
there is nothing parochial or tendentious about the contention that, for example, the
denial of such 'basic' human rights, as are represented by torture and the refusal of a
fair trial, is wrong, however widespread these practices may be.
There can be no denying that there continues to be an element of aspiration in human
rights documents, but there is also a progressively generalising recognition that states
are obligated to comply with rules enshrining human rights. The fact that some states
frequently do not comply usually leads them to deny or excuse such failure rather than
to deny their obligation. Indeed, a trend does seem to be emerging in favour of
compliance. Significantly, it is suggested, Bull concedes that "[i]t is possible that the
area of shared moral attitudes and preferences in world society as a whole will grow".
Michael Walzer elaborates on the long-recognised place of human rights in
international society and the 'distinction' between the rights of the state and those of
192 Akehurst op. cit. at 1
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the individuals who inhabit it. He consequently describesl'" the rights of political
communities (Le. 'states'), viz. territorial integrity and political sovereignty, as deriving
ultimately from the rights of individuals. It is from individuals that states acquire their
authority. He quotes John Westlake194 as holding that "[t]he rights and duties of states
are nothing more than the duties and rights of the men who compose them".
Thus, when state are attacked, it is their members who are challenged, not only as to
their lives, but also as to the aggregation of the things they value most, including the
political association they have developed that enables and facilitates all those other
things. The challenge to the state is recognised and explained in terms of their
members' rights. If they were not morally entitled to choose their form of government
and influence the policies that shape their lives, external coercion would not constitute
the crime of aggression. Indeed, individual rights (to life and liberty) underpin the most
important judgments we make about war. States' rights are simply their collective form.
The rights of states, says Walzer, rest on the consent of their members, on the basis of
contract theory. 'Contract' is a metaphor for the process of association and mutuality,
the continuing nature of which the state claims to protect against external threats of
encroachment. The moral standing of any particular state depends upon the reality of
the common life it protects and the extent to which the sacrifices required by that
protection are willingly accepted and considered justified.
The consequence of this contract is that political allegiance presages legal title to land,
which follows the people who live on it. Consequently, territorial integrity is a function
of national existence: it is the coming together of a people that establishes the integrity
of the territory. Walzer bolsters this explanation by reference to the primary form of the
'legalist paradigm' of the defmition of aggression, which has been endorsed by the
193 Michael Walzer 'The Rights of Political Communities' in International Ethics Princeton University
Press: Princeton, N. J. 1985, 165-194 at 167
194 John Westlake Collected Papers L. Oppenheim (ed.) Cambridge, England, 1914, at 78, cited in
Waltzer ibid. at 167
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United Nations General Assembly'": He presages his discussion of this paradigm with
the caveat that the complex realities of international society have required the devising
of a 'revisionist paradigm' in order to more accurately provide for judgments on the
justice and injustice of particular wars.
The legalist paradigm of the theory of aggression is summed up in six propositions:
1. There exists an international society of independent states
States are the members of this society, not individual men and women. In the absence
of a universal state, men and women are protected and their interests represented only
by their own governments. Although states are founded for the sake of life and liberty,
they cannot be challenged in the name of these rights by any other states: Hence the
principle of non-intervention. The rights of private persons can be recognised in an
international society, as in the UN Charter and Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
but they cannot be enforced without challenging the dominant values of that society:
the survival and independence of separate political communities.
2. This international society has a law that establishes the rights of its members - above
all, the rights of territorial integrity and political sovereignty
These two rights rest, ultimately, on the right of men and women to build a common
life and to risk their individual lives only when they freely elect to do so. Nevertheless,
the relevant law refers only to states, and its details are determined by the conflictual
and consensual interactions between states. These processes are continuous, and
international society therefore has no fmal structure, although territory and sovereignty
can be described at any point in time.
3. Any use of force or imminent threat of force by one state against the political
sovereignty or territorial integrity of another constitutes aggression and is a criminal act
195 See the 'Report of the Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression (1974), General
Assembly Official Records, 29th Session, Supplement No. 19(A/9619), 10-13, discussed in Walzer op.
cit. at 175 ff
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As is the case with domestic crime, the focus is on actual or imminent action: a state
cannot be said to be forced to resist unless the necessity is both obvious and urgent.
4. Aggression justifies two kinds of violent response: a war of self-defence by the
victim and a war of law enforcement by the victim and any other member of
international societv
Anyone may come to the aid of the target state, use necessary force against the
aggressor, and make the equivalent of a 'citizen's arrest'. As in domestic society, the
duties of bystanders are not entirely clear, but the theory tends to negate the right of
neutrality and to require general participation in law enforcement.
5. Nothing but aggression can justify war
The central purpose of the theory is to limit the incidence of war. There must have been
a wrong and it must have been received (or is imminent). Nothing else justifies the use
of force, not even domestic injustice. Hence, again, the principle of non-intervention.
6. Once the aggressor state has been militarily repelled, it may also be punished
The concept of the just war is ancient, but neither the procedures nor the forms of
punishment have been firmly established in customary or positive international law.
Nor are its ends clear: retribution, deterrence; restraint or reform? The domestic adage
is 'punish crime to prevent violence'; its international equivalent is 'punish aggression
to prevent war' .
The implication of the paradigm is clear: if states are members of international society,
the subject of rights, they must also be the object of punishment.
The principle that states should never intervene in the domestic affairs of other states
"follows readily from the legalist paradigm and, less readily and more ambiguously,
from those conceptions of life and liberty that underlie the paradigm and make it
plausible", Walzer observes. These same conceptions "seem also to require" that we
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disregard the principle on occasions. Consequently, 'intervention' is not defmed as a
criminal activity and, although intervention in its various forms may entail threats to the
territorial integrity and political sovereignty of target states, including invasion, it can
be justified. And, as an exception to a fundamental organising principle of an
international society that some see as perpetually on the brink of anarchy, it must be
justified.
Walzer expands upon his thesis by referring to the ideas of John Stuart Mill196,
discussed elsewhere, who retains the individual/community analogy. The citizens of
target states are the members, it is presumed, of a political community entitled, a priori,
to collectively determine their own affairs, says Mill. States are to be treated as self-
determining regardless of whether or not their internal political arrangements can be
described as free, for 'self-determination' and 'political freedom' are not equivalent
terms. Thus, a state is 'self-determining' even if its citizens struggle unsuccessfully to
establish free institutions, and it has been deprived of self-determination even if such
institutions have been established - but by an intrusive neighbour.
The members of a political community, Mill holds, must seek their own freedom, just
as the individual must cultivate his own virtue. They cannot be liberated, and he cannot
be rendered virtuous, by any external force. Indeed, political freedom depends upon the
existence of individual virtue - which the armies of another state is most unlikely to
elicit unless, perhaps, they inspire an active resistance and set in motion a process of
political self-determination. But, Mill implies, the raw material must be there in the first
instance. Self-determination, accordingly, is the school in which virtue is learned (or
not) and liberty is won (or not).
Mill allows that a people who have endured the "misfortune" to be ruled by a tyrannical
government are peculiarly disadvantaged: they may never have enjoyed the opportunity
196 J S Mill 'A Few Words on Non-Intervention' in J S Mill Dissertations and Discussions New York,
1873, Vol. III, 238-63, discussed in Walzer ibid at 178 ff.
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to develop the virtues required for establishing and maintaining freedom. But he stands
firm, nevertheless, on the stem doctrine of self-help. "It is during an arduous struggle to
become free by their own efforts that these virtues have the best chance of springing
up". Walzer here draws an instructive comparison with the Marxist aphorism that '[t]he
liberation of the working class can come only through the workers themselves'F".
Mill appears to believe that citizens get the government they deserve or, at least, the
government for which they are "fit". And the only test of whether a people have
become 'fit' for democratic institutions is that they, or a sufficient number of them to
prevail in a contest, "are willing to brave labour and danger for their liberation.... No
people ever was and remained free, but because it was determined to be so; because
neither its rulers nor any other party in the nation could compel it to be otherwise"!".
Paraphrasing Mill, one may conclude that there exists no right to be protected from the
consequences of domestic political, i.e. individual moral, failure.
However, Walzer notes an important rider to Mill's apparently rigid position: force
directed by a state at its own people will never prevail over a people ready to "brave
labour and danger", except if it is reinforced from outside. Correspondingly, only if the
external intervention force is prepared to undertake action that is continuous and
sustained over time can it shift the domestic balance of power decisively toward the
forces of freedom. Contrarily, however, it is precisely any prolonged or intermittent
intervention that carries with it the greatest threat to the triumph of the domestic forces
of freedom; the former, one surmises, because it portends either to overwhelm or to
atrophy the internal liberation forces, the latter simply because of its unreliability.
197 Irving Howe (ed.) 'The Basic Writings of Trotsky' New York, 1963,397, cited in Walzer ibid at 179
198 John M. Robson (ed.) 'The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill' Vols. 1-33, University of Toronto
Press: Toronto and London 1963-1991 Vol. 21,123-4, quoted in Varouxakis op. cit. at 60
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These are, says Walzer, the ''truths expressed by the legal doctrine of sovereignty",
which defmes the "liberty of states as their independence from foreign control and
coercion". While, of course, not every internationally 'independent' state is
domestically 'free', he suggests that the recognition of sovereignty is "the only way we
have" of establishing a ring within which battle for liberty can be conducted and
sometimes won. As with individuals, so with sovereign states: there are some things
that we cannot do, even when it is ostensibly for their own good.
The dangers of and barriers to intervention remain. Nevertheless, the language of
human rights is creating a transnational justice constituency that continues to pressurise
states to improve their domestic conduct. It is this constituency that promises to ensure
the creation of a means more dependable than either unilateral state-to-state, or
multilateral, intervention has proven to be. As Maurice Cranston has said199: "There is
indeed something deeply absurd in an arrangement by which something so personal and
individual as the rights of man should be settled in committees to which only
governments have access; it is a situation worthy of Lewis Carroll".
Consequently, concedes Walzer, "the ban on boundary crossings is not absolute", partly
because of the frequently "arbitrary and accidental nature" of such borders, and partly
because of the ambivalent relationship between the political community or
communities within those borders and the government that holds that ring. Both of
these grounds are of immense significance for post-colonial Africa, one would suggest,
especially in view of the debate around 'state failure' in Africa200 and Hedley Bull's
concessionê'" vis-a-vis entities whose status as states is open to doubt, for whatever
reason. Echoing Bull, Walzer - correctly, it is submitted - identifies a significant
lacuna in the non-intervention principle: it is often unclear when a community is, in
fact self-determining; when it qualifies, in effect, for non-intervention. In fact, Mill
199 source unknown
200 see, for example, Jeffrey Herbst 'Responding to State Failure in Africa' International Security Vol. 21
NO.3 (Winter 1996/7) 120-144; and Shadrack Gutto 'The African state, human rights and refugees'
in Putting People First by Mathoma et al., op. cit. 73-84, especially 76-7
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later modified his position to hold that 'liberal' powers have a right to "assist struggling
liberalism", without the condition precedent of ongoing interference by a foreign
powe~02.
The prohibition on intervention is, accordingly, subject to unilateral suspension in three
categories of case where it apparently fails to serve the purposes for which it was
devised:
1. When a set of borders contains two or more political communities, one of which is
already engaged in a large-scale military struggle for independence. In other words,
when the international community is faced with a war of national liberation or
secession. Examples are numerous: North and South Korea; North and South Vietnam;
East Timor and Indonesia; Eastern Europe during the Cold War; the Kurds and Iraq and
Turkey; Afghanistan; Sudan; Ethiopia and Eritrea; Katanga and Zaire; and the range of
anti-colonial struggles in Central America and Africa.
2. When the borders have already been crossed by the armed forces of a foreign power,
even if invited by one of the parties to a civil war. This constitutes the instance of
counter-intervention. The wars in the former Yugoslavia, Angola and Namibia and,
more recently, the conflict in ZairelDemocratic Republic of Congo, spring to mind.
3. When the violation of human rights within domestic borders is so abhorrent that it
makes talk of community or self-determination or 'arduous struggle' seem cynical and
superfluous, such as in cases of enslavement or genocide.
ad 1. National liberation or secession
A difficulty arises in trying to ascertain whether a liberation or secessionist movement
in fact represents a distinct community, or that the community has voluntarily
201 Bull 'Human rights and world politics' in Pettman op. cit. 79-91 at 83
202 Varouxakis op. cit. at 70
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coalesced as opposed to succumbed to the threatened or actual terror of a superior
force. Consequently, the mere appeal to the principle of self-determination is
insufficient: evidence must be furnished that a community exists whose members are
committed to independence and are ready and able to determine the conditions of their
own existence. Thus the requirement of a political or military struggle sustained over
time.
Domestic despots are, according to this scenario, protected, but perpetrators of imperial
or colonial oppression are not. The reason underlying the distinction may be found in
the supposed task of international society, viz. to establish independent communities,
and not necessarily liberal or democratic ones. While, however, counter-intervention
for the sake of independence is 'honourable and virtuous', it is not always necessarily
prudent - or even morally required - because of the dangers involved.
ad2. Civil War
It is rare that a national liberation movement unambiguously embodies the claims of a
single, unified political community, is capable of sustained military action, and is
challenged by a clearly alien force whose intervention can be avoided or halted without
risking a wider war. The prospective third party intervenor is more frequently faced
with a confused web characterised by claim and counterclaim. It is, consequently,
extremely difficult to establish the point at which a direct and open intervention,
military or otherwise, may be fairly described as a counter-intervention. It is similarly
difficult to predict the effects of such intervention.
In these circumstances a qualified form of self-help is applied. Assistance to the
established government is permitted on the grounds that it is 'the official representative
of communal autonomy in international society'. Assistance may, however, be given
for only as long as the government faces only internal dissension, rebellion or
insurgency. As soon as the insurgents acquire sustained control over some significant
portion of the territory and population of the state, they are to be regarded as
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
110
belligerents with rights, including an equality of status with the government. In such
circumstances, neutrality is enjoined and even obligatory. For once a community is
effectively divided, foreign intervention (as discussed earlier) rarely serves the cause of
self-determination.
Regrettably, it is suggested, this position can amount to a bare endorsement of de facto
positivist realism, as it succumbs to the exercise of sheer force. Mill and Walzer argue
that "foreign states cannot establish or disestablish the legitimacy of a government". It
cannot be gainsaid: there can be no doubting the central importance of the standing of
the government with its own people. But, one would continue, the stated position is
insufficiently nuanced to take account of whether the population is divided as a result
of the exercise of force or of choice. Granted that it may be extremely difficult to
ascertain the truth of the matter, but it is suggested that an effort should at least be made
to determine whether sheer overwhelming brute force has quenched the fires of liberty,
and whether it has been supplemented from outside a territory.
But what is the test of legitimacy of and popular support for a government where 'true'
democracy is unknown? Walzer and Mills would say that it is the test of self-help. The
legitimacy of a new regime is assumed during a period of grace, giving it time to build
support. But a government that receives economic and technical aid, military supplies
and strategic and tactical advice, and is still unable to instil obedience, let alone
allegiance, in its population, is plainly illegitimate, whether defmed according to
sociological or moral standards. Ultimately, therefore, counter-intervention is morally
permissible only on behalf of a government that has already passed the self-help test.
ad 3. Humanitarian intervention
A legitimate government, then, for Mill, is one that can fight its own internal wars. And
external assistance in such wars is, says Walzer, correctly termed counter-intervention
only when it balances, and does no more than balance, the prior intervention of another
power, making it possible once again for the domestic forces to win or lose on their
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own. The result of civil wars should not be indicative of the strength of the intervening
states, but of the domestic balance of power.
There are, however, other instances where the external players do not wish the internal
balance to prevail - precisely because it is an artificial balance maintained by force. If
the dominant forces within a state are engaged in massive violations of human rights,
insistence upon self-determination and self-help is neither appealing nor persuasive,
despite the limitations and potential complications that have been recognisedi'".
Walzer distinguishes the reference to self-determination and self-help as applying to the
freedom of the political community as a whole; it is inapplicable when the basic
survival or essential liberty of a substantial numbers of its members is threatened. In
such cases there may well be no help except from outside. Crucially, we are then
obliged to query the very existence of a self-determining political community when a
government viciously attacks its own people. In these circumstances, the government
and its forces are easily classified as criminal and guilty of crimes against humanity.
Humanitarian intervention, then, is the form of intervention that is most closely
analogous to what, domestically, may be characterised as law enforcement or the
maintenance of law and order.
Nevertheless, intervention even in these circumstances requires that an international
frontier be crossed, which is forbidden by the legalist paradigm - unless it is authorised,
in present circumstances, probably by the international society of nations through the
United Nations. The fact of the matter is that unilateralism is the norm in the
international arena, but it is of greater concern when it involves a response to domestic
violence because it can so easily be used as a cover for aggression aimed at dominating
and coercing a susceptible neighbour.
203 Booth op. cit. at 120
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Hence, many lawyers prefer to abide by the legalist paradigm, merely denying legal
recognition to the need for intervention and asserting that humanitarian intervention
"belongs not in the realm of law but of moral choice, which nations, like individuals,
must sometimes make ... ,,204. This is acceptable, says Walzer, only if one recognises
that moral choices are not simply made; they are the products of judgment, for which
one requires criteria. If the law does not provide the necessary criteria, they are
nevertheless present in our 'common morality'.
Thus, intervention is justified when it is a calculated, proportionate response (with
reasonable prospects of success) to actions that shock the conscience of ordinary men
and women. There is, therefore, concludes Walzer, no moral reason "to adopt that
posture of passivity that might be called 'waiting for the UN' ('waiting for the universal
state, waiting for the messiah ... ')". Any state capable of stopping the slaughter has a
right, at least, to try to do so. The fact that the legalist paradigm excludes such efforts
indicates only the inadequacy of the paradigm to account for moral realities.
The revisionist paradigm may, therefore, be summarised as follows: States may be
invaded and wars justly begun to assist secessionist movements (once they have
demonstrated their representativeness), to balance the earlier interventions of others
states, and to rescue peoples threatened with massacre. In each of these instances we
permit or, afterwards, either praise or decline to condemn, these 'violations' of the
formal rules of sovereignty. We do so on the grounds that they uphold the values of
individual life and communal liberty - of which sovereignty is merely an expression
and from which it is, ultimately, derived.
The limitations and provisos are central to the revisions. While it is sometimes argued,
says Walzer, that it would safer to insist on an absolute rule of non-intervention
204 Thomas M Franck and Nigel S Rodley 'After Bangladesh: The Law of Humanitarian Intervention by
Military Force' 67 (1973) American Journal of International Law 304, quoted in Walzer op. cit. at
193
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because of their frequent disregard, the strict rule may also be ignored, and we are then
left with no criteria to judge what will happen next. In any event, we do possess
'valuable', in the sense of value-laden, standards in the form of internationally binding
legal commitments to human rights. Rather be guided by these, one would suggest, than
by a cold neutrality. Neutrality, or a stance in favour of strict non-intervention, amounts
to the same thing as intervention, observed Talleyrand, this time in favour of the status
quo205•
4.4 Armed humanitarian intervention and the law
Intervention with the aim of restoring an internationally acceptable level of human
rights observance is probably the most controversial enforcement option available in
human rights law. It is frequently seen as "simply a cloak of legality for the use of brute
force by a powerful state against a weaker one". "[E]xperience has shown how readily
more powerful states have used the pretext of a higher good to impose their will and
values on weaker states,,206.
Humanitarian intervention has never been accepted as a warrant for the unilateral use of
force by a state. Chapter VII of the UN Charter thus provides that only the Security
Council shall have the authority to determine the existence of a threat to or breach of
the peace, or an act of aggression, or to decide on measures to maintain or restore
peace.
Furthermore, Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter, the definitive international statutory
provision on the use of force, states that: '[a]ll Members shall refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
20S Charles-Maurice Talleyrand, quoted in Oscar Schachter 'International Law in Theory and Practice'
Martinus Nijhoff: The Hague 1991 at 1640-41, cited in Christopher M. Ryan 'Sovereignty,
Intervention and the Law' op. cit. at 79
206 Faroq Hassan 'Realpolitik in International Law: After the Tanzanian-Ugandan Conflict' in Willamette
Law Review Vol. 17NO.4 (1981) 850-60, quoted in Ryan ibid at 90
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political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the
Purposes of the United Nations.'
Literalists argue that that the only permissible exception is the narrow provision in
Article 51 for the right of self-defence. However, this position fails to take account of
the changing political and social context in which international law must operate, and
would amount to "a tyrant's charter,,207.Even in the past, scholars like the naturalist
Hugo Grotius asserted the right of humanitarian intervention as a component of the just
war theorl°8• Thus, he said, if a tyrannical leader "should inflict upon his subjects such
treatment as no one is warranted in inflicting, the exercise of the right vested in human
society is not precluded". It is possible to argue, on the basis of an interpretation of the
Purposes and Principles of the UN as set out earlier, that the UN Charter permits
humanitarian intervention, if authorised by the Security Council. This argument is
further supported on the basis of Articles 55 and 56's requirement that states take joint
and separate co-operative action for the promotion of universal respect for, and
observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms
Despite this mandate, however, no action taken by the United Nations to alleviate
human rights violations has been overtly taken in terms of Articles 55 and 56209.
Instead, the UN has, not unreasonably, determined that a threat to or breach of
international peace or security had occurred and authorised action in terms of Chapter
VII.
The UN Charter is not the only international legal instrument providing possible
sources of authority for intervention in cases of human rights violations in Africa.
Article 8 of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (1948) states that any contracting party may call upon the 'competent organs
207 Ken Booth op. cit. at 116
208 Hogo Grotius De Jure Belli ac Pacis trans F W Kelsey, M W Dunne: Washington D.C. 1925, 584,
cited in Ryan op. cit. at 91
209 ibidat 92
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of the United Nations to take such action under the Charter of the United Nations as
they consider appropriate for the prevention and suppression of acts of genocide'j'".
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) provides states with
recourse to dispute settlement procedures established by general or particular
international agreements in force between them; these can range from non-forcible
diplomatic pressure to forcible military actiorr'!'. However, any UN-authorised
response must be taken in accordance with the principles of proportionality and
necessity.
Importantly, interventions under the auspices of the United Nations are less susceptible
to suspicions of ulterior motives because they will be subject to closer scrutiny than
would be the case in the event of unilateral action. One may, thus, superficially contrast
the UN enforcement action in Kuwait and Somalia, for example, with the NATO action
in YugoslaviaIKosovo on the narrow basis of authorisation. While there can be no
doubt that the former were the subject of heightened official political scrutiny in terms
of adherence to closely defined mandates, the latter was equally the subject of intense
media scrutiny (as were the other two operations) that arguably served much the same
purpose.
Thus, while the technical illegality of the NATO operation cannot be doubted, one
cannot deny the initial moral warrant for some degree of pre-emptive intervention in a
chronically pathological situation and in the face of UN Security Council paralysis-It is
submitted that these considerations were only marginally dulled by the sometimes over-
zealous and reckless action during bombing operations over Belgrade. Indeed, the
recent electoral overthrow of Slobodan Milosevic as the federal Yugoslavian leader,
followed by the establishment of diplomatic relations with the primary actors in the
210 adopted 9 December 1948, UN Treaty Series (Vol. 78, 1951) at 277, cited in Ryan op. cit. at 93
211 adopted 16 December 1966, Article 44, cited in Ryan op. cit. at 93
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NATO action, speaks louder, one would venture, than the alleged 'immorality' of
illegality .
The most important issue in a situation of human rights violation is to ascertain when
such internal violations pose a threat to international peace and security. Some scholars
have argued that human rights contraventions arising directly from internal conflicts
that are sufficiently large to justify the attention of international society are a priori
large enough to represent a threat to international peace and securilf12.
UN Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar addressed the issue in his 1991 annual
reporr'':':
'It is now increasingly felt that the principle of non-interference with the essential
domestic jurisdiction of States cannot be regarded as a protective barrier behind which
human rights could be systematically violated with impunity .... [T]he case for not
impinging on the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence of States
is by itself indubitably strong. But it would only be weakened if it were to carry the
implication that sovereignty ... includes the right of mass slaughter or of launching
systematic campaigns of decimation or of forced exodus of civilian populations in the
name of controlling civil strife or insurrection.'
However, the question of which standard should be applied by international society to
determine whether a violation is sufficiently large to warrant international intervention
remains unanswered'!". In the instances of Iraq, Somalia and Haiti, the Security
Council decided that abuses were sufficiently severe to pose a threat to international
peace and security. But the standard utilised is unclear. The challenge posed to
international society by the absence of this standard is to move beyond the political
212 David Scheffer 'Toward a Modem Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention' University of Toledo Law
Review Vol. 23 NO.1 (1992),263, quoted in Ryan op.cit. at 95
213 Report of the Secretary General of the United Nations Press Office of the United Nations: New York,
NY 1991, 5, cited in Ryan ibid at 96
214 Ryan ibid. at 96
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considerations that hamper international co-operation and accept a set of criteria that
contradicts the traditional view of sovereignty.
One way to meet the challenge is to accept the liberal and natural law interpretation of
sovereignty as derived from 'the people'. It is possible to argue that, when a state
makes itself guilty of massive cruelty and persecution of its people in a manner that
deprives them of internationally recognised human rights, it is no longer behaving as a
state properly so-called. It has transgressed the bounds of domestic jurisdiction, and has
violated a fundamental precept of humanity. The mechanism contained in Articles 55
and 56 of the UN Charter (discussed above) would then be available to authorise action
on the basis that domestic violations of human rights constitute a threat to international
peace and security.
A second argument endorsing the legality of intervention is based upon the traditional
ius cogens view that, if a consensus exists in the domestic legal systems of a number of
states guaranteeing the basic human rights of their inhabitants, these guarantees are
regarded as norms of international customary law. Breach of these laws through state-
sanctioned force could, therefore, constitute a breach of international peace and security
requiring a Security Council response in terms of Chapter VII, Article 39.
4.5 Armed humanitarian intervention in historical practice
If the legal foundation for humanitarian intervention can thus be said to exist, how are
we to address the ever-present threat of Security Council inaction arising from use of
the veto? It is argued that a precedent and an admittedly imperfect mechanism already
exist in the 'Uniting for Peace' Resolution of the General Assembly when dealing with
the Korean situation215. The Resolution permits the General Assembly to take action if
the Security Council is unable or unwilling to address a threat to or breach of
international peace and security216. It was based on the view that Article 24 gives the
215 of3 November 1950, see Akehurst op. cit at 186-7; and Harris op. cit. at 682-7
216 Ryan op. cit. at 83
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Security Council only primary (i.e. not 'sole') responsibility for the maintenance of
international peace and security'!".
The mechanism is, however, imperfect because it depends on rare political agreement,
although the voting threshold is lower in the sense that no veto power exists and a two-
thirds majority is required by Article 18 on 'important questions'. On the other hand,
the emergence on the African continent of a growing democratic consensus would
suggest that a convergence of fundamental values is taking place. The 'difficulty' here
with the argument for intervention is that this democratic consensus is emerging
without the need for or the implementation of a settled right of humanitarian
intervention.
On the other hand, the existence of a right and the consequential creation of an
organised system of operationalisation could, arguably, hasten the advance of
democracy or, at least, an end to the destructive intrastate conflicts that do not give
democracy a chance. Conversely, the Nigerian experience of persistent religious and
ethnic conflict, even after the advent of democracy, alerts us to the possible accuracy of
Mill's stem caution against the futility of external intervention to impose democratic
and human rights norms on a people who have not, as a whole, yet begun to appreciate
their true value.
Stanley Hofftnarur'" has echoed Mill by endorsing Emmanuel Kant's emphasis on the
primary importance of the receptivity of the domestic milieu. While Kant was right to
recognise the interdependence of the twin solutions to the two problems of human
rights and peace, he was also correct to stress the decisiveness of the internal
arrangements within a country. Thus, whether or not a particular country upholds
human rights standards depends, ultimately, not only on whether external peace permits
domestic 'civility', or on favourable internal circumstances (often subject to the whims
217 The argument was approved in the Certain Expenses of the United Nations Case, ICJ Reports 1962,
151, quoted in Harris op. cit. at 698-704; and Akehurst op. cit. at 186
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of passing rulers). It depends also on the social, economic and political structures
arising from underlying values: the state of human rights is the mirror of the polity, not
vice versa. Consequently, one may conclude that the enforcement of the international
normative order requires the prior achievement of some form of domestic liberal
democratic consensus.
Alexander Ccckburrr''" has observed that the US has frequently intervened (usually via
CIA-funded coups, insurrections and assassinations) to effect a change of government
in developing countries. The outcome has, almost without exception, been contrary to
America's long-term interests and values. Cockburn cites mainly examples in the
Middle East: Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan. But, given the history of American
interventions in central America and the Far East, the principle discussed above appears
to hold: where there is no democratic domestic consensus in the targeted state, each of
these indirect interventions has succeeded merely in muddying the waters for the
United States. Intervention in support of factions or individuals on the grounds of their
perceived power and influence has led to less stability, diversion from the d,emocratic
path and lower standards of human rights observance.
Would a world at peace, even because of respect for the normative order, be capable of
transforming its members? asks Hoffinann. The dilemma he sees is that the
effectiveness of the international normative order of human rights requires both a
genuine (not merely a rhetorical) consensus on the values that inspire the order, and a
global [i.e. supranational and independent] enforcement system that would constitute a
revolution in international relations. He considers neither of these to be readily
attainable.
218 Hoffinann Daedalus op. cit. at 32
219 South African Broadcasting Corporation: AMLive 26 September 2001 www.sabc.co.za (Date
accessed: 31 October 2001)
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Nevertheless, he calls on liberal democracies to take the international dimension of
human rights more seriously and, accordingly, a major foreign policy goal220, for
reasons of morality and long-term self-interest. Elaborating upon the latter category of
interests, he notes that development, social progress, a reduction in the levels of
violence and a concomitant enhancement of psychological, economic and physical
security, as well as environmental sustainability, require a "reorientation of politics and
a redefinition of the national interest ... [to] ... incorporate ... more of the international
interest ... ". This reorientation produces "a pooling of sovereignties, and the spread and
strengthening of international regimes,,221.Such a strategy, he argues, would narrow the
gap between the normative order and international practice.
Hoffinann rejects the realist response of 'It can't be done and you should not try' as
unrealistic: it is essential that we try, however difficult. It to be essential, however, that
not only governments but also the voluntary, informal and private sectors be brought on
board, by restrictive legislation, if necessary, so that public policy is not undercut by,
for example, bankers and corporations investing in a target country. Central to his plan
is the requirement that it be multinational, to guard against the temptations of selfish
national interest.
This brief description of a multi-faceted approach to the challenges of human rights
protection finds an echo in a description of actual, but failed, 'alternative' intervention
in Rwanda before the 1994 genocide222.Adopting a 'conflict resolution' conception of
intervention, as opposed to an 'international society' approach, Bruce Jones argues that
220 Hoffinann op. cit. at 35
221 ibid at 37. C B Macpherson The real world of democracy Oxford University Press: New York and
Oxford 1966, has also discussed future domestic and foreign policy imperatives for liberal
democracies. He argues at 66-7 that " ... national power from now on is going to depend on moral
advantage, on moral stature, then the claims of morality and power will coincide. The way to national
power will be the recognition and promotion of equal human rights". Internationally, " ... if the liberal
capitalist economies merely retain their present moral advantage and disadvantage, the net balance of
advantage will tip against them, and they will decline in relative power".
222 Bruce D Jones 'Intervention without borders: humanitarian intervention in Rwanda, 1990-94
Millennium: Journal of International Studies (1995) Vol. 24 No.2 225-249 at 225-6
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the latter accords humanitarian status to interventions undertaken with humanitarian
motives, whereas the former are measured in terms of their outcomes. They argue that a
robust theory of intervention should incorporate both motives and results in assessing
the humanitarian character of actions.
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CHAPTER FIVE: AFRICAN PRIORITIES
5.1 Human rights and security
John Stremlau, writing on African priorities before the Millennium Assembly of the
United Nations in September 2000, argued223 that sub-Saharan Africa's two biggest
countries, Nigeria and South Africa, should be heading a diplomatic initiative
advocating a people-centred approach to regional security and development.
"Consistent with their pro-democracy policies would be a call for regional and
international organisations to hold member governments more accountable for the
denial of human rights and other domestic abuses of power that can lead to deadly
conflict and bedevil development". He predicated this forecast on the contention that
"recent political disasters in Africa rank among the world's worst complex emergencies
of the 1990s. They have destroyed progress and prospects of economic development,
and diverted scarce foreign assistance to urgently needed but less productive
humanitarian purposes".
The priorities of Western donor governments are moving away from country-focused
development programmes that have proven to be the mainstay of corrupt and abusive
governments. The priority in new funding programmes is to prevent deadly conflict and
accelerating poverty reduction, and to address a new generation of transnational
environmental, public health, crime and other public safety problems. African
countries, in order to access greater proportions of the available donor funds, will need
to re-orient their own conduct and relationships toward a greater regional focus.
This, Stremlau suggests, could lead to a new North-South compact in which developing
countries generally will also have to agree to accept donor conditionality in the form of
stricter internationally-imposed conditions and accountability for the management of
223 'Putting People First: Priorities for Africa and the UN Millennium Assembly' in Putting People First:
Priorities for Africa and the UNMillennium Assembly Mathoma et al., op. cit. 1-27, at 1
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their domestic political and economic affairs. In exchange, the North would agree to
more generous funding and permit the South a greater role in the governing of the
global institutions whose task it will be to "defme and enforce stricter standards of local
accountability" .
Although much ground needs to be covered before any such bargain may be struck, at
least two factors are seen as motivating its future acceptance by representatives of both
developing and developed countries:
- A growing realisation in Africa and internationally that existing approaches to conflict
prevention, human rights protection and development have proven to be inadequate in
stemming the tide of disintegration of many African states.
- A Western desire to avoid being drawn into further costly humanitarian crises,
coupled with an even stronger aversion to mounting effective peace enforcement or
peacekeeping operations. African proposals concerning preventive partnerships are,
therefore, likely to be sympathetically received.
By promoting the rights and empowerment of the people rather than defending the
exclusive sovereignty of states as the basis of world order, African leaders "can begin
to make a moral case for a more equitable North-South relationship". Stremlau adds the
caveat that, crucially, the realisation of this prospect depends on African leaders
demonstrating their readiness to hold each other accountable for implementing
democratic values and practices. He cites the anti-colonial and anti-apartheid struggles
as a positive and hopeful precedent for achieving local success when Africans have
advanced moral arguments globally. He recognises, however, that for African
governments to judge each other's domestic behaviour contradicts a central tenet of the
continent's post-independence international relations. 'Interference' of any kind in the
internal affairs of another state, "although not uncommon, until very recently has been
routinely rejected by the ... OAVexcept in cases of colonial territories or apartheid
South Africa".
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
125
The decision at the 1999Algiers OAU Summit to oppose any government that assumes
power by military means reflects this change. However, the resolution received the
support of several delegates whose accession to power had been by precisely such
means, and military threats to civilian rule are by no means a thing of the past.
It is difficult to disagree with Stremlau when he observes+" that contemporary global
political struggles are no longer ideological, but are more about equity than liberation.
Matters of freedom and justice draw their moral strength from the principle of the
inherent equality of people, which, he states, is the "cornerstone of political order in
any democratic nation" and, echoing Umozurike, "the first article of faith among all of
the world's major religions".
The world's older democracies are discovering that, if the principle is to retain its
relevance as the foundation for social and political order, it must be applied also in the
economic sphere of life. All inhabitants must be allowed increased equalities of
economic opportunity. The global demographic and economic trends noted earlier
signal escalating levels of conflict unless novel means of adaptation and integration can
be devised to reflect increased equity and fairness.
The European Westphalian international system, applied to post-colonial Africa, has
clearly not prevented a disastrously dysfunctional scenario across much of the
continent, in which warlords have vandalised extensive areas of west, central and east
Africa. The OAU's strict adherence to the principles of sovereignty and non-
interference has proven effective in avoiding more than a few interstate wars. However,
even those states that have benefited from more enlightened and beneficent leadership
are faced with the growing reality that the prevailing norms of sovereignty are more
often a hindrance than a help in meeting the challenge of economic and cultural
globalisation.
224 ibid. at 2
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Not only does political self-determination frequently belie economic dependence, but
unless people's security within states is soon enhanced, the danger exists that domestic
human insecurity will spill over and undermine international security among and
between states. Three current examples of the accuracy of the fear of this threat already
exist. They are the multi-state meltdown around the Democratic Republic of Congo, the
effect on Namibia and Zambia of the (almost entirely value-free) civil war in Angola,
and the contagion of instability among the small states of West Africa.
The inability or unwillingness to deal democratically with the destructiveness of
factionalism has made Africa the world's most conflict-ridden region, as well as host to
23 of the world's poorest countries225.Consequently, Africa's leaders are beginning to
examine their more distant history in an endeavour to discover possible models to
surmount current failures. Traditional notions of community (discussed earlier) are
included in this consideration and may encourage the trend to greater receptivity to
norms and institutions beyond sovereignty and "more responsive to the needs and
aspirations of communities within and across,,226existing state boundaries. Increased
interest in the potential benefits of regional co-operation and even integration in the
economic, fmancial and security fields provides some evidence of the perceived decline
in significance of what is, essentially, only ever either nominal or partial sovereignty.
These harsh realities have stirred renewed interest in the value of human rights
observance as a key indicator of a country's political health and stability. A
deterioration in the status of human rights observance in respect of individuals or
minorities is increasingly seen as an early warning sign of potential conflict. Boutros
Boutros-Ghali, in his 1992 Secretary General's report to the UN Security Council,
entitled 'An Agenda for Peace', initiated consideration of a more people-centred
approach to security and development by noting that a failure to protect human rights
225 K Annan The Causes of Conflict and Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable development in
Africa Report of United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan to the UN Security Council, May
1998, cited in Stremlau op cit. at 5
226 ibid.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
127
risked the failure and fragmentation of more and more states227. Should this happen, he
warned, the relative peace and stability of the current international order would be
subverted.
President Mandela elaborated on this theme in a 1994 essal28:
'While governments should be mindful of the high ideals of human rights, they should
be conscious of a democratic realism that surrounds the issue, too. The neglect of
human rights is the certain recipe for internal and international disaster.'
A few years later, at the June 1997 OAU Summit in Harare, the new UN secretary-
general, Kofi Annan, made the "strongest endorsement of human rights ever heard at
such a gathering,,229:
'The conflicts that have disfigured our continent have, all too often, been accompanied
by massive human rights violations. I am aware of the fact that some view this concern
as a luxury of the rich countries for which Africa is not ready ... . I find these thoughts
truly demeaning of the yearning for human dignity that resides in every African heart
.... Human rights are African rights, and I call upon you to ensure that all Africans are
able to fully enjoy them.'
Annan followed this statement with a forceful report a few months later to the Security
Council that analysed conflicts in Africa, noting thar30:
'Since 1970, more than 30 wars have been fought in Africa, the vast majority of them
intrastate in origin. . .. The consequences of those conflicts have seriously undermined
Africa's efforts to ensure long-term stability, prosperity and peace for its peoples ...
227 B Boutros-Ghali An Agenda for Peace Report of the Secretary General pursuant to the statement
adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992, A/47/277-S/24111, 17
June 1992, cited in Stremlau ibid at 6
228 N R Mandela 'The waning nation-state' in N P Gardels (ed.) At Century's End: Great Minds Reflect
On Our Time ALTI: La Jolla, Calif. 1996 at 291, quoted in Stremlau ibid
229 UN Press Release, 'Secretary General calls for efforts to unleash African "Third Wave" based on
democracy, human rights, sustainable development', SG/SM/6245/Rev.1, 2 June 1997, quoted in
Stremlau ibid
230 Annan The Causes of Conflict op cit. at 1, quoted in Stremlau ibid at 7
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Preventing such wars is no longer a matter of defending states or protecting allies. It is
a matter of defending humanity itself.'
The situation has not improved since then: Africa in 1998 ranked first among the
world's regions for the number of deadly conflictsr". Africa, consequently, continues
to produce the highest number of internally-displaced people and refugees spilling over
borders, draining resources and destabilising neighbouring states. Sadako Ogata, the
erstwhile United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, has reminded governments
that "[t]oday's human rights abuses are tomorrow's refugee movements,,232.
A more intrusive, people-centred approach to regional security is indicated here, too,
but devising agreed policies on intervention in African countries where human rights
abuses are intensifying continues to face significant political resistance. Even non-
binding statements criticising a government's domestic policies continue to be viewed
by members as violating the UN Charter's principle of non-interference in the internal
affairs of a state. This wariness may well stem from reluctance to subject themselves to
the prospect of similar treatment by a divided and politicised organisation at some point
in the future. This already occurs within the confines of the UN's Human Rights
Commission, where the United States was recently voted off that body. That argument,
however, may be met with the response that it is simply another argument in favour of
some form of open judicial or quasi-judicial process. This function might, perhaps, be
broadly akin to the incipient International Criminal Court or, alternatively, a type of
international human rights ombudsman, with the power of independent
recommendation, as opposed to the overtly political and narrow nationalistic process
that currently persists.
231 The University of Hamburg's Research Group on the Causes of War, December 1999, The Star
Johannesburg 21 December 1999, cited in Stremlau ibid at 7
232 UN High Commissioner for Refugees, The World's Refugees: In Search of Solutions, Oxford
University Press: Oxford 1995 at 57 ibid
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Only once in about forty years has the UN intervened in the internal affairs of a state in
an attempt to contain or reverse severe human rights abuse. The only exception was the
1979 Security Council decision in terms of Chapter VII of the UN Charter that
apartheid posed a sufficient threat to international peace. It is now widely agreed that
the sanctions imposed in terms of the Security Council's resolution contributed
significantly to the peaceful end to oppression in South Africa. Bearing in mind this
precedent, it may have been theoretically possible that many of the more recent
conflicts in Africa and elsewhere may have been avoided had earlier action been taken
by either the UN or the appropriate regional body or, even, an independent,
professional, early-warning body.
It is, says John Stremlau, "in this spirit" that ex-President Nelson Mandela has called
for a "more comprehensive [and value-laden] international policy of 'democratic
realism' to replace the traditional concept of 'realism"'. The latter approach presumes
that "all states seek maximum advantage in their international relations and that, at best,
peace will be a function of a balance of power capable of deterring the most powerful
from seeking domination,,233.
This vision of 'democratic realism' suggests a world in which diversity (in terms of
which virtually everyone is a member of a minority) is protected, not just between
states, but within them. The practical advantages of the consequent peace and stability
will be enhanced prospects for the combating of poverty as greater predictability
encourages and attracts the foreign direct investment needed to provide the stimulus for
growth in the absence of domestic savings.
Considerations of sovereignty ensure continued resistance by states generally to foreign
guidance on democracy and human rights. Nevertheless, scholars have endorsed the
perception of increased responsiveness and accountability, and an egalitarian approach
to governance among an emerging politico-military bloc of market-oriented but
233 Stremlau ibid at 8
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pragmatic African states that aim to end the continent's decline234• To the extent that
this bloc may be evidence of a 'democratic realism', it may hold out the hope of a
growing trend in favour of a greater sensitivity to the needs and aspirations of Africa's
citizenry.
5.2 The African Renaissance and human rights: the development of South African
foreign policy
It is into this context that South African Presidents Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki
have spoken, with their shared vision of a continental reawakening. How are we to
assess South African foreign policy since the 1994 elections? Has South African
foreign policy promoted African observance and protection of human rights, either
directly or indirectly? Has South Africa adopted a stance that could be said to have
assimilated the opportunities in the evolving global and continental situation?
The years immediately following South Africa's first democratic elections in 1994
were sprinkled with hope, unedifying confusion and disappointment over the place of
human rights in South Africa's foreign relations.
5.2.1 Human rights at the forefront of South African foreign policy
Barely a month after his inauguration as President of the newly democratic South
Africa in June 1994, Nelson Mandela addressed a summit ofOAU heads of state235• He
was infused with hope that Africa was, at last, on the threshold of a new era. He began
his address with a reference to Rome's defeat of Carthage, and proceeded to catalogue
"a litany of African suffering and subjugation", culminating in the twentieth century
when Africans were ''the outstanding examples of the beneficiaries of charity" and "the
permanent victims of famine, destructive conflicts and the pestilences". He
acknowledged that many in his audience had failed their people: "We must face the
234 Dan ConneIJ and Frank Smyth 'Africa's New Bloc' Foreign Affairs March/April 1998 Vol. 77 No.2,
80-94
235 Alec Russell op. cit. at 290
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matter squarely that where there is something wrong in how we govern ourselves, it
must be said that the fault is not in our stars but in ourselves that we are ill-governed".
Mandela nevertheless asserted that Africa's time had come: "We have it in ourselves",
he said, "as Africans, to change all this. We must assert our will to do so. We must say
that there is no obstacle big enough to stop us from bringing about an African
Renaissance."
However, recalls Alec Russe1l236, Pierre Sané, Secretary General of Amnesty
International, "ridiculed" the idea of a new dawn during his visit to South Africa in
1998 ahead of the fiftieth anniversary of the UN Declaration of Human Rights. He
cautioned against "unfounded optimism" as being "as dangerous for Africa as knee-jerk
pessimism". "Renaissances have been promised by African leaders since
independence", he said. "In the sixties we heard of Renaissance. In the eighties we
heard of it." Echoing what then-Deputy President Thabo Mbeki was saying at the time,
Sané said "The reality of Renaissance to the ordinary people will come [only] when
human rights are a reality ... and when the right to food and access to health care is a
reality. As long as those are not the case it will remain what it is, just talk."
The disappointment and cynicism had first set in following South Africa's about-face
on Nigeria that brought it more into line with the hesitant approach adopted by other
African countries. In contrast to Nelson Mandela's trailblazing call in 1995 for
sanctions against the Nigerian dictatorship, South Africa subsequently tried to 'pull the
teeth' from a United Nations Human Rights Commission resolution which criticised the
West African country's human rights record237•
The Department of Foreign Affairs acknowledged that it had withheld support for the
resolution until it was watered down, but argued that this was the best strategy to get
236 ibid 292
237 Stefaans Brummer Weekly Mail & Guardian 19April 1996 www.mg.co.za
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consensus among African, Asian and Latin-American countries. Such a consensus was
sought apparently in order to increase the chances of the European Union-sponsored
resolution being adopted by the United Nations Human Rights Commission in Geneva.
Jackie Selebi, South Africa's ambassador to the UN High Commission in Geneva, said
that South Africa had taken the view that it "should make a contribution to a position
where African countries can for the first time get consensus on an issue that involves
[Nigeria]". Selebi was later appointed Director-General of the Department of Foreign
Affairs.
This was quite different from Mandela's courageous and outspoken call for oil
sanctions against Nigeria immediately after the hanging in November 1995 of minority
rights activist Ken Saro-Wiwa. Mandela's stance had been praised, but not heeded, by
many in the West, but African countries made it clear they were not amused by what
they saw as Mandela's disregard for African solidarity. South Africa's position before
the UN Human Rights Commission was seen as fmal confirmation that it had
prioritised African solidarity, and would no longer act alone.
Indeed, South Africa's regional partners in the Southern African Development
Community had made it clear at the body's pre-Christmas 1995 summit that South
Africa "had to do things on a regional basis". This criticism was, clearly, taken to heart
and, thereafter, became a strong theme in South Africa's foreign policy. This became
evident from the fact that South Africa, and Mandela, fell silent on Nigeria during 1996
to the extent that South Africa tried to discourage a meeting of Nigerian opposition
groups in the country by, for example, not issuing visas timeously. In other matters
concerning individual countries, such as the crisis in Swaziland, where pro-democracy
and labour groups asked for South African help, the Department of Foreign Affairs said
repeatedly it would act only in conjunction with its regional partnersr".
238 Speaking at the launch of the African Renaissance Institute in Pretoria on Il October 1999, Mbeki re-
emphasised the essential priority of consensual action in advancing the African Renaissance, albeit
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Negotiations to water down the resolution coincided with a visit by Foreign Minister
Alfred Nzo to London for a meeting of the Commonwealth 'Committee of Eight'. The
Committee, of which Nzo was a member, was established by the Commonwealth at its
annual heads of state meeting in New Zealand in November 1995 to examine human
rights abuses in Nigeria, Sierra Leone and the Gambia. Part of the Committee's
mandate was to visit Nigeria on a fact-fmding mission, but the Nigerian dictator,
General Sani Abacha, refused them entry on the grounds that it interfered with the
country's sovereignty.
with a democratic twist. South Africa's sensitivity to charges that it secretly harboured hegemonic
aspirations were evident:
' ... [Tjhroughout the entirety of our political lives we have been exposed to the inspiring perspective
of African unity and solidarity and the renewal of our Continent. ... I am convinced that all of us
present here share a common vision in favour of African unity and solidarity, African development
and renewal and an end to the marginalisation of our Continent in world affairs and development
processes. It would seem to us vitally necessary that whereas, for some time, the achievement of
these objectives has been left to our governments, it is necessary that we return this vision to the
people.
'We are therefore of the firm view that there is a critically important and urgent need to develop a
Popular Movement for the African Renaissance. Accordingly, we believe that political organisations
and governments in all African countries should be mobilised to act in furtherance of the objectives
of the African Renaissance.
, ... we must move from the fundamental proposition that the peoples of Africa share a common
destiny. Each one of our countries is constrained in its ability to achieve peace, stability, sustained
development and a better life for the people, except in the context of the accomplishment of these
objectives in other sister African countries as well. Accordingly, it is objectively in the interest of all
Africans to encourage the realisation of these goals throughout our Continent, at the same time as we
pursue their attainment in each of our countries.
'These goals can only be achieved through a genuinely popular and protracted struggle involving not
only governments and political parties, but also the people themselves in all their formations. Such a
popular movement for the fundamental renewal of Africa would also have to take into account the ...
reality that:
- the continental offensive can only be sustained if the active populations of all countries are
confident that none of the countries of the continent, regardless of the extent of its contribution to the
Renaissance, seeks to impose itself on the rest as a new imperialist power; and
- the forces for change have to be built up and consolidated within each country, without ignoring or
underestimating the imperative and the potential for an increasing co-ordinated trans-national
offensive for the mutually beneficial renewal of the continent.'
www.anc.org.za/ancdocslhistory/mbeki/1999/indexlhtml (Date accessed: 13 October 2001)
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As with the Commonwealth Committee of Eight mandate (from which South Africa
later withdrew), the part of the EU resolution at the Human Rights Commission that
South Africa wanted removed also sought an international probe into Nigeria's human
rights situation. A draft version of the EU resolution said, among other things, that it
was "deeply concerned about the human rights situation in Nigeria". It called for a
range of human rights to be guaranteed and for Nigeria to take "immediate and concrete
steps to restore democratic government". It also called for the appointment of a UN
special rapporteur to "examine the human rights situation in Nigeria" and to report to
the UN General Assembly and the Human Rights Commission. But, said Selebi,
"African countries don't like a special rapporteur; in fact not any country likes a special
rapporteur,,239.
5.2.2 South Africa's foreign policy 'failures'
South Africa was, however, not alone in flinching from firm action on human rights.
The subsequent Commonwealth heads of government meeting in Edinburgh had also
held back from imposing tougher sanctions against the military regime in Nigeria24o.
The attempted military coup in Zambia, following so closely behind the decision of
Commonwealth leaders not to impose tougher sanctions against the military
dictatorship in Nigeria because of opposition from African countries, held "a searing
lesson" for the international community, but especially for Africa and the
Commonwealth, asserted TheArgus in an editorial.
The lesson was that, "so long as the pervasive curses of modem Africa military coups
are allowed to succeed and prosper through the easygoing response to them of the
world's democracies, so long will Africa remain a politically unstable continent with
huge impediments to trade and investment. The combative editorial in The Argus
argued that the Commonwealth's failure to embrace President Mandela's call for far
tougher sanctions against Nigeria "could only have encouraged those who at that very
239 Selebi indicated that a special rapporteur is seen as having very wide powers and as being "difficult to
remove from the agenda".
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time must have been conspiring to overthrow the elected government in Zambia". The
"hand-wringing response of a majority of African Commonwealth leaders to the
despotism in Lagos" had only aggravated a perception of invulnerability.
"The exciting vision of an African renaissance, a vision which had its genesis in South
Africa's hard struggle for freedom and democracy, depends crucially on the
advancement of democracy and human rights on the continent", it argued. However,
what prospect was there of advancing this "great cause of renewal" if the
Commonwealth failed to vigorously take action against those rulers who had subverted
democracy and who exhibited contempt for human rights?
"The Commonwealth's African members failed democracy when they had shied away
from President Mandela's proposals on Nigeria. Sadly for all who live in Africa",
concluded the editorial, "the consequences [were] unlikely to be limited" to this
instance.
"Renaissance", lamented The Independent of Londorr'" a short time later, echoing the
caution concerning the continent, "is not a word we have come to associate with the
African continent in recent years. Bloodshed and catastrophe, more often. Three
decades after the end of the colonial era, the legacy has seemed bitter and poisoned.
After the great wave of independence, one-party socialist regimes promised a utopia
which never arrived in much of the continent, while capitalist-friendly dictators ruled
and plundered the rest. The Cold War was fought by proxy between the allies of
Washington and Moscow - sometimes just with money, sometimes with guns. The
continent has been marked by famine, corruption and chaos."
Even in the 1990s there had been bloodshed on an unimaginable scale, where the world
looked on in apparent helplessness. Nigeria, Sudan, Angola, Rwanda, Burundi, Sierra
240 Editorial 'The Commonwealth and democracy' The Argus, Cape Town, 1997 www.iol.co.za
241 Editorial 'Bloodshed and catastrophe' The Independent (London) 22 May 1997 www.iol.co.za
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Leone, Liberia, Mozambique had all been scarred by civil war, and the misery of
millions that it caused. Not, then, a time for much optimism about the continent. And
yet, the newspaper supported President Nelson Mandela's call for an African
renaissance. Mandela had said that he was "convinced that our region and our continent
have set out along the new road of lasting peace, democracy, social and economic
development" .
Despite the temptation of a cynical response, said The Independent, "it would be
dangerous to dismiss this as the mere wishful thinking of an old man. Mandela, perhaps
more than anybody else, has the moral right to be at odds with conventional wisdom
about his continent." The editorialist saw an apparent boost for Mandela's optimism in
the collapse of the Mobutu regime in Zaire, although Kabila himself had not yet shown
whether he possessed democratic credentials. So Mandela's optimism had to be
"hedged round, again and again". As Mandela himself acknowledged: "It is given that
complex problems spanning decades will not lend themselves to easy solutions." But he
also insisted that "[t]he time has come for Africa to take full responsibility for her
woes, use the immense collective wisdom it possesses to make a reality of the ideal of
the African renaissance whose time has come."
In politics, The Independent accepted, bringing people to believe that something could
be achieved was one of the first stages in finding a path over apparently insurmountable
barriers. If there was, urged the editorialist, "even the smallest possibility Mandela may
prod his fellow leaders around Africa into raising their aspirations, and cleaning up
their acts, he should be heard, and applauded".
Then-President Nelson Mandela was involved in a further instance of the clash of
views over the appropriate place of human rights in South Africa's foreign policy. He
accepted a controversial award from President Muammar Ghaddafi of Libya and paid
an official visit to the country. Exiled Libyan opponents of the Ghaddafi regime wrote
open letters to President Nelson Mandela urging him not to visit Libya and give his
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tacit support to a "brutal, tyrannical regime,,242.. They argued that Mandela's visit
represented "a tragic setback to human rights and to the cause of freedom and
democracy in all of Africa."
One correspondent, clearly of the opinion that moral and ethical considerations should
be central to the conduct of foreign policy, wrote:
'I do not think that this letter will make much difference to you now that you have
joined the ranks of 'the political elite' as these kind of letters had little impact in - the
beginning - on those who presided on the system of apartheid. But this letter will make
a difference to me, for I happen to believe that resisting evil, even in the simplest of
ways, is its own reward and that great results come from small but moral steps. As
the great Mahatma Gandhi said "They say means are after all just means. I would say
means are after all everything" (emphasis added).
'Your planned trip to Libya, may be justified in your mind and the minds of your
'advisers' in so many different 'political and economic' ways. One thing is for sure
however, it cannot be justified MORALLY and ETHICALLY in any way ... .'
Another correspondentr" wrote:
' ... [Y]our president's intention to visit Libya ... is unfortunate. Nelson Mandela
should know that he is a respected elderstateman but ... I am not happy with the way he
handles humanitarian issues.
'[Given] the wave of unrest that blew across Africa during his incarceration under the
gulag of apartheid South Africa, one should expect that he should be in the forefront
fighting for the freedom of Africa. The way he is going he will lose his credibility and
... respect.' The correspondent praised Mandela's 1995 condemnation of Ken Saro-
242 Daily Mail & Guardian 20 October 1998 www.mg.co.za
243 Per Ottest, Bergen, Norway, Daily Mail & Guardian 27 August 1998 www.mg.co.za
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Wiwa's murder by the Nigerian, but regretted his later prevention of members of the
opposition from holding a conference in South Africa.
Thus, despite the hopeful signs discerned by some observers in the language used by
Mandela and Mbeki to promote the concept of an African Renaissance, the human
rights practice of the South African government was firmly aligned with the
requirements of African elite solidarlty'".
It was, consequently, of little surprise when Amnesty International/" later strongly
criticised South Africa's failure to respect its international human rights obligations.
Amnesty charged that South Africa had rendered itself guilty of failing in its
obligations "under both its national constitution and international law". Amnesty
located such failure in South Africa's 'protection' of Mengistu Haile-Mariam, former
Ethiopian head of state, and its failure to ensure that he remained in South Africa
pending the outcome of an investigation into his alleged human rights crimes.
The government, at the very least, should have ensured that Mengistu Haile-Mariam
remained in the country until the National Director of Public Prosecutions had
244 This move to adopt a solidarist position was not without its own faultlines, however. Mbeki addressed
the Non-Aligned Movement Ministerial Meeting at the United Nations in New York on 23
September 1999 as Chairperson. He proposed that NAM had to review and question its methods of
work and its structures. It had to do so in order to ascertain whether they were appropriate and able to
serve the needs of its members' people for a democratic system of global governance that would
ensure that all countries had an equal stake in promoting peace and security. These questions were
important if NAM were to be able to respond adequately to the new challenges posed by
globalisation, he argued.
Thus, for example, he asked whether the consensus principle "did ... not all too often prevent [NAM]
from taking meaningful action when a few members states, or even one, refused to compromise and
thus prevented the majority from acting in unison". He wondered aloud whether NAM could really be
affective if its procedures and methods of work allowed it to move only at the pace of the slowest or
the most obstinate and difficult member.
www.anc.org.za/ancdocslhistorylmbekill999/indexlhtrnl (Date accessed: 13 October 2001)
245 Amnesty International News Release 8 December 1999. News Service 231/99 AI INDEX: AFR
53/99.
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undertaken an investigation into his possible prosecution in South Africa or extradition
to another state, said Amnesty Internationalr".
South Africa's Constitution incorporates customary international law, and it had a
resulting obligation to investigate the alleged crimes of Mengistu Haile-Mariam, said
Amnesty. "This obligation" had again been "assumed by South Africa when it ratified
the Convention against Torture and the Genocide Convention on 10December [1998]".
The Mengistu incident appeared to be no more than a further step in a journey down
from the moral high ground. Griffiths Ayiteyfio, writing in the Weekly Mail &
Guardian of August 26 1998247 argued that the 1994 election victory of the ANC had
raised hopes that a new moral authority would shape the political agenda of the whole
continent. But, he said, "the ANC had not taken a single progressive stance on an
African issue". The inability of the Government of South Africa to promote a
progressive agenda in Africa "baffled" him. He reported the widespread hope that the
moral authority that South African President Nelson Mandela carried in Western
Europe and the United States "would have been used to shape a viable African agenda
for the late twentieth century and beyond". However, if recent events in Africa were
any measure of the ANC's foreign policy (or lack thereof), he argued, "then the
sacrifice of millions of Africans to spur change in South Africa during the dark days of
Apartheid would have been in vain".
246 The South African government sought to excuse its failure on the technical basis that Mengistu Haile-
Mariam had left the country apparently prior to the receipt by the government of a formal request for
his extradition to Ethiopia. (Mengistu had returned to Zimbabwe where he has lived under President
Mugabe's protection since fleeing Ethiopia in 1991.)
247 'The ANC squanders its moral leadership over Africa' www.mg.co.za
See also 'South Africa's foreign policy: human rights and national interests' in Focus Letter NO.3
June 1996 Helen Suzman Foundation: Johannesburg. The writer deplored the "shameful betrayal" of
Nigeria's democrats and the Libyan people and the "embarrassing" reversal of a "principled" policy.
The "prodigious promise" and "international prestige" of Mandela and his reconciling nation had
been "comprehensively squandered" within a few months.
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Ayiteyfio recalled how, in A Long Walk To Freedom, South Africa's first president
described in detail the campaign to raise funds from various poor countries in Africa -
from which they were not sent away empty-handed. He was willing to excuse the ANC
government for not being able to help Rwanda during the genocide of 1994, because
the government was still very new. However, there had since been occasions where a
"resolute policy of engagement could have given hope to millions of Africans that we
were on the threshold of an Age of Reason. But, while those to whom a lot has been
given dither and drag their feet, the forces of evil are passionately committed248• Since
the inception of the ANC administration in 1994, South Africa has not taken a single
position that a reasonable person who is informed about African affairs could interpret
as progressive: on Angola, Sierra Leone, Nigeria, Congo-Kinshasa (the invasion by
Rwanda and Uganda), or Sudan. When millions of lives are at stake, there is nothing
but busy consultations to do precisely nothing!", he charged249•
He contrasted South Africa's essentially diplomacy-based foreign policy in the
Democratic Republic of Congo, with the starkly military form adopted by other
Southern African countries, such as Zimbabwe and Namibia. In the face of their
"genocide", instead of "offering a helping hand, ... South Africa [was] once again
shirking." There was "a dire need", he submitted in conclusion, "for a single success
248 It is argued that neutrality is a chimera, and that it is, instead, necessarily itself a form of
'intervention' - in favour or, even, in defence of the most the most ruthless. Edmund Burke is
recalled as famously saying that the only thing necessary for the triumph of evil is for good men to do
nothing. Similarly, Mohandas K. Gandhi observed that "Non-co-operation with evil is as much a duty
as is eo-operation with good". See Dr Laurence Peter 5 000 Gems of Wit and Wisdom Treasure Press:
London, 1991 at 225
249 Mbeki did eonsider it necessary to express South African's gratitude for the enormous sacrifices made
by the peoples of the continent towards the liberation from apartheid when he spoke at the launch of
the African Renaissance Institute in Pretoria on Il October 1999:
'The sacrifices the peoples of our Continent made to end the apartheid crime against humanity, which
denied the very humanity of everybody who was African, were many and varied. Among other
things, the countries of Southern Africa also paid a very high price in human lives lost, as well as
property and infrastructure destroyed, as they withstood the campaign of aggression and
destabilisation conducted by the apartheid regime. Undoubtedly, Angola and Mozambique paid the
highest price in this regard. I would like to take this opportunity, once more, to reiterate our profound
appreciation to their governments and peoples for their extraordinary solidarity, which our people
will never forget.'
www.anc.org.zaIancdocsihistory/mbekiIl999/indexlhtml (Date accessed: 13 October200 1)
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story, where progressive African forces triumph over evil in a clear and decisive
manner,,2S0.If the ANC government could not use a carrot and stick approach to
African issues now, then when, he asked. "If not in the heart of Africa, then where, and
on what occasion?" (emphasis added).
Reuel Khoza was similarly critical of the apparent absence of clear and principled
adherence to core values and principles by black businessr", who were supposed to
participate in the drive to revitalise the African economy. He charged that a failure to
pursue "values" would stultify dreams of a continental rebirth. Black business leaders,
particularly, had a "historic responsibility to help create and shape economic processes,
systems and institutions that support and nourish the vision of an African renaissance".
The task for black business was simple and easy, yet profoundly difficult, he warned. In
the economic sphere, their contribution was to "begin doing those things that most
reflect African values and interests; those things that help define Africa and its people
as competent, successful and with a profound sense of dignity and self-worth. It is easy
and simple because it is straightforward and is a natural desire of any people. It is
difficult because we have not developed the vision, the courage, the honesty, the
consistency and the discipline to constantly make those decisions, in the course of black
economic empowerment deals, that could be seen to be contributing to an African
renaissance" .
He bewailed the fact that "[m]any of our decisions and activities are characterised by
short-sightedness, expediency, greed and vanity. In many instances where our hearts
are in the right place and we are trying to do the right things, we seem to lack the
250 In other words, decisive action was needed to 'encourage courage' among ordinary people resisting
disempowerment and deprivation.
251 Reuel Khoza 'Are we making new clothes without an emperor?' Independent Newspapers, 1997.
(Reuel Khoza was the then chairman of the Eskom Council and of Co-ordinated Network
Investments, a black empowerment group. The article was an edited version of his keynote address to
the 33rd annual conference of the National African Federated Chambers of Commerce and Industry.
www.iol.co.za )
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
142
intellectual framework or the self-belief to stay the course and prevail when challenges
arise". He concluded, eloquently summarising his analysis of the values that must
necessarily inform an African renaissance:
'We have choices to make. . .. We could choose to be like parasitic weeds, or we could
choose to be like oak trees. . ..We could choose to perpetuate the stereotype of the
African as a dependent, servile, parasitic citizen of the world, or we could choose to
create a new prototype of the African as a proud, productive and independent citizen of
the world ... ' .
5.2.3 Human rights caution
Presaging Blade Nzimande's later brief reference to the need for greater
democratisation in Africa, Jan van Eck noted252 that a new generation of African
leaders was saying that, for democracy to be durable, it had to flow from a 'bottom-up'
process. In the light of this emerging recognition, then-Deputy President Thabo
Mbeki's call for an African renaissance would be questioned by many, argued van Eck.
It was necessary to understand why so many African countries experienced the kind of
chaos and disorder that most recently had scarred Sierra Leone and the Great Lakes
region. These experiences included the unspeakable atrocities committed by Uganda's
Idi Amin253; the mass migrations and terrible suffering of millions of pitiful refugees;
as well as the revolution in the former Zaire and the ousting of Mobutu. These
upheavals had, and would continue to, reinforce the negative image that so many non-
Africans in the so-called developed world have of the continent and its people.
However, van Eck cautioned, it was too often forgotten that nearly all these African
upheavals and catastrophies were caused by small, sectarian and selfish groups of
leaders. The practice in international quarters to label some African countries as 'failed
252 Jan van Eck 'Restore the lifeline from Africans to leaders' Independent Newspapers, 10 June 1997.
www.iol.co.za . Van Eck was an ANC MP and was, at the time of the article, a senior consultant in
conflict analysis and resolution at the Centre for Conflict Resolution at the University of Cape Town.
253 Geoffrey Robertson op. cit. at 62 notes that Tanzania was the only member state of the OAU that had
''the decency" to criticise Amin's "barbaric" rule.
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states' or 'basket cases' was not very helpful, he asserted. It did a grave injustice to the
millions of ordinary people who had no say over the political élites and their misguided
policies. It incorrectly implied that not only had the rulers failed, but so had the people.
If this were true, then only a foolish man (which Mbeki was not, said van Eck) would
predict an African 'renaissance'.
To be able to evolve sustainable solutions to the problems of Africa, van Eck argued,
we needed to understand the way in which the traditional link between the government
or those in authority and the governed had been destroyed over many centuries. It had
started, he said, during the slave trade when "so-called leaders" sold their own subjects
to slave traders from foreign countries. It had continued during colonialism when
leaders "sold their souls to their colonial masters and governed their subjects according
to the wishes of the colonialists", and during the post-colonial, independence era when
so many new (black) political elites merely continued the unaccountable policies and
practices of their former colonial rulers. It had also continued during the "Cold War
(which was cold everywhere except in Africa and the Third World), when many
African leaders sold their countries and its people to the highest bidder - be they from
the West or East". Since then, also, during a "new era of international economic ['neo-]
colonialism"', leaders had allowed "foreign capital to dictate their domestic policies."
The common thread identified by van Eck that ran through all these periods in Africa's
history was that those in authority, had been "forced, coerced, bought or encouraged to
co-operate with selfish, exploitative non-Africans" to implement policies that benefited
foreign powers and interest groups. These policies had, at the same time, had disastrous
consequences for the ordinary citizens of African countries.
For example, asked van Eck, would the chaos which had characterised the former Zaire
for almost 40 years have ensued had certain Western powers not planned and
implemented various forms of destabilisation against - and the execution of - Zaire's
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first extremely popular and charismatic prime minister, Patrice Lumumba on the
grounds that he was regarded as a communist?254
Africa's post-independence era, he speculated, might have been more stable had
Africans been allowed to select their leaders and help develop policies without the
active and on-going interference of certain powers, especially foreign ones. It had not
been the Africans who had decided on their leaders and their policies, but London,
Paris, Berlin and Washington. Was it any wonder, therefore, asked van Eck, that the
whole concept of accountable leadership had virtually ceased to exist in so many
African countries? This was one of the most important reasons why so many African
countries had so frequently been plagued by military coups, he argued. Had the
governments that were overthrown truly been people's governments, it was unlikely
that military coups would have become virtually second nature in Africa.
The lesson which had been learnt by the new generation of African leaders such as
Yoweri Museveni of Uganda "was that society had to be rebuilt from the bottom up to
ensure that the masses, the ordinary people, were the ones who decided who would
govern them, and how".
In view of the "incredibly violent" history of many African countries, "the resultant
severe lack of tolerance, trust, transparency, accountability and the history of misuse of
state institutions for sectarian interests, it was highly unlikely that any of them would
move rapidly towards fully representative multiparty democracy", however. For
254 Mbeki recognised that it was important to demonstrate that Africa had learned from its experiences
but, also, that it was not alone in deserving blame. Consequently, he argued, the "exit from the
African stage of a personality such as General Mobutu Sese Seko of the former Zaire" represented
''the death of neo-colonialism" on the continent.
Excerpted from the speech by Deputy President Thabo Mbeki at the United Nations University 'The
African renaissance, South Africa and the world', 9 April 1998.
www.anc.org.zalancdocsihistory/mbekilI998/index.html(Date accessed: 13 October200I)
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democracy to be sustainable and truly bottom-up, the process of democratisation would
"of necessity" have to be a lengthy one.
5.2.4 Conception and birth of the vision
In June 1997, Vusi Mavimbela, then political adviser in Deputy President Thabo
Mbeki's office, initiated the public debate concerning the future of the continent. He
wrote that "Africa needed to reinvent itself in a way that would send a clear message to
the world that it is no longer prepared to be marginalised'f ".
Mavimbela was writing during the post-Cold War surge of more open political and
economic interaction on a world scale. In this state of flux, he discerned a new vision of
political and economic renewal in Africa, a vision surpassed only by the optimism that
had greeted the first years of decolonisation in the 1960s. Campaigns for
democratisation in the nineties, and the liberation of South Africa in particular, had
energised African peoples nearly as profoundly as the nationalist movements of more
than two generations previously, he asserted. These two "moments of African rebirth"
had served as dress rehearsals and held important lessons for the third 'moment': the
African renaissanceé'".
255 Independent Newspapers, 15 June 1997 www.iol.co.za . Mavimbela's detailed statement of the
Deputy Presidency's vision is a valuable record for identifying the source and tracing the
development of many current themes and policy initiatives by the South African Government.
256 Mbeki later traced a different set of three stages when, he addressed the launch of the African
Renaissance Institute in Pretoria on 11 October 1999:
'We speak of a continent which, while it led in the very evolution of human life and was a leading
centre of learning, technology and the arts in ancient times, has experienced various traumatic
epochs; each one of which has pushed her peoples deeper into poverty and backwardness. We refer
here to the three periods of:
- slavery, which robbed the continent of millions of her healthiest and most productive inhabitants
and reinforced the racist and criminal notion that, as Africans, we are sub-human;
- imperialism and colonialism, which resulted in the rape of raw materials, the destruction of
traditional agriculture and domestic food security, and the integration of Africa into the world
economy as a subservient participant; and
- neo-colonialism, which perpetuated this economic system, while creating the possibility for the
emergence of new national elites in independent states, themselves destined to join the dominant
global forces in oppressing and exploiting the masses of the people.
'During this latter period, our continent has experienced:
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The first 'moment' covered roughly the period from Ghana's independence in 1957 to
the collapse of the socialist grouping of states in 1989. There were many debates about
why developing countries, in Africa especially, had been unable to use this moment of
political liberation to usher in social and economic emancipation. Mavimbela identified
himself with the long-standing view espoused by the Non-Aligned Movement that
relations between African nation states and world powers continued to be determined
less by free policy choices than by what was prescribed by the major donor countries. It
was an unequal relationship, politically and economically, he said.
The ideological, economic and strategic imperatives of the Cold War had played a huge
part in the nature of the relations between Africa and the world powers. Even the
political and economic organisational instruments of the developing countries, such as
- unstable political systems in which one-party states and military rule have occupied pride of place,
leading to conflict, civil wars, genocide and the emergence of millions of displaced and refugee
populations;
- the formation of predatory elites that have thrived on the basis of the looting of national wealth and
the entrenchment of corruption;
- the growth of the international debt burden to the extent that, in some countries, combined with
unfavourable terms of trade, it makes negative growth in national per capita income inevitable; and
- actual declines in the standard of living and the quality of life for hundreds of millions of Africans.'
www.anc.of!~.za!ancdocsJhistoryimbeki/1999/indexlhtrnl (Date accessed: 13 October 2001)
Paul-Henri Bischoff has echoed The Argus' (see footnote 236 above) understanding of the
Renaissance idea as having a South African origin. He has argued that, what began in South Africa as
"'a national renaissance', including the nation-building project centred on a redefined African self
and the transformation of [South African] society to achieve a more equitable redistribution of power
and wealth, is part of a continuum which wants to be part of the change occurring in Greater Africa.
Out of this transformation for which the rest of Africa hoped, struggled and suffered, has therefore
come South Africa's advocacy in Africa and the rest of the world for an African Renaissance"
(emphasis added).
Bischoff argued that:
'[t]he need to achieve stability holds the key to a new African vision, as does the recognition that
there have to be many ways of achieving stability. Uniting different efforts to bring peace to the
continent is the all-embracing vision of an African Re-awakening. The idea of renewal is first and
foremost an attempt to bring about an African view on the containment and prevention of conflict,
second, the eschewal of authoritarianism and third, the attempt at functional co-operation to make
autonomous communication and co-operation possible in the face of global encroachments [on
sovereignty].'
See 'A foreign policy for all? South Africa and the call for an African Renaissance' Conflict Trends
Issue 3 at 33-6
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the Non-Aligned Movement, the Organisation of African Unity and regional economic
groupings such as the Southern African Development Community ('SADC'), were
rendered less effective by the ideological alignment of forces within them. For this
reason, they ended up as divided and disjointed, 'loose' formations incapable of
empowering developing countries to secure their independence from the dynamics of
the Cold War.
The second 'moment' identified by Mavimbela covered the period from the end of the
Cold War, at the end of the 1980s, and the decade of the 1990s. Regrettably, he noted,
''the Cold War era has not yet been replaced by a New World Order characterised by
the restructuring of international relations, the guaranteeing of mutual respect and the
redressing of the legacy of colonialism and neo-colonialism". Instead, he lamented, the
bipolar world of the Cold War had been replaced by ''the tripolar economic and social
world made up by North America, Europe and East Asia". Advances in technology that
had revolutionised production, distribution and the communication of knowledge
constituted the material basis of this world. This tripolar competition was threatening to
marginalise Africa.
With African countries no longer considered by world powers to be of the same
strategic importance as they were during the Cold War, an exacerbation of this
marginalisation threatened. African countries found themselves in direct competition
for global economic integration and vital capital flows with more regionally integrated
economies in eastern Europe and east Asia. Nevertheless, he submitted, this miracle
offered hope to the people of Africa that economic development could be rapid and
achievable without the annexation of foreign markets through imperial physical
force257•
257 It may be worth recalling, at this point, that contrary to Mavimbela's thesis, the 'Asian
miracle' has, since, lost some of its lustre. It became apparent that it had been excessively
founded on economic and financial practices, such as nepotism and cronyism, which
contradicted the broad trend of globalisation towards open competition. It is these and more
benign cognate practices arguably inherent to African culture and society that may prove to
pose significant obstacles to African integration into globalising markets. One is mindful here, for
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Mavimbela's thesis258 was that "[t]he raison d'être for a renaissance in the African
continent [was] the need to empower African peoples to deliver themselves from
[among other things] the legacy of colonialism and neo-colonialism, and to situate
themselves on the global stage as equal and respected contributors to, as well as
beneficiaries of, the achievements of human civilisation". Thus, just as the continent
was once the cradle of humanity and an important contributor to civilisation, he argued,
example, of the relative loyalty displayed toward tribe and clan, as opposed to the inchoate chimera
of the 'nation' composed of citizens of equal status and worth.
258 Mbeki subsequently set out his understanding of the vision in a speech at the launch of the African
Renaissance Institute in Pretoria on 11 October 1999. The necessary conditions existed, he said, for
the realisation of the African Renaissance vision. They are:
,_ the completion of the continental process of the liquidation of the colonial system in Africa,
attained as a result of the liberation of South Africa;
_ the recognition of the bankruptcy of nco-colonialism by the masses of the people throughout the
continent, including the majority of the middle strata;
_ the weakening of the struggle among the major powers for spheres of influence on our continent, as
a consequence of the end of the Cold War; and
_the acceleration of the process of globalisation.'
The tasks of the African Renaissance derived from the continent's experience, covering the entire
period from slavery to date. They included, said Mbeki:
-; the establishment of democratic political systems to ensure the accomplishment of the goal that
'the people shall govern', ensuring that these systems take into account African specifics so that,
while being truly democratic and protecting human rights, they are nevertheless designed in ways
which really ensure that political and, therefore, peaceful means can be used to address the competing
interests of different social groups in each country;
_ establishing the institutions and procedures which would enable the continent collectively to deal
with questions of democracy, peace and stability;
_ achieving sustainable economic development that results in the continuous improvement of the
standards of living and the quality of life of the masses of the people;
_ qualitatively changing Africa's place in the world economy so that it is free of the yoke of the
international debt burden and no longer a supplier of raw materials and an importer of manufactured
goods;
_ensuring the emancipation of the women of Africa;
_successfully confronting the scourge of HIV/AIDS;
_ the rediscovery of Africa's creative past to recapture the peoples' cultures, encourage artistic
creativity and restore popular involvement in both accessing and advancing science and technology;
_ strengthening the genuine independence of African countries and continent in their relations with
the major powers and enhancing their role in the determination of the global system of governance in
all fields, including politics, the economy, security, information and intellectual property, the
environment and science and technology.'
www.anc.org.za!ancdocs/histozy/mbekiI1999/indexlhtrnl (Date accessed: 13 October 2001)
The recognition of the central importance of human rights to both the theoretical design and practical
realisation of the vision is clear.
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this renaissance should empower it to help the world rediscover the oneness of the
human race; the equality of humankind.
One of the most fundamental elements constituting this renewal, Mavimbela submitted,
was the creation of a growing and sustainable economy; one which could assimilate,
contribute to and take advantage of world economics. This economic condition was an
essential element for the "survival and consolidation of this African dream".
Mavimbela employed notably idealistic language when he discussed the political
dimension of the vision. It would include a "new wave for the democratisation of
Africa [that] should be broadened, deepened and sustained as part of the quest for its
rebirth. Africa must lead the world by example and show that it is a continent based on
the will of its people, a continent singularly dedicated to their total emancipation".
Africa also needed capable political leadership and stable societies, Mavimbela
accepted. The continent needed the leadership that could win progressive political
debates within their own countries and provide effective national, continental and
global Ieadership=".
Talk of the 'New World Order' should also include the restructuring and repositioning
of many of the regional, continental and international institutions in line with the
objective of empowering developing countries, Mavimbela continued. Not only should
global institutions such as the United Nations, International Monetary Fund and the
World Bank change to accommodate this goal, he submitted, "but organisations of
developing countries such as NAM and the OAU should redefme their roles. These
organisations", he proposed, "should begin to gear themselves for the task of socio-
economic empowerment".
259 One might observe that this might prove to be a slow process as the continent's leadership finds it
difficult to move too far ahead of still extensively conservative societies. On the other hand, times of
overwhelming, unavoidable change have frequently proven to be opportune moments for
precipitating a 'paradigm shift' in both thought and actions.
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Also linked to the issues of development and global competitiveness was the
importance of institutions for regional co-operation and integration. Capital tended to
flow towards big and integrated markets, he observed, but shunned fragmented and
multiple markets where there was multiple membership, duplication, waste of resources
and a lack of co-ordination.
Mavimbela also argued that social scientists needed "to identify aspects of our social
culture which need to be enhanced and protected to serve the [cause] of the African
renaissance". He referred to the claim that the Renaissance of the 16th century had
benefited from the Protestant ethic. He noted, also, that the emergence of the Asian
renaissance had led to the increased popularity of classical writings on Confucianism in
Western bookshops, although, in the 1920s, Max Weber blamed Confucianism for
Asia's economic stagnation.
Mavimbela concluded that there were many elements necessary for the realisation of
the renewal of the African continent which were still missing. Others, however, had
begun to emerge, albeit in a rudimentary form. "The task", he argued, was "not to
lament those that are missing, but to work on those that exist and to encourage and
bring about those elements that are missing".
To realise this dream, he identified the pressing need to "work tirelessly to build
continental unity and consensus on the necessary programme of action". Certainly, he
cautioned, the continent would have to surmount obstacles set by those who did not
wish to see, or those who feared, a united and renewed continent. Nevertheless, Africa
could not be left ''wandering between two worlds, one dead, the other unable to be
born". This was a generation, he encouraged, caught in a historical conjuncture which
privileged it with the possibility of seizing the moment and become the midwives of the
African renaissance (emphasis added).
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5.2.5 The challenge is posed
In 1997, then-Deputy President Mbeki's concept of an 'African Renaissance' was an
idea in its infancy. Like all newly named trends, "it was a mix of emerging fact, insight
and a modicum of wishful thinking". Whether the term become a reality or withered in
the face of economic stagnation and strife depended, at least in part, on how the
continent responded to the trend of superpower withdrawal, argued Ross Herberf60.
The trend was illustrated by France's decision to reshape its policy toward its former
African colonies and gradually withdraw some of its 8 300 troops in six countries.
France's policy change reflected also the growing refusal to intervene militarily, and to
promote, instead, African peacekeeping forces. French diplomats argued that 'it was
time for Africa to stand on its own feet'. France would continue to offer moral,
developmental and industrial aid. But it would no longer unilaterally intervene in the
internal affairs of former colonies.
This was a significant policy shift, observed Herbert. Unlike Britain, France had never
fully disengaged from its African colonies. With a mix of advice, foreign aid and
military intervention, France had frequently played kingmaker. France had used its
influence to press for good governance on occasion. But maintenance of influence and
profitable economic relationships had been far more important goals, which had driven
France into cosy relationships with some of Africa's most corrupt and anti-democratic
regimes, he noted.
For decades, Africa policy had been set by "a small clutch of diplomats, without regard
for French public opinion", which had grown increasingly critical of French military
intervention to defend the indefensible. Herbert reported diplomatic sources as saying
the policy shift was a direct reaction to that criticism and in a sense represented the
"democratisation of French foreign policy".
260 Ross Herbert The Star, 1997 www.iol.co.za
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The change was positive for Africa, but there was great potential for this policy shift to
embarrass those singing the praises of African Renaissance, argued Herbert. France
was effectively leaving a power vacuum that the "spectacularly ineffective" OAU was
in no position to fill. Within that vacuum were a "spate of [continuing] crises and
several of Africa's longest-reigning rulers who face[-d] approaching elections after
spending years resisting the spread of democracy".
Herbert's assessment of the prospects for an African Renaissance began with the
recognition that southern Africa had clearly made real progress on issues of peace and
economic growth. But for every success story, he mourned, there was a rebellion
somewhere or an illegitimate leader clinging to power that detracted from sporadic and
patchy efforts at peace-building and democratic stability. With France, the United
States and Britain all unwilling to deploy troops in Africa, the burden of African crisis
prevention was squarely on African shoulders. Several African nations, including South
Africa, had expressed "routine" willingness to deploy their soldiers on peacekeeping
missions, but an African leader was needed, he argued, "who possesses moral authority,
economic strength and an effective, disciplined military".
Nigeria had attempted to play the role in Liberia and Sierra Leone, but had been largely
ineffective. That left South Africa as the natural leader and mediator, said Herbert.
While South Africa had accepted participation in African peacekeeping operations,
taking the lead in crisis prevention was no easy task. He recognised that intervention
was expensive, risked lives and distracted leaders from pressing domestic issues. But
Herbert and others have concludedf" that the issue would not go away. This meant that
261 See, for example, Hussein Solomon and Maxi van Aardt (eds.) 'Caring' security in Africa:
theoretical and practical considerations of new security thinking ISS Monograph Series No. 20 Feb
1998, ISS: Halfway House; Mark Malan SADC and sub-regional security: unde venis et quo vadis?
ISS Monograph Series No. 19 Feb 1998, ISS: Halfway House; Jakkie Cilliers Building security in
Southern Africa: an update on the evolving architecture ISS Monograph Series No. 43 Nov 1999,
ISS: Pretoria; Jakkie Cilliers and Annika Hilding-Norberg (eds.) 'Building stability in Africa:
challenges for the new millennium' ISS Monograph Series No. 46 Feb 2000, ISS: Pretoria; Mark
Malan 'Keeping the peace in the neighbourhood and abroad: lessons for South Africa from the
Russian experience?' African Security Review Vol. 7 NO.3 1998, 27-41; "Peace enforcement': the
real peace support challenge in Africa' African Security Review Vol. 7 NO.5 1998, 11-25; and
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"South Africa will have to decide exactly how badly it wants to see the African
Renaissance become a reality".
It is on the basis of this assessment of South Africa's lead role in the promotion and
implementation of the African Renaissance vision that the principal focus of the
remainder of this section will be on South African policy and practice. This
examination is intended to assist in answering the question whether it offers a realistic
prospect an enhancement in levels of African adherence to fundamental human rights
standards.
Writing a few months before the release of the ANC's landmark foreign policy
discussion document in December 1997, Blade Nzimande262 subsequently observed
that South Africa's transition to democracy was taking place at a time of momentous
changes in the international order. The collapse of the Soviet Union had ushered in a
world that was "uni-systemic". At the same time, powerful forces of globalisation and
liberalisation had emerged. These forces had not only profoundly changed international
economic relations, but also threatened the national sovereignty of many countries,
particularly in the Third World, he said.
South Africa's own interests demanded that it be active in promoting greater
understanding internationally for the developmental needs of peoples and countries in
the Third World, and in promoting self-determination and democratic norms
worldwide. It was against this background, he submitted, that South Africa's foreign
policy should be devised and judged.
Richard N. Haass Intervention: the use of American military force in the post-Cold War world
Brookings Institution Press, Washington DC, 1999.
262 Blade Nzimande 'SA's challenges in Africa and world' Independent Newspapers, 7 May 1997
www.iol.co.za . Blade Nzimande MP was chairman of the ANC National Executive Committee's
international affairs committee.
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For Nzimande, one of South Africa's major achievements on the African continent was
the prominent role the country was playing in the peaceful resolution of conflicts. South
Africa's initiatives, within the context of the OAU, were setting an example of how
Africans themselves were capable of resolving their problems. This was being achieved
"despite major problems whereby some of the leading world powers would like to see
African problems resolved in a manner that is favourable only to themselves".
The ANC, he stated, believed that such solutions were no solutions at all. South
Africa's role in Africa and the ANC's emphasis on Africans taking a leading role in
resolving their own problems was firmly located within a vision of an African
renaissance. This was an attempt, he continued, to "build confidence among ourselves
as Africans that Africa as a continent has what it takes to overcome underdevelopment,
poverty and instability and set itself on a route to accelerated development, democracy
and prosperity".
South Africa was still faced with many challenges in the international arena, but a few
stood out as the most important, said Nzimande, echoing Mavimbela and presaging the
ANC's subsequent discussion document. The first was to lobby and struggle for the
democratisation of world multilateral forums, including the UN, the IMF and World
Bank. The second challenge was to play an effective role, within the context of the
. OAU, in achieving an African renaissance. The third task was to contribute to
strengthening Third World solidarity and united action towards ajust world orde~63.
5.2.6 The African National Congress' approach
This narrower understanding of the responsibilities arising from Africa's sacrificial
contribution to South Africa's liberation seemed to be echoed by the African National
263 South Africa's fourth challenge, said Nzimande, was to contribute towards the liberation and self-
determination of, particularly, the Palestinian and the Saharawi peoples.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
155
Congress' ('ANC') landmark foreign policy discussion documenr'", released before its
end-of-year conference in 1997. The document recognised that a "distinguishing
feature" of South Africa was the "sustained interest of the rest of the world" in its
future. This would not necessarily last indefmitely, however. Nevertheless, despite its
"limitations and problems", South Africa aimed to "make a significant contribution to
ensuring peace, democracy, respect for human rights and sustained development".
These "principles" were "fundamental" to its foreign policy65, as was an eschewal of a
short-term focus on narrow self-interest or on hegemonic ambitionsi'",
The document was described by Clive Sawyer as a "thought-provoking mixture of
pragmatism and quixoticism" and viewed the African Renaissance vision as a "counter
to continuing globalisation'Y". The ANC's vision of an African renaissance "formed
the main pillar of its proposals for South Africa's foreign policy", said Sawyer, but that
policy "pitted the renaissance against globalisation in what many may regard as a
quixotic and controversial quest". There was, however, he concluded, no other option
for the movement than to propose this quest, given the reservations it [and many others]
had about globalisation.
The document blamed globalisation for subjecting international political and economic
institutions, as well as national political institutions, to the overarching global market. It
argued that globalisation entailed a "real danger" that the political and economic policy
of governments throughout the world could be dictated by the monopoly companies of
developed countries. Naturally, this was anathema to the ANC that, in the years since
the first democratic elections, had increasingly signalled its intention to pursue an
264 The 'working document' proposed that "South Africa's policy initiatives should be modest and not
overly ambitious". It should devise a "proactive policy in keeping with South Africa's resources and
commensurate with its international position" - paragraph A2. 'Introduction'.
265 Paragraphs 3.4 'South Africa's re-entry into the community of nations', 4.7 'Focus on good
governance, human rights and democratisation' and 5.7 'South Africa's limitations and strengths'.
266 Paragraph 3.1 'South Africa's democratisation process'.
267 Clive Sawyer 'ANC sets sights on new world order' Independent Newspapers 1997 www.iol.co.za .
The African National Congress reviewed its foreign policy vision ahead of its December 1997
national conference.
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independent course on foreign policy. It had, on occasion, refused to bend to the will of
any particular bloc and, in particular, that of the world's sole superpower, the United
States, said Sawyer.
The discussion document was "frank about the realities facing the country and the
party". It "soberly" noted that the economic objectives of the Western powers had not
come to an end with the Cold War and that the division of the world into economic
blocs left little opportunity for challenging the world order.
The document indicated a strong sensitivity concerning the drive towards neo-
liberalism that accompanied the process of globalisation, thereby undermining the
sovereignty of, especially, countries in the developing world. This dilution of state
sovereignty was illustrated by some developing countries having to seek World Bank or
International Monetary Fund approval for their national budgets before they present
these budgets to their parliaments.
The ANC document, however, rejected the two extreme reactions to globalisation: the
first being acquiescent assimilation into the global village and the second being an
ultra-leftist resistance to the leviathans of the world economy. The shortcoming of the
first approach - passive assimilation - was its failure to recognise that the emerging
international context was not necessarily structured to the advantage of a developing
country like South Africa. The drawback of the second was that it failed to recognise
that South Africa, as a small country, was already inextricably tied to the international
economy. Another weakness was that it reduced foreign policy opportunities.
The document proposed using the international situation to work for a just and
equitable world order and envisaged that the African Renaissance vision should form
the basis for this. It was for this very reason, the document argued, that the renaissance
posed a threat to the strategy of globalising capitalism. Indeed, "[t]he success of the
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
157
Renaissance depends on the extent to which it challenges globalisation [in its present
form]."
It was, therefore, clear that there existed for the drafters an inextricable link between
the economic and political future of the continent. Neither democracy and human
rights, on the one hand, nor issues of national and international good economic
governance, on the other, could be considered to be independent of each other. Neither
could be pursued to the exclusion of the other. There was no trade-off in either
direction. Adequate protection of human rights depended upon the production of
sufficient economic resources to fund the necessary mechanisms. Similarly, the
generation of a sustainable economic surplus was reliant upon respect for fundamental
norms of human dignity.
It was also clear that it adopted a broad perspective on the wide range of elements
necessary for a holistic continental recovery. All of these elements should be borne in
mind simultaneously when assessing appropriate responses to various situations.
Consequently, to emphasise any particular element would be inappropriate and may
lead to a misinterpretation and misunderstanding of the overall policy thrust. Thus, for
example, it would be inaccurate to hold on the basis of the document that South
Africa's foreign policy would prioritise human rights. This would be especially so if
one were to argue that this focus would be pursued to the virtual exclusion of other
pivotal aspects, such as economic recovery and the fight against poverty. It is
important, therefore, to examine this milestone document in its entirety for an accurate
understanding of the true relative priority of human rights issues in South African
foreign policy and practice.
The document consequently argued that key elements of the renaissance vision should
include:
- The economic recovery of the African continent as a whole.
- The establishment of political democracy on the continent.
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- The neeênê'lirêak neo-colonial relations between Africa and the world's economic
powers.
- The mobilisation of the people of Africa to take their destiny in their own hands,
preventing the continent from being [merely] a place for the attainment of the geo-
political and strategic interests of the world's most powerful countries.
- Fast development of a people-driven and people-centred economic growth.
Significantly, the document noted that a renaissance would not be possible in an
environment of conflict and instability. It went on to examine how the goals of the
renaissance could be achieved, notably drawing on the lessons of the Great Lakes
conflicts. The events leading up to the establishment of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo were "a learning example of the potential for Africa to resolve its own problems
without interference from the imperialist countries". "At the same time, one major
lesson was the extent to which powerful countries like the US still want to see their
interests being of central importance on the African continent."
The document went on to signal a reluctance to grasp the nettle of human rights norm
promotion and protection, calling for clarity on how to put human rights, justice and
democracy at the forefront of foreign policY68. The policy it suggested was the
avoidance of a harsh sanctions-style or interventionist approach, a further reiteration of
the importance of both continental solidarity and economic matters. More direct and
'invasive' forms of intervention, particularly of a military kind, were clearly beyond
serious consideration. Consequently, it said, adopting a carefully non-prescriptive and
'neutral' stance, placing human rights at the forefront of foreign policy "certainly
should not mean that we should refuse to conduct any diplomatic and trade relations
with countries whose record in human rights or democracy we regard as unsatisfactory.
But it should also not mean that, when we engage with the governments of such
268 Although it was not stated within the document, Sawyer feit that this may have stemmed partly from
the discomfort felt by the Government over criticism that it had failed to do enough to campaign for
human rights elsewhere. But the policy it suggested, the avoidance of a harsh sanctions-style
approach, was unlikely to close the door to such criticism, he concluded.
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countries, we ignore, marginalise or subordinate these principles and only concentrate
on trade and diplomacy". Thus was the policy of "quiet diplomacy" explicitly endorsed
as the only form of diplomacy'", since deployed with so little evident effect in the
instance of human rights abuses and the undermining of the rule of law in Zimbabwe,
particularly since 1999.
The discussion document also proposed a revamp of the Non-Aligned Movement to
help in these efforts. Turning to the Organisation of African Unity, the document
'accepted' that South Africa's interests were inextricably linked to those of the broader
continent and called for South Africa to lead a campaign to transform the OAU.
Importantly, the document defmed the principal challenge as enabling the OAU to
effectively 'intervene' in the promotion of democracy, justice and human rights, while
at the same time not undermining the OAU Charter, which protected the national
sovereignty of African countries. Nevertheless, urged the authors, ever seeking to
emphasise the equivalence of the several goals it proposed, the Charter "should not be
used as a shield for states that violate human rights."
Mbeki has repeatedly stated that he discerns a "new urgency to build and strengthen our
institutions of democracy, develop a culture of respect for human rights and [to] ensure
accountable and transparent governance". He has cited as evidence of this the decision
by the Organisation of African Unity, at its 1998 Summit in Algiers, that those leaders
who seized power through force should not be permitted into the next Summit of the
OAU. The African continent was "awakening and assuming its responsibilities" he has
declared270 (emphasis added).
It remains to be seen, however, whether Mbeki and the OAU take a stand against those
who, like President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, seem intent upon retaining power
269 Paragraph 5.2 'Principles and cornerstones'
210 Address by the Chairperson of the Non-Aligned Movement, President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa,
to the NAM Ministerial Meeting, United Nations, New York, 23 September 1999.
www.anc.org.za/ancdocslhistory/mbeki/1999/index.html (Date accessed: 13 October 2001)
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by legal subterfuge and force. It is suggested that President Mugabe's refusal to date to
agree to permit foreign scrutiny of the presidential electoral campaign should, at least,
give rise to a warning of the prospect of exclusion.
The policy document dealt also with human rights, "conflict prevention and
peacemaking" as "substantial" concerns to "South Africa in the African context". It
also viewed "preventive diplomacy" as "an essential and fundamental consideration",
particularly as, "once conflict occurs, diplomacy ... is more difficult, traumatic and
costly - both materially and in terms of human life - namely, devising appropriate
peacemaking and peacekeeping operations'F" (emphasis added).
Multilateral military action is apparently not excluded by the document. However"
unless it purports to adopt the Clausewitzian defmition of war as merely an extension of
politics (i.e. 'diplomacy'), the form of words adopted by the document suggests that
South Africa is wary of committing itself to anything but the diplomatic exercise of
"devising" peacemaking interventions, as opposed to participating in them. In
particular, armed humanitarian intervention is not discussed in so many words, despite
the possibility of arguing for an implied connection from the contextual juxtaposition of
the issues of human rights and peacemaking.
Outlining strategies to put the concerns of Africa and the developing world on the
international agenda, the document called for the development of alliances with
progressive states and parties in the Western world. The emphasis in these alliances
would vary from trade to political considerations. However, the document cautioned
that the development of such alliances was unlikely to work unless countries in the
developing world devised a common agenda272•
271 Paragraph 6.1 'The challenge of multilateralism'
272 1n concrete terms, this common agenda should include the following priorities:
- Making a priority of democratising and expanding the membership of the United Nations Security
Council.
- A common programme on poverty alleviation and debt relief for developing countries.
- Democratisation of institutions like the World Bank and the IMF.
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The document's emphasis on economic issues as they related to the urgent need to
combat poverty was again evident in the call for the strengthening of the OAU to
effectively co-ordinate economic relations on a continental basis.
Having outlined these ambitious goals, the document reiterated the warning against
overestimating South Africa's capacity as a small country although, it said, the
country's international image would enable it to 'punch above its weight'.
It was inevitable that an African renaissance and attempts towards the transformation of
international relations would mean responses from major powers that "might not be
positive", the document warned. It was, consequently, "important to strike a balance
between pursuit of an African renewal and gathering enough strength in order to defend
whatever advances we make and, most importantly, not to act in a childish manner"
(emphasis added).
5.2.7 The new policy in action
Peter Fabricius subsequently assessed the practical effects and implications of this
redefmed policy, including the stated intention not to conduct itself immaturely,
following South Africa's response to the American Africa Growth and Opportunity
Act, which promised improved access to the US market for important African
products273•
Fabricius noted that Deputy Foreign Minister Aziz Pahad had remarked in 1996 that,
where United States and South African interests intersected, "we can co-operate". That
statement, commented Fabricius, may have created the impression that relations
between the two countries were entering a "more mature phase of co-operation in
pursuing common interests". South Africa had, previously, bent over backwards to
avoid creating the impression among African states that it was the unwitting tool of the
United States' Africa policy. Pahad's words and some concurrent developments
273 Peter Fabricius 'SA must not side with dictators' Independent Newspapers 1998 www.iol.co.za
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suggested, however, that South Africa was now more ready to assert itself on the
continent and show less sensitivity to what other African countries feit about its
relationship with the US (or anything else).
However, noted Fabricius, Pahad's statement was made not long before the birth of the
concept of the 'African Renaissance' was articulated by then-Deputy President Thabo
Mbeki's Office. Fabricius recalled that the concept was initially widely hailed in the
West and elsewhere as a promising sign that South Africa was at last about to fulfil its
historic.destiny by leading Africa into a new age of good governance, sound economic
policies and prosperity. But since then, he argued, an implicit strain of the renaissance
had become more explicit, one that was not so pleasing to Western ears. That was the
idea that if Africans took responsibility for their own destiny, others should completely
keep out.
While this may be a good thing in principle, Fabricius accepted, one contradictory
consequence had seemed to be that South Africa had increasingly taken sides with
Africa in disputes with the Western powers, even where, by doing so, it sided also with
undemocratic practices, human rights abuse and bad economics. "Instead of blowing a
new breath of fresh air into Africa, the renaissance [was] to this extent starting to
reinforce the weary old destructive tendency to resist criticism from the outside, or even
from other African states, as interference, and so to let bad rulers be".
Fabricius cited the example/?" of Ex-President Nelson Mandela's "powerful" 1995
stand against the Nigerian military regime, when he led "a crusade" to have Nigeria
expelled from the Commonwealth. But South Africa had, thereafter, "backed right off'.
It had even withdrawn from the Commonwealth ministerial group monitoring
sanctions. This had followed a statement by a senior Mbeki adviser that South Africa
wished to present a lower profile on the issue because its leading role was creating a
274 discussed above
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degree of resentment in Nigeria which might threaten South Africa's African
renaissance ambitions275•
Another unfortunate example discussed by Fabricius was South Africa's attitude
towards Western initiatives to help Africa create a peacekeeping capabllityi". Some of
the least democratic African countries - the ones which had, therefore, come under
greatest Western pressure, such as Nigeria (at that time), Sudan, and Libya -
unsurprisingly opposed the initiatives most strongly. Other countries with better
records, such as Uganda, were in favour. Even the foreign minister of Zimbabwe, "no
great lackey of the West", Fabricius commented, had apparently advocated that the
OAU accept the aid with the pragmatic observation that, whatever Western interests
might be in Africa, African countries should take the aid and use it to their own ends.
South Africa's foreign minister, Alfred Nzo, had, however, reportedly kept out of the
argument, apparently for fear of appearing pro-West.
But perhaps the most glaring example cited by Fabricius was South Africa's initial
attitude towards the United States' Africa Growth and Opportunity Acf77. The bill had
struggled through Congress against heavy opposition because it would, among other
things, boost African exports into the US by lifting or easing tariffs on certain
important African products, especially textiles and clothing. The rest of SADC and
most other African countries supported the bill, for obvious reasons. Textile producers
in South Africa said it would create 100000 jobs in the country. But South Africa for a
long time withheld support for the bill, jeopardising its chances of being enacted. South
Africa's ambassador to the US, Franklin Sono was reported as saying he was troubled
27S The Nigerian government subsequently participated closely with South Africa and Algeria in the joint
New Africa Initiative. NAI included the essence of the African Renaissance vision and the
Millennium Africa/Omega Plan devised by Mbeki and Algeria's President Bouteflika. This
development may corroborate the efficacy of South Africa's withdrawal from President Mandela's
principled, but unpopular stand.
276 Discussed at the OAU.
277 Later renamed the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act.
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by the bill's 'conditionalities' which stipulated that its benefits would accrue only to
countries judged by the US to be committed to the free market and democracy.
Here, says Fabricius, South Africa had placed itself in the "absurd position of
jeopardising its own workers' interests [in order] to demonstrate a solidarity with its
African fellows which most of them did not want". South Africa easily qualified for the
benefits of the bill. So too would most, if not all, SADe countries. For whose sake then
were we being so sensitive to Western pressure?, he asked. For the Libyas, Nigerias278
and Sudans of the continent?
While it was fitting that SA should refuse to be a tool of Western interests in Africa, it
was "perverse to oppose worthy objectives just because the West supports them. Such
worthy interests must include the pursuit of democracy and sound economic policies in
Africa, without which we will always suffer by association. It is much more in South
Africa's own long-term interests to pursue these goals, even in tandem if necessary
with the dreaded Western powers, than to oppose those values and jeopardise our
material interests for the sake of solidarity with African dictators", argued Fabricius279•
It certainly seemed as if South Africa was not drawing the line in the most appropriate
location.
5.2.8 Mbeki's interpretation of the vision
It is important, for a number of reasons, to closely consider Thabo Mbeki's exposition
of the renaissance vision. Firstly, Mbeki has gathered into his office the reins of much
of South Africa's foreign policymaking and practice. His is an active presidency in this
respect, as is evidenced by his many foreign engagements. Not least among his
278 Nigeria has, of course, since embraced democracy once again.
279 Since these incidents, and particularly in the African Union's endorsement of the joint New Africa
Initiative, it seems that the continent and South Africa have publicly committed themselves to
principles acceptable to the Western powers who hold the purse strings so vital to the economic and
political revival of Africa. It may be doubted whether this presages a real change in policy to
substantive action against human rights abuse on the continent, rather than constituting merely a
continuation of the cautious language of the ANC's 1996/1997 foreign policy document, which
effectively endorsed 'quiet diplomacy'.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
165
decisions that have served to increase his direct management of South Africa's foreign
policy was the appointment of the trusted Dr Nkosazana Zuma as his Foreign Affairs
Minister.
Secondly, South Africa's second president has energetically pursued the project of
building a broad-based crosscutting coalition in support of the continent's rebirth.
Seminal steps have included the absorption of other signal African contributions, such
the Omega Plan, as well as the subsequent European and North American endorsement
of the newly co-authored strategy, discussed further below. The President is clearly the
lead player in the development of the dream. His efforts at ensuring implementation are
certainly worthy of continued attention.
Meanwhile, Deputy President Mbeki continued his campaign of raising the profile of
the renaissance idea while addressing the United Nations Universicy280.He asked how
the continent could "hope to emulate the great human achievements of the earlier
Renaissance of the Europe of the 15th and 16th centuries". One of the answers to this
question was to recall the fact that, "as the European Renaissance burst into history in
the 15th and 16th centuries, there was a royal court in the African city of Timbuktu
which, in the same centuries, was as learned as its European counterparts." What this
told him was that "my people are not a peculiar species of humanity!"
He spoke of this "long-held dogma" of Africans' difference because it continued to
"weigh down the African mind and spirit, like the ton of lead that the African slave
carrie[-dl on her ... shoulders, producing in her and the rest" an attitude which
contested "any assertion that she [was] capable of initiative, creativity, individuality,
and entrepreneurship". The weight of this dogma and consequent attitude dictated that
she would "never straighten her back and thus discover" her equality. "An essential and
280 Speech by Deputy President Thabo Mbeki at the United Nations University 'The African renaissance,
South Africa and the world', 9 April 1998. www.anc.org.zalancdocs/history/mbekiI1998/index.html
(Date accessed: 13 October 2001)
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necessary element of the African Renaissance" was, consequently, to "assert the
principality of her humanity - the fact that she, in the first instance, is not a beast of
burden, but a human and African beini8!."
Defining 'genuine liberation', Mbeki recognised the necessity to demonstrate the
capability of establishing and maintaining systems of good governance. Africa's own
practical experiences, he explained, emphasised that military governments did not
represent the system of good governance that it sought. Accordingly, the continent had
made the point clear that it was opposed to military coups and had taken practical steps,
as exemplified by the restoration to power of the elected government of Sierra Leone,
to demonstrate its intent to meet this challenge. Similarly, said Mbeki, many African
governments, as well as the OAV, had sought to "encourage the Nigerian government
and people to return as speedily as possible to a democratic system of governmenr'V."
The cautious, diffident and non-invasive tone of this statement has proven to be a
significant herald of his policy content. Consequently, although at least 25 multi-party
democracies had been established in Africa in the nineties, he cautioned that "each
country has its particular characteristics to which it must respond as it establishes its
democratic system of government. Accordingly, none of us seek to impose any
supposedly standard models of democracy on any country, but want to see systems of
government in which the people are empowered to determine their destiny and to
resolve any disputes among themselves by peaceful political means."
281 Marcus Ramogale agrees that a nation's "psycho-cultural wealth" determines its success. It is,
consequently, vital that Africa takes responsibility to rebuild its value systems in the wake of their
colonial destruction. The reconstruction process is necessarily a moral one, based on notions of
'decency and excellence'. - 'Quest for excellence' in Frontiers of Freedom 1st quarter, 1998, South
African Institute of Race Relations: Johannesburg.
282 Mbeki again referred to " ... the important decision recently taken at the Algiers Summit of the OAU
to exclude from its ranks, with effect from the next Summit, all military regimes that may still exist
on the African Continent. A further decision was taken to assist such countries resolutely to move
towards a democratic system of government" (emphasis added).
Address to the 54th Session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York, 20 September
1999W\-\-w.anc.org.zaJancdocs/history/mbekilI999/index.html (Date accessed: 13 October 2001)
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In this context, and adopting an essentially long-term and catholic perspective of the
continent's historical progress, he mentioned two 'initiatives' taken by the continent as
a whole through the agency of the OAV. The first was the establishment of the inter-
state Central Organ for the Prevention and Resolution of Conflicts. The Organ would
be increasingly empowered, he promised, perhaps unaware of the inherent
contradiction, to intervene to resolve conflicts on the continent by means of
peacekeeping, which would increase the "collective capacity to intervene quickly, to
ensure that we have no more Rwandas, Liberias or Somalias,,283.
283 For Mbeki, there seems to exist a close parallel between the role of the OAU/AU and the role of the
UN in the need to democratise its structures, and the concomitant need re-focus their respective
activities on the objective promotion and defence of democratisation. It is suggested that it is not
unreasonable to read into his implicit analogy a call for the UN to undertake to do that which the
OAU/AU may not be able to do itself for the foreseeable future in defence of human rights norms.
During his address to the 54th Session of the United Nations General Assembly ibid, Mbeki noted
that changed circumstances created the opportunity for a more democratic system of international
governance, as would be reflected by a "correct" restructuring of the UN. The process of
globalisation necessarily redefined the concept and practice of national sovereignty, he argued, and
the frontiers of that sovereignty were being pushed back, especially as regards the smaller countries
of the world. Inevitably, then, it became necessary that a "compensatory movement took place,
towards the reinforcement of the impact of these countries on the system of global governance,
through the democratisation of the system of international relations".
He argued that the mere spread of democracy throughout the world spoke of a greater commitment
among the nations to the resolution of national and international conflicts by peaceful means. The
UN, therefore, had a responsibility to focus especially on the objective contained in Article 1 of its
Charter, viz. 'to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the
peace ... and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and
international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to
a breach of the peace ...' .
This, said Mbeki, imposed a solemn and supreme responsibility on the United Nations to work for the
prevention of conflicts, and to endeavour to resolve them so that a durable peace can be established.
Sometimes, the international response to conflicts had been to wait for them to develop into violence,
and even wars and, only then to intervene through costly peacekeeping operations. These served, at
times, merely to "freeze those conflicts, perpetuate polarisation, and make their timely resolution
more difficult". On the other hand, the requirement that the United Nations undertake such
interventions to "prevent" the outbreak of hostilities, imposed an obligation on the UN to ensure that
it was viewed by governments and peoples as a truly even-handed interlocutor and "peacemaker".
Peacemaking, then, is not an exercise in military enforcement, according to Mbeki's view.
In view of this criticism, it is unclear whether Mbeki's reference to an enhanced 'peacekeeping' role
for the OAU's Central Organ for the Prevention and Resolution of Conflicts, would actually increase
the "collective capacity to intervene quickly, to ensure that we have no more Rwandas, Liberias or
Somalias". The OAU's Central Organ is to be increasingly empowered to intervene to resolve
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
168
The second initiative was the adoption of the African Charter of Human and Peoples'
Rights. The Charter set norms according to which African countries could judge both
themselves and their sister countries as to whether they were conducting themselves "in
a manner consistent with the defence and promotion of human and peoples' rights."
Implicitly recognising the historical failure to give real substantive content to these
norms, and that a change in the way these admirable values are actually dealt with was
possibly a long way off, he conceded that "[l-]ike others throughout the world, we too
are engaged in the struggle to give real meaning to such concepts as transparency and
accountability in governance, as part of the offensive directed against corruption and
the abuse of power".
Perhaps cognisant, too, of the type of scepticism voiced by Pierre Sané, Mbeki
identified his vision with a long-established 'movement'. He argued from these
initiatives that, in the political sphere, the African Renaissance had already begun:
'Our history demands that we do everything in our power to defend the gains that have
already been achieved, to encourage all other countries on our continent to move in the
same direction, according to which the people shall govern, and to enhance the capacity
conflicts on the continent by means of peacekeeping (as well as to prevent aggravated levels of
conflict).
Continuing to address the UN's credibility crisis, he argued that it could attain the objective of acting
as an even-handed 'peacemaker' only if it worked genuinely 'to develop friendly relations among
nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples' as stated
in its Charter. If the nations were indeed seriously committed to these critical objectives of peace and
democracy in the world, then there was no excuse to further postpone meaningful restructuring of the
United Nations, he declared.
During the Cold War era, with the prevalence of dictatorship in many countries, the politics of power
might have been seen as the only path to survival, he conceded. However, the management of the
world today through the exercise of such power, however modified, would itself "subvert the
objectives of democracy and peace, spawning pretenders to the throne at global, continental and
regional levels", Mbeki argued.
Continuing to appeal to the more hard-headed and self-interested among his audience, Mbeki added
that "it could be argued quite rationally that international peace, democracy and prosperity" were the
"necessary condition for the further rapid growth of the world economy. This latter held, in tum, the
key to the further expansion of corporations both small and big, which seek global markets.
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of the OAU to act as an effective instrument for peace and the promotion of human and
people's rights, to which it is committed'.
The "political imperatives of the African Renaissance" were inspired "both by our
painful history of recent decades and the recognition of the fact that none of our
countries is an island which can isolate itself from the rest, and that none of us can truly
succeed if the rest fail".
Turning to economic matters, he addressed the need to deal urgently and effectively
with the reality of both hunger and disease. Furthermore, the "restoration of the dignity
of the peoples of Africa" demanded that Africa's leaders "deal as decisively and as
quickly as possible with the perception" of the continent as "condemned forever to
depend on merciful charity". Accordingly, many countries had introduced new
economic policies which sought to create conditions that were attractive for domestic
and foreign investors, encourage the growth of the private sector, reduce the
participation of the state in the ownership of the economy and, in other ways, to build
modem economies. The creation of regional markets was also a priority, he said.
He then reiterated the interconnectedness of economic and political progress. As part of
the "determined offensive to achieve integrated and mutually beneficial regional
development", Southern African leaders, especially, had taken other initiatives to deal
with common regional problems. These included regional security, peace and stability,
including the building of regional peacemaking and peacekeeping capacity, as well as
a regional system of co-operation to combat crime.
Mbeki underlined Africa's supposed recognition of the reciprocal linkage between the
political and economic categories of human rights. He noted that a significant number
of countries had "shown relatively high rates of growth as a direct consequence of
changes in economic policy and, of course, the achievement of stability within our
countries, as a result of the establishment of democratic systems of government". These
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economic objectives, ''which must result in the elimination of poverty, the
establishment of modem multi-sector economies, and the growth of Africa's share of
world economic activity", were an essential part of the African Renaissance.
Mbeki again accepted that South Africans owe their "emancipation from apartheid in
no small measure to the support and solidarity extended to us by all the peoples of
Africa". In that sense the country's victory over the system of white minority
domination was an African victory. This, he believed, imposed an obligation on South
Africans lead, ''to use this gift of freedom, which is itself an important contribution to
Africa's Renaissance, to advance the cause of the peoples of our continent." South
Africa, therefore, had to succeed, especially in strengthening and further entrenching
democracy internally and inculcating a culture of human rights among all its people.
This was indeed happening, he said.
Lest he give credence to whispered unease over his country's suspected 'imperial'
designs, Mbeki clearly bound himself to a solidarist position in the achievement of
these ends. He declared that the peoples of Africa entertained the "legitimate
expectation that the new South Africa, which they helped to bring into being", would
not only be "an expression of the African Renaissance by the manner in which it
conduct[-ed] its affairs, but [would] also be an active participant with other Africans in
the struggle for the victory of that Renaissance throughout our continent" (emphasis
added).
Similarly, arguing that a recognition of interdependence implied the necessity of global
action, Mbeki invited his audience to "join us in the noble struggle" to achieve these
objectives. The process of globalisation emphasised the fact that no person is an island,
sufficient to himself or herself, he observed. Rather, all humanity was an
interdependent whole in which none could go hungry 'elsewhere' in the world. It was,
accordingly, impossible for the African renaissance to succeed unless the international
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community agreed that Africa constituted the principal development challenge in the
world.
In a subsequent statement at Gallagher Estate, Midrand, on 13 August 1998284, Thabo
Mbeki addressed the struggle for political power that was, at that time, dragging down
particularly the Kingdom of Lesotho, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea and
Ethiopia, Guinea Bissau, and Algeria. He said that it was "because of these pitiful
souls, who are the casualties of destructive force for whose birth they are not to blame,
that Africa needs her renaissance".
Africa, he proclaimed, had no need for the criminals who would acquire political power
by "slaughtering ... innocents... ". Nor had she any need for such as those who, because
they did not accept that power was legitimate only because it served the interests of the
people, had laid Somalia to waste.
"Neither", he continued, "has Africa need for the petty gangsters who would be our
governors by theft of elective positions, as a result of holding fraudulent elections, or
by purchasing positions of authority through bribery and corruption .... together [they]
demean our Continent and ourselves. The time has come that we say enough and no
more, and by acting to banish the shame, remake ourselves as the midwives of the
African Renaissance ... " (emphasis added). President Mbeki has no-one but himself to
blame if his actions concerning Zimbabwe's 2002 presidential elections are closely
scrutinised.
He levelled severe criticism at those who corrupted the political order for personal gain
at all costs. In this equation, he argued, the poverty of the masses of the people became
a necessary condition for the enrichment of the few. Itwas out of this "pungent mixture
284 www.anc.org.zalancdocs/history/mbeki/1998/index.html (Date accessed: 13 October 2001) The
speech became known as "The African Renaissance Statement", although this was more because of
its principled moral content and powerful phraseology, rather than because it heralded anything more
than a ringing exhortation.
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of greed, dehumanising poverty, obscene wealth and endemic public and private
corrupt practice", that many of Africa's coups d'etat, civil wars and situations of
instability were born and entrenched.
He declared in ringing tones that the time had come to "call a halt to the seemingly
socially approved deification of the acquisition of material wealth and the abuse of state
power to impoverish the people and deny our Continent the possibility to achieve
sustainable economic development." The African Renaissance, he asserted
dramatically, demanded that "we purge ourselves of the parasites and maintain a
permanent vigilance against the danger of the entrenchment in African society of this
rapacious stratum with its social morality according to which everything in society
must be organised materially to benefit the few" (emphasis added).
" ... The call for Africa's renewal, for an African Renaissance", he continued, implicitly
endorsing Mill's assertion of domestic national responsibility, "is a call to rebellion.
We must rebel against the tyrants and the dictators, those who seek to corrupt our
societies and steal the wealth that belongs to the people. We must rebel against the
ordinary criminals who murder, rape and rob, and conduct war against poverty,
ignorance and the backwardness of the children of Africa" (emphasis added).
Again, however, Mbeki left unsaid what action, if any, might be employed by external
agencies such as the OAV in support of such 'democratic rebels' if, indeed, he meant
these powerful words to be understood in their literal sense. This vagueness
characterises most of Mbeki's public pronouncements on the practical dimension of the
'commitment' of the African Renaissance vision and programme to the protection and
promotion of human rights. It is, consequently, not entirely clear whether Mbeki means
by such statements that the time has come to 'forcefully' fully implement and/or defend
the provisions of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, while simultaneously
moving on to fulfil the terms of the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
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An alternative interpretation might be that he intends to merely endorse the African
Charter of Human and Peoples' Rights as it currently stands, with all its limitations and
reservations. Thus, while the 'Charter apparently recognises rights, it does so 'within the
law' as any undemocratic leader may determine from time to time. So, for example,
Article 6 provides that" ... No one may be deprived of his freedom except for reasons
and conditions previously laid down by law". Similarly, Article 8 declares that "No
one may, subject to law and order, be submitted to measures restricting the exercise
of' freedom of conscience and the profession and practice (emphasis added).
Emphasising perspectives of balance and moderation, Mbeki placed all his eggs in the
basket of democracy: " ... [W]e want to see an African Continent in which the people
participate in systems of governance in which they are truly able to determine their
destiny and put behind us the notions of democracy and human rights as peculiarly
'Western' concepts. Thus would we assume a stance of opposition to dictatorship,
whatever form it may assume." Reinforcing this assessment, he limited his call for
'opposition to dictatorship' to the role of an election monitor: "Thus ... we must ensure
that ... elections are ... truly democratic, resulting in governments ... genuinely
representative of the will of the people". By this means [alone], he asserted, would the
continent create the mechanisms for the peaceful resolution of conflicts within African
society, to ensure that the competition for scarce resources does not result in a mutual
slaughter of civil war and violent conflict.
He again seemed careful to avoid bold leadership: "By saying all this, I am not
suggesting that there is anyone model of democracy which we must copy.
Necessarily, we have to take into account the specific conditions in our countries to
find the organisational forms which, while addressing those specific conditions,
nevertheless still live up to the perspective that the people shall govern" (emphasis
added).
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While, then, on balance, Mbeki appears to accept a broad defmition of the political
evils to be confronted, they are, essentially, to be confronted peacefully, by the
international community, at least. Armed humanitarian intervention is not an option to
be considered readily or, even, at all it seems.
The essential reliance on the single strategy of 'pure' or elemental diplomacy, as
opposed to the inclusion of any broader tools of persuasion, was re-emphasised when
Mbeki spoke at the opening of the Zimbabwe Trade Fair in May 2000285• On this
occasion, he again focused on mutual interests and solidarity, to the almost entire
exclusion of words indicating disagreement, let alone disapproval. Again repeating
central concepts as if they were a mantra or magic spell that would, by themselves,
achieve the desired end, he stated: "In as much as we know from our own history that
2855 May 2000. Mbeki said:
'I am convinced that Zimbabwe and South Africa share a common obligation to ensure that their
economies help to drive the process of growth and development throughout the SADe region.
Inevitably, therefore, both of us have responsibilities that extend beyond our borders and have to
respond to these, basing ourselves on the regional solidarity and unity in action we achieved during
the difficult years of the struggle for liberation.
'It is obvious that the regional programme I have spoken of requires that we also address the issue of
peace and stability throughout our region. Our region needs no education about the fact that without
such peace and stability, we cannot achieve sustained development, the fundamental condition for the
realisation of the objective of providing a better life for all our people.
'As peoples who share a common destiny, defined by more than the mere fact that we are neighbours,
we have to be concerned about what happens in each of our countries. In this context, Mr President, I
might take advantage of this occasion to mention the concern you had, a few years ago, that we, the
black people of South Africa, should not make the grievous mistake of allowing the outbreak of a
civil war among themselves. I am convinced that the interventions you made in this regard
contributed to turn us away from a path that would have been truly disastrous.
'[A]s a people, we are convinced that it would be best that this important matter is dealt with in a co-
operative and non-confrontational manner among all the people of this sister country, both black and
white, reflecting the achievement of a national consensus on this issue, encompassing all
Zimbabweans. Accordingly, we trust that ways and means will be found to end the conflict that has
erupted in some areas of Zimbabwe, occasioned by the still unresolved land question in this country.
'Peace, stability, democracy and social progress in Zimbabwe are as important for yourselves as they
are for the rest of the region. Peace, stability, democracy and social progress in South Africa and each
one of the countries in our region are important both within each of our national boundaries and in the
context of the successful evolution of all the other SADC countries.'
www.anc.org.za/ancdocslhistorylmbeki/2000/indexlhtml (Date accessed: 13 October 2001)
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you are ready to assist us to achieve peace, stability, democracy and social progress in
our own country, so are we, in the common interest, willing and ready to work with you
for peace, stability, democracy and social progress in Zimbabwe, in our region and the
rest of our Continent ... ".
It has become clearer with the passage of time that Mbeki's words are more artistry and
artifice than to be interpreted literally as 'action-oriented'. Indeed, the practice of his
foreign policy to date has been conducted largely within the verbal dimension, and
indirectly so at that. In this sense, the South African Presidency, where it leads, does so
with great caution.
Those seeking an endorsement of a more direct and literal interpretation of the
confrontation with or intervention against undemocratic abuses of human rights, may
discern some degree of irony in the following words, uttered by Mbeki at the UN
Millennium Summit in New York on 7 September 2000. Speaking in an economic
context, Mbeki regretted the global 'refusal' to use its "enormous capacity to end the
contemporary, deliberate and savage violence of poverty and underdevelopment. Our
collective rhetoric conveys promise", he asserted. "The offence is that our actions
communicate the message that, in reality, we do not care. We are indifferent. Our
actions say the poor must bury the poor. The fundamental challenge that faces this
Millennium Summit is that, credibly, we must demonstrate the will to end poverty and
underdevelopment" (emphasis added).
A further instructive example was the response of the current Deputy President, Jacob
Zuma, to a question in the National Assembly concerning the policy status of his
reported statement made at the close of the Heads of South African Foreign Missions
Conference on 15 February 2001. The statement had indicated that the OAU principle
of non-interference in the domestic affairs of member states should be challenged as
outmodedf".
2867 March 2001. www.anc.org.zalancdocsihistoQ./mbeki/200llindex.html
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The Deputy President's reply to the question referred to the Constitutive Act of the
African Union, which will replace the OAU in 2002, and which the South African
Parliament ratified on 28 February 2001. While the reported statement did not
constitute official government policy, Mr Zuma said, he added tentatively that "current
developments on the Continent show that many leaders share these views. Examples of
this are the stance of the OAU to isolate military dictatorships, the move towards
democratisation and the pending establishment of an African Court of Human and
People's Rights.... There may now exist sufficient grounds for Africa to review its
original position, with the intention of either confirming it or changing it, based on the
will of the African people ... ".
This response provided little clarity on the possible place in South Africa's foreign
policy of any form of armed intervention in defence of human rights norms and
standards. Indeed, its vagueness closely mimicked the controversy and confusion
surrounding the 'SADC' (effectively, South African and Botswanan) intervention in
Lesotho some three years previously''".
Then-Deputy President Mbeki had sought to deploy the concept of 'neo-colonialism'
when defending that intervention against critics of its legality. Ignoring the allegations
of vote-rigging, Mbeki said, bitingly:
'Because of their hatred for the forces of genuine change on our Continent, and their
determination to defeat us, ... these judges virtually approve of a coup d'état in Lesotho
against an elected government, proclaim criminal arson and looting in Lesotho as an
heroic act of resistance, denounce a humane approach by the region's armed forces
which minimised the loss of life, and prostitute the truth in the process ....
(Date accessed: 13October 2001)
287 See Cedric de Coning 'Conditions for Intervention: DRC and Lesotho' in Conflict Trends Issue 1,
October 1998 at 20ff, ACCORD: Umhlanga Rocks, South Africa; and Prof. George Barrie 'South
Africa's forcible intervention in Lesotho: what does international law say?' de Rebus January 1999 at
46-7.
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'Our strength, however, derives from the fact that in as much as we did not owe our
liberation as a Continent from colonialism and apartheid to these superior judges, so we
will not owe our emancipation from the deadly clutches of neo-colonialism and the
other ills which afflict our Continent to these eminent persons. Accordingly, it is not
their view which should determine our direction and pace of march, but our own
sovereign perspective of what is good and necessary for us to achieve the new birth of
Africa' (emphasis added).
Because of the President's much-criticised occasional resort to the 'race card'
domestically, it is unclear whether Mbeki's disparaging response to 'neo-colonial
judges' constituted merely a calculating deflection of warranted criticism and a
justification of the legally indefensible. Consequently, it is difficult to draw any
conclusions concerning whether or not 'humanitarian intervention' may indeed
constitute part of the armoury to advance the African renaissance.
A similar example is presented by the Constitutive Act of the African Union. It
stipulates the 'right of the Union to intervene in a member state, pursuant to a decision
of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely, war crimes, genocide and
crimes against humanity'. However, the possibility of a decision by the Assembly in
favour of intervention in defence of human rights remains an imponderable. This is
particularly so in view of the almost obligatory obeisance he paid to the concept of
sovereignty, although on this occasion the reference was to a solidarist, continental,
independence/'".
When then-Deputy President Mbeki addressed the ministerial meeting of the Non-
Aligned Movement in Durban289, he again expressed his grave doubts whether a stable
world of divided fates was possible and, more importantly, whether such a world, even
if it were possible, was desirable. It was not possible, in his view, for "some to
288 For further discussion of this issue, see footnote 278 above
289 Durban, 31 August 1998. www.anc.org.zaJancdocslhistory/mbeki/1998/indexlhtml
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ceaselessly maintain and expand their prosperity while billions of others were victim to
dire misfortunes'F". Patently, something had to be done. The necessary "action", urged
Mbeki, required of global political leaders was that they should face up to the question
of ''whether universal human values have any place at all in the ordering of human
affairs,,291.
Mbeki then elaborated on the necessary connection between the completion of political
liberation and progression to the next phase, of economic liberation, contrasting
conduct within Africa's 'new bloc,292with that of the unreconstructed rump. "Clearly,
he declared, "any among us who is preoccupied with denying his or her people their
democratic and human rights, who is fixated on waging wars against others, who is too
busy looting the public coffers or who thinks that he or she must bow in supplication
for charity to those whose wealth sets them aside as the mighty, will not have the time
to participate in meeting this historic challenge".
(Date accessed: 13October 2001)
290 Mbeki referred with approval to the writer in the London Financial Times in June 1998, who had
commented on the emerging markets crisis as follows:
'At present the west, in general, and the US, in particular, seem blessed even by the dire misfortunes
of others. But the stability of this world of divided fates is doubtful - economically and ultimately
politically. Either sustained prosperity in the west will help bring stability and renewed growth to
Asia and elsewhere, or the spreading crisis is all too likely to export instability to the west. Today's
western complacency could tomorrow look mere vainglory.' (FT: June 13/14, 1998)
291 Mbeki, addressing the 54th Session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York a few days
later on 20 September 1999, reiterated his earlier calls for a truly international undertaking to extend
the application the full range of human rights standards. In doing so, he utilised the opportunity to
echo the catholic (i.e. political and economic) focus of his African renaissance vision:
'The Charter of this Organisation and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provided all of us
with the vision towards which we should strive', he said. 'The time had come to take determined
measures to ensure that the values expressed by these words informed what actually happened in the
common world we all share. There was a need to work together to reconstruct human society in a
manner consistent with the perspective of which they spoke. The central message they contained
was', he said, 'expressed in the words of the Declaration of Human Rights:
, ...the peoples of the United Nations have in the Charter reaffirmed their faith in fundamental human
rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person and in the equal rights of men and women and
have determined to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom."
292 Dan Connell and Frank Smyth 'Africa's new bloc' Foreign Affairs March/April (1998) Vol.
77 No.2, 80-94
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Subsequently, during his Chairperson's address to the Non-Aligned Movement's
Ministerial Meeting at the United Nations in New York on 23 September 1999293,
Mbeki noted that the largest number of intra- and inter-state violent conflicts and wars
were within NAM. This had resulted in millions of refugees and displaced persons. He
questioned whether the time was not now appropriate to prevent and manage these
conflicts so as to spare their people the horrendous consequences of instability and war.
Were NAM members ready, he asked, to "assist each other, learn from one another and
act together to end tension and resolve conflicts?" Or did they "deliberately deny
[themselves] the possibility of sharing these problems with one another by asserting
[their] state [i.e. political] sovereignty?"
Everyone who viewed the Non-Aligned Movement as "the repository of democracy,
human rights, good governance and the sovereign voice of the poor of the world" must
also see the Movement as "a serious instrument for the transformation of a world driven
by the process of globalisation". It was, he asserted, therefore necessary for NAM to
examine itself to see whether the way it was organised and worked as a Movement, and
the way its members co-operated, were such that it was able to meet these challenges
and opportunities. Mbeki, again, was playing the role of the prophet in the wilderness,
rather than the leader of a triumphant army emerging from the trenches; a teacher and
encourager, rather than a sergeant major.
Addressing the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs294, President Thabo Mbeki re-
stated the central position of democratic forms of governance to the Renaissance vision.
The new wave of African leaders viewed democracy as "a vital element of the
humanisation process" he declared. Re-emphasising the relevance of human rights to
daily life, Mbeki criticised the loss of democratic power in many African countries that
293 www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/histozy/mbeki/1999/indexlhtml (Date accessed: 13 October2001)
294 Address to the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Abuja, 3 October 2000:
'Democracy and Renaissance in Africa: In search of an enduring Pax Africana' -
www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/histozy/mbeki/2000/indexlhtml (Date accessed: 13 October 2001)
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had led to the people "being pre-occupied with a hand-to-mouth existence, the difficult
struggle to survive".
The argument of cause and effect could be reversed, however, urged Mbeki295."It is
important that all of us", he continued, " ... build an Africa that shares a common vision
for a more human, caring society freed of dictatorship, warfare and military upheavals,
where there is a desire among all that the conflicts that will [i.e. 'inevitably,
unfortunately'?] exist will be resolved peacefully. At the same time, for our people to
have the space to participate in the processes of the renaissance, they must live in
conditions of peace and stability throughout the continent,,296.
Mbeki quoted with approval John Stremlau, an American scholar at the University of
the Witwatersrand who, in his essay African Renaissance and International Relations,
had this to say:
'None of the political disasters afflicting African in recent years were inevitable, nor do
any more have to be. Surmounting the legacies of colonialism remains a complex
challenge for many communities, but at least no future imperial threats loom. Resolving
current crises and preventing new ones will require much broader and deeper forms of
intra-African co-operation.
295 The principle of the indivisibility and interdependence of all human rights accords with the modern
trend in international human rights law. See Sandra Liebenberg 'The International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and its implications for South Africa' (1995) 11 SA Journal on
Human Rights 359-378 at 374.
296 Mbeki has returned repeatedly to this form of words or exhortation, for example, in a statement at the
African Renaissance Conference in Johannesburg on 28 September 1998. He expressed support for
the people of Nigeria in the similar challenges they faced, having taken their first important
democratic step away from military rule, corruption and the abuse of power. He indicated his
approval of "a system of governance that successfully addresses the challenges of a multi-cultural and
multi-ethnic society and an equitable system of sharing resources, for a path of economic growth and
development which benefits the people and reinforces the independence of Nigeria. Any progress
made on all these issues would be of great benefit not only to Nigeria."
Similarly, just as that "enemy to progressive change represented by ethnic divisions and
antagonisms" could not be avoided, so the people of the Democratic Republic of Congo could not do
without that process of fundamental transformation in the interests of the people, which constituted
"the core of the vision of an African Renaissance".
www.anc.org.za!ancdocslhistory/mbeki/1998/indexlhtml (Date accessed: 13 October 2001)
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'If successful, an African renaissance will finally bring an enduring pax africana and
the promise of evolving political frameworks that will allow the continent's rich
cultural diversity to flourish. Only then can inescapable forces of economic and
technological globalisation be managed and eventually turned to advantage at all levels
of African society.'
Mbeki expressed his concurrence that "one of the most important challenges facing
Africa today is to achieve a comprehensive and sustained peace and to ensure an
enduring pax africana, "for [both] democracy and sustained development [are] possible
only in conditions of peace and stability."
5.2.9 Mbeki's leadership team
This conviction, shared by other African leaders, has led to the progressive
development and frequent adaptation of a proposed 'Marshall Plan' for the African
continent. Foremost among the continent's leadership involved in transforming the
vision into an implementabie plan have been Mbeki, Nigeria's democratically-elected,
reformed military dictator, President Olusegun Obasanjo, Algeria's electoral 'thief,
President Abdelaziz Bouteflika, and President Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal.
Termed, variously, the MAP/Omega Plan, NAI and, most recently, NEPAD297, the plan
pledges implementation of, or requires, the following pre-conditions for sustainable
growth and development:
- peace and security
- democracy and good political governance
- sound economic and corporate governance
- infrastructure development
- improved access to developed-country markets
291 Business Report 26 October 2001 'Africa called to clean house', Quentin Wray. See also 'Plan for
African renaissance launched today', Cape Times 23 October 200 1, Reuters, and 'European leaders
welcome African initiative', The Star Il October 2001, Sapa-AFP
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The plan was adopted in July 2001 by a summit of the 53-member Organisation of
African Unity, which is to be transformed over the period of a year into a broader
entity, the African Union.
Addressing the World Economic Forum meeting in Davos, Switzerland, on 28 January
2001298, Mbeki described the then-MAP programme as a declaration of "a firm
commitment by African leaders to take ownership and responsibility for the sustainable
economic development of the continent". Their starting point was a critical examination
of Africa's post-independence experience and an acceptance that things had to be done
differently in order to achieve meaningful socio-economic progress, without which it
would not be easy to achieve their historic task of improving the lives of their people.
Their programme contained, said Mbeki, "a vision, perspective and the outlines of a
plan for the redevelopment of Africa". It clarified the objectives [of the African
renaissance vision] and the approach to development projects that were going to be
appraised, further developed and negotiated with their partners in Africa and the rest of
the world during the succeeding few months. They had developed the outlines of a
concrete programme of action that was multi-faceted and the priority areas it would
cover included creating peace, security and stability, and democratic governance,
without which it would be impossible to engage in meaningful economic activicy299.
298 'Millennium Africa Renaissance Programme - Implementation Issues'
www.anc.org.za/ancdocslhistory/mbeki/2001lindexlhtml (Date accessed: 13 October2001)
299 Oth ...er priorities are:
- Investing in Africa's people through a comprehensive human resource strategy;
- Harnessing and developing Africa's strategic and comparative advantages in the resource-based
sectors to lead the development of an industrial strategy;
- Increasing investments in the information and communication technology sector, without which
Africa would not be able to bridge the digital divide;
- Development of infrastructure, including transport and energy; and
- Developing financing mechanisms.
For a range of complex reasons, MAP's leadership conceded, African countries (with a few notable
exceptions) had ''weak states". An essential step in the implementation of the programme would,
therefore, be to strengthen the capacity of these states. There was a need to create a 'continent-wide'
programme to develop this capacity with the support of developed countries, the private sector and
multilateral institutions. The focus of the programme was not increased aid, but increased
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The overarching objective was the "acceleration of efforts to eradicate poverty on the
continent" and to significantly increase new investments by mobilising both domestic
and especially foreign savings. Participation would be limited to African leaders
committing themselves to a Compact, while a Forum of Leaders would make decisions
about sub-programmes and initiatives and review progress on its implementation.
Regarding issues of democracy and human rights, African governments were already
working together on conflict prevention and resolution, he said. He again referred to the
"firm resolution" taken by the Organisation of African Unity to "discourage"
usurpation of power and military coups and to "concrete action" taken to resolve
conflicts in many parts of the contineneoo.
investments in viable infrastructure and business opportunities. Targeted aid and technical support to
address capacity constraints and urgent human development priorities would, however, also be
required.
MAP proposed a 'Global Partnership' for Africa's development and inclusion in the world. This
posed "a challenge and an opportunity to all countries of the world. The continued marginalisation of
Africa from the globalisation process, and the social exclusion of the vast majority of [its] people
constitute[-d] a serious threat to global social stability".
300 Again, 'concrete action to discourage' seems to mean little more 'than a euphemism for quiet
diplomacy.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
185
CHAPTER SIX: THE NEED FOR A REASSESSMENT OF
THE DEMANDS OF THE RENAISSANCE VISION
This paper has attempted to argue that the essential raw material exists for an
improvement in the human rights climate on the African continent. The international
legal framework is in place and there exist myriad examples of workable domestic or
national interpretations and applications of the ingredients of that edifice. African states
have acquired their independence from colonial oppression and exploitation and the
number of African democracies is growing. A consensus is slowly emerging among the
continental leadership that democracy is what their peoples need for contentment,
stability and economic growth. It is not merely a concept that the 'West' uses as a tool
with which to discriminate against African countries for the sake of colonial-era
resentments. The trend to African adoption of international norms and standards in the
field of governance has accelerated despite lingering appeals to the exclusive nature of
indigenous African traditions. Increasingly, common ground is being recognised
between the two historical traditions. Differences in emphasis need not become
differences of principle. Through the pain and mistrust of the imperial era, an
understanding is growing of an essential mutuality of interests and values.
The realisation of Africa's feared marginalisation will only perpetuate the ability of its
undemocratic leaders to successfully appeal to 'indigenous' values to the exclusion of
alien 'Western' norms. These indigenous values, while not necessarily in themselves all
immoral or unethical, are impractical and incompatible with any attempt at a successful
modem state. Any supposed distinction between these values and those increasingly
part of broader international understanding is far easier to assert and deploy in the
continued absence of the plethora of cross-cutting interpersonal ties that typify modem
international society. In a world where knowledge is power, individual knowledge must
be extended beyond self-serving élites in order for it to serve democratic ends. The
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reasoning behind Mbeki's emphasis on connecting Africa to the digital revolution
becomes clear given this core element of the irresistible forces of globalisation.
This convergence of understanding regarding values has taken place at the same time as
(and, possibly, because) the demise of the Cold War revived hopes for greater
consensus on matters of human rights. In reaction to the brutal consequences of the
selfish exploitation of 'realism', a resurgence of idealist natural law theories of
international relations and democratic governance has been evident. The subsequent
announcement of a vision of an Africa reborn seemed to give added impetus to these
idealistic hopes of a New World Order. The Renaissance vision as expounded by
President Thabo Mbeki was enthusiastically greeted as offering some hope that these
values may assume centre-stage importance in the 'African century'.
Consequently, the vision of an African Renaissance, and MAP/Omega/NAIINEPAD,
clearly requiring Africa to take responsibility for its failures and for implementing
solutions, inspired significant optimism concerning developments on the continent. Ex-
President Nelson Mandela's stance concerning Nigeria only served to increase that
optimism. South Africa's second President, Thabo Mbeki, has called upon Africans to
identify and defme their problems and to recognise their existence, in order to seek
partnerships to eradicate or, at least, overcome them.
In doing so, however, a 'brown' or developmental rights agenda seems to have received
most attention from his office. While this focus is recognised as necessary and, indeed,
vital to the future of Africa, in practice it frequently seems to be emphasised at the
expense of a vital simultaneous - and practical - emphasis on the other rights in the
spectrum, especially the 'blue' rights that underpin democratic governance. When the
two agendas are not pursued exclusively of each other, the value of continental and,
more especially, sub-Saharan solidarity is interposed in order to temper any criticism
that may be voiced against undemocratic practices. This tendency has evoked sighs of
frustration, disappointment and even exasperation at times.
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On the other hand, the contribution and benefit of the value of brotherhood or ubuntu
may be too readily ignored. It does, at least, have the positive effect of not closing
down channels of communication. One is reminded also of John Stuart Mill's
conclusions concerning the vital necessity of domestic readiness to best appropriate any
assistance arising from external intervention. If one accepts Mill's thesis, then the
possibility exists that Mbeki's approach may, in fact, be the most appropriate in the
circumstances. He may indeed be deliberately avoiding overt and direct confrontation
and challenge with leadership perceived to be 'out of line' with democratic trends,
choosing to focus instead on a policy of 'educating' and 'encouraging' domestic
populations to object to current experiences of some form of rights deprivation. This
may be the longer, but more sustainable, route to follow. It may be worth recalling that
Aesop's tortoise did, ultimately, defeat the hare.
Indeed, time has bred caution and a realisation that, if Africa is to offer something new,
it may well be some while in gestation. In fact, the attainment of the vision of the
African Renaissance is explicitly stated by its exponents to be partly dependent upon
the realisation of greater levels of global, continental and domestic 'justice'. It appears,
then, that Africa's renaissance may well be an essentially long-term journey with a
broad vision.
While exegesis and assessment of the vision remain immature, it is reasonable to
conclude that President Mbeki has been well advised concerning the caution with
which African leaders continue to approach the matter of human rights promotion and
protection. National sovereignty is difficult to surrender in a world of weak allies and
strong competitors (or, in the eyes of some, 'exploiters'). The announcement of the
rebirth of the continent does not, at least in this respect, herald any significant or
immediate departure from the hesitantly-breached confidential style of the OAV.
Indeed, there has been no 'Damascus road' conversion for African leadership as a
group. As President Mbeki has been at pains to explain, the Renaissance is no new
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phenomenon: it has been under way at least since Ghana became the continent's first
celebrant of freedom from the colonial yoke. The inclusion in the African Charter of
legal and political rights and moral obligations presented Africa with a unique
opportunity to make a signal contribution to the resurgence of natural law theories in
public international law and international relations. However, the opportunity has yet to
bear much of the promised fruit.
Thus, the mediation of the Renaissance vision through South African foreign policy
suggests that a sober reckoning has been undertaken concerning the complexity and
duration of the task of turning the ship around. Mbeki has, consequently, adopted a
non-confrontational consensus-building process, thereby ensuring that as many African
leaders as possible 'buy in' to the vision and its programme of implementation. While
time-consuming, it may at least produce a solidly grounded policy approach to the
amelioration of the continent's ills.
While, therefore, South African foreign policy initially prompted idealistic projections
arising from the supposed occupation of the 'moral high ground' following the
'democratic miracle' of 1994, it may now be described as more firmly rooted in a
'realist' understanding of the primary need for committed and dependable allies. The
South African government has shown itself sensitive to allegations of hegemonic
aspirations. It has, for this reason, developed a strong 'Afro-centric' or 'South-centric'
plank in its Renaissance platform that has, on occasion, led to the adoption of certain
questionable positions.
Consequently, South Africa's relative economic strength on the African continent led to
an initial perception of its power not always matched by its subsequent willingness to
deploy that power in either a military form or, even, in a unilateral political mode. Its
potentially influential political and diplomatic role since the advent of the process of
democratic transformation has been tempered by its more cautious emphasis on
solidarity among sovereign states.
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It has been argued that "Africa's future success lies in a combination of the need for
expertise, good, democratic and transparent governance, and capital,,301. One avenue
leading to this goal is through the establishment of strategic alliances and patterns of
practical co-operation between African states themselves, ideally within existing
regional economic and security structuresi'". This appears to be the prescription
currently proposed by NEPAD. But it is submitted that another equally immediate need
is to actively 'encourage' informed and sensitive domestic governments, an imperative
that requires, among other things, a shift in policy focus and lending practice by
multilateral institutions such as the United Nations-system bodies, and the national and
international financial agencies.
Also required, it is suggested, is a more realistic - and courageous - assessment of the
full range of practical implications of the call to 'encourage courage' by the
'democratic rebels' lauded by Mbeki, as well as appropriate support methodologies.
Such 'rebellions', or resistance, even if peaceably begun, notoriously do not necessarily
elicit a non-violent response by an undemocratic state apparatus. Consequently,
something more than a uni-dimensional foreign policy or multilateral strategy is
required. The poverty of a one-track foreign policy is starkly illustrated in the failure of
SADC to 'encourage' Mugabe to reconsider his chosen path to re-election. Even Mbeki
has acknowledged that political violence will not simply be wished away.
What remains absent, therefore, and not only in Africa it must be emphasised, is an
urgent appreciation of the fundamental primacy of the value of human life. Arising
from this deficiency is the widespread policy failure to recognise the cardinal value of
the protection of human rights or, more directly and personally phrased, the protection
of human beings. The consequence of this intellectual and moral omission is policy
301 PT Mathoma 'Foreword' in Mathoma et al. Putting People First op. cit. at p xii
302 For discussion of these issues, see Hussein Solomon and Maxi van Aardt (eds.) 'Caring' security in
Africa op. cit.; Mark Malan SADe and sub-regional security: unde venis et quo vadis? op. cit.; Jakkie
Cilliers Building security in Southern Africa: an update on the evolving architecture op. cit.; Jakkie
Cilliers and Annika Hilding-Norberg (eds.) Building stability in Africa: challenges for the new
millennium op. cit.
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confusion over the appropriate policy tools to utilise when undemocratic regimes
seriously infringe acceptable norms and standards of humanitarian decency. And the
fruit of this confusion is the continuation of mistrust and accusations of double
standards. Hence, the 'brave new world' of the principled use of armed humanitarian
intervention to halt large-scale human rights abuses has remained only sporadically
evident.
Analysts like Mark Malan of the Institute for Security Studies and Richard N. Haass
have written extensively and authoritatively on the complex philosophical and practical
problems facing attempts to keep and make peace, in Africa and elsewhere'i". They
have shown that traditional diplomatic and military approaches to the prevention of
intrastate conflicts (the type of conflict that constitutes both the main threat to human
rights-norm observance, and the frequent consequence of failure to do so), have proven
inadequate.
However, even Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the United Nations Secretary General who
consequently introduced the concept of 'peace enforcement' has been unable to define
it. The UN itself, moreover, has proven signally incapable of effective response to the
imperative of intervention in 'failed states in the throes of civil war,304 in order to
contain or halt the gross human rights abuses that frequently characterise failing states.
As the authorities gradually lose whatever respect and control they once enjoyed, a
creeping anarchy emerges that defies simple, clear characterisation as a 'crisis'
warranting and justifying some form of direct, forceful intervention.
303 See, for example, Mark Malan: (a) 'The principle of non-interference and the future of multinational
intervention in Africa' op. cit.; (b) 'Keeping the peace in the neighbourhood and abroad' op. cit.; and
(c) "Peace enforcement': the real peace support challenge in Africa' op. cit. See also Emmanuel
Kwesi Aning 'War and peace: Dilemmas of multilateral intervention in civil wars' African Security
Review Vol. 9 No.3 2000, 19-33; Richard N. Haass Intervention op. cit; and Pierre du Toit
'Peacebuilding in Africa: prospects for security and democracy beyond the state' African Security
Review Vol. 8 No.1 1999, 11-19
304 'Peace enforcement' ibid at 11
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Malan has argued that this inability stems partly from the fact that "multinational
interventions continue to be based on the peacekeeping principles of impartiality,
consent, and the non-use of force except in self-defence - principles which are tenuous
in the midst of the turmoil of intrastate conflicts". The "politically correct" school
"continues with its fixation on Chapter VI [of the UN Charter which provides for the
pacific settlement of disputes] and its reluctance to seriously consider how to make
peace enforcement work,,305. Consequently, most national doctrines on forceful
interventions in the cause of peace or human rights "continue to amount to a counsel of
inaction bordering on paralysis,,306, says Malan. The anti-intervention argument is
founded upon pragmatism, emphasising what is perceived to be possible and effective
in usually complex emergencies, rather than what is right.
There exists, however, "a minority viewpoint which is less concerned with the risks
involved and more concerned with humanity" and "based on ethics. In an humanitarian
emergency, it is morally reprehensible", says Malan, "to stand by and do nothing, even
if the only way to intervene effectively requires lethal force,,307.The answer, argues
Malan, is clearly to unify these perspectives by "focusing on what is both right and
effective,,308.
Consequently, it is submitted, it ought now finally to be recognised that it has been
placed beyond debate that the internal violation of human rights is legitimately a matter
of international concern. This is affirmed by the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights and even the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights.
Moreover, the principle of 'humanity' as codified in, particularly, international
humanitarian law and practice, demands that people are treated humanely in all
305 ibid at 13
306 ibid. at 15
307 This viewpoint is represented by such as Sir Brian Urquhart, who has made a great contribution to
'classical' UN peacekeeping.
308 However, for Malan, the strongest practical argument for attempting to develop a viable peace
enforcement doctrine is the fact that such operations 'have been and will continue to be conducted' in
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circumstances, and that everything possible is done to alleviate human suffering and to
ensure respect for the individual. These considerations should, therefore, form the
departure point for the development of international and regional capacity for peace
enforcemenrf" .
Malan refers to the obvious but fundamental general principle of conflict resolution
identified by the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda report, i.e. that
"respect for international law and norms will tend to diminish conflict, whereas
violations will tend to stoke it,,3!o.The simple and fundamental point he makes is that
respect for the law tends to encourage more of the same, and vice versa. The 'Rwanda
Report' continues to indict the violation of "international law and associated principles"
and the failure to act upon the "legal right and moral obligation to intervene in order to
stop the genocide".
It is, therefore, submitted that the reluctance of governments to act in circumstances
where they do not perceive their direct national interests to be affected, where
appropriate national laws either do not exist, or where the rule of law has disintegrated,
must be counterbalanced by Security Council action. In Africa, where developed
countries are signalling their growing reluctance to become involved in areas and issues
of which they have limited understanding'!', the African Union must, of necessity, also
a wide range of circumstances by many different parties and agents. The issue is not going to go
away. See also Christopher M Ryan 'Sovereignty, Intervention and the Lawop. cit. 77ff.
309 J 0 C Jonah 'Developing a United Nations capacity for humanitarian support operations' in L
Gordenker and T G Weiss (eds.) Soldiers, peacekeepers and disasters MacmillanIInternational Peace
Academy, London, 1991, cited in Malan ibid
310 H Adelman and A Suhrke 'The international response to conflict and genocide: lessons from the
Rwanda experience' in Early Warning and Conflict Management (Study 2), Steering Committee of
the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, March 1996, at 71, cited in Malan ibid 16
311 Stephan Maninger "Heart of darkness: Western policy of non-interventionism in Africa" African
Security Review Vol. 8 No.6 1999,25-36, provides a particularly harsh and bleak explanation of the
supposed historically immutable marginalisation of the continent. Indeed, he characterises
decolonisation as 'less a successful freedom struggle on the part of Africans than a voluntary albeit
gradual withdrawal by colonisers' who had grown disillusioned with the prospects of the 'three Cs'
of 'Commerce, Christianity and Civilisation' taking root and flourishing. He describes a superstitious,
pathologically fragmented and tribalised continent founded upon familial loyalties and widely
dependent upon slavery for economic advancement inherently unsuitable to Western enlightenment
concepts such as the separation of powers, the rule of law and individual rights. He, thereby, savagely
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take up this challenge. Malan has pointed out, however, that recent Western efforts to
assist African countries to build capacity to participate in peace support operations have
focused on outmoded, traditional, standard UN peacekeeping doctrine - with all its
limitations in the circumstances facing the continenf12.
Malan and others have, consequently, endorsed peace enforcement as an appropriate
doctrine for dealing with current realities. In this scenario, and in accordance with the
legal principles contained in the sources of international law referred to above,
intervention is justified when it is a calculated, proportionate response (with reasonable
prospects of success) to actions that shock the conscience of ordinary men and women.
These limitations and provisos are central to the validity of the revisionist argument.
There is, therefore, no moral reason "to adopt that posture of passivity". Any state or,
preferably, any group of states, capable of stopping the slaughter has a right, at least, to
try to do so. The fact that the legalist paradigm excludes such efforts indicates only the
inadequacy of the paradigm to account for moral realities.
Its antithesis, the revisionist paradigm, may be summarised as follows: States may be
invaded and wars justly begun to assist secessionist movements (once they have
demonstrated their representivity), to balance the earlier interventions of other states,
and to rescue peoples threatened with massacre. In each of these instances, the society
of states should permit or, ex post facto, either praise or decline to condemn, these
'violations' of the formal rules of sovereignty, on the grounds that they uphold the
undermines optimistic forecasts of democratisation and sustainable economic growth based on a
newly-discovered work ethic.
Perspectives such as Maninger's of the African continent as the so-called 'heart of darkness', may
give rise to a query concerning the significance of President Thabo Mbeki's comment at the launch of
the African Renaissance Institute in Pretoria on Il October 1999. On that occasion, Mbeki apparently
endorsed a 'superstitious' worldview when he said that "[t]he only ailment that has no cure is the
spawn of a curse".
312 One may find some connection, if not an entire explanation, between this deficiency and the general
lack of enthusiasm exhibited by African countries for the idea of the creation of a joint armed
humanitarian intervention force.
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values of individual life and communal liberty. Sovereignty is merely an expression of
these fundamental values and, ultimately, derived from them.
It is sometimes argued that it would safer to insist on an absolute rule of non-
intervention because of the frequent disregard of these riders. Similarly, however, the
strict rule may also be ignored, and we are then left with no criteria to judge what will
happen next. In any event, we do possess 'valuable', in the sense of value-laden,
standards in the form of internationally binding legal commitments to human rights.
Rather be guided by these, one would suggest, than by a cold neutrality. After all,
neutrality, or a stance in favour of strict non-intervention, amounts to the same thing as
intervention, this time in favour of the status quo, as Talleyrand has averred.
It is important to understand, nevertheless, that the African renaissance vision as
articulated and implemented thus far is, as yet, in its early incarnations. The vision may
not yet be firmly established among its initial adherents. Nor may there yet be a full
appreciation of its consequent demands. Although this may be disappointing for the
idealists, it is perhaps therefore too soon to expect the necessary broad acceptance of
the centrality of the need to overtly establish a multilateral organ/mechanism for
humanitarian intervention. One suspects that the political will to establish and utilise it
may emerge only if and when demanded by the democratised, educated and 'activist'
electorate both envisaged and required by the African Renaissance vision. In that sense,
at least, the proponents of the vision are correct when they assert that the future of
Africa is in its own hands.
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